Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Of Civil Liberty', 'Anarchical Fallacies: on the Declaration of Rights' and 'Minds, Brains and Science'

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6 ideas

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room

2427	Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers]
	Full Idea: Searle originally directed the Chinese Room against machine intentionality rather than consciousness, arguing that it is "understanding" that the room lacks,….but on Searle's view intentionality requires consciousness.
	From: report of John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by David J.Chalmers - The Conscious Mind 4.9.4
	A reaction: I doubt whether 'understanding' is a sufficiently clear and distinct concept to support Searle's claim. Understanding comes in degrees, and we often think and act with minimal understanding.

7389	A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle]
	Full Idea: There is nothing remotely like genuine understanding in any hunk of programming small enough to imagine readily.
	From: comment on John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 14.1
	A reaction: We mustn't hide behind 'complexity', but I think Dennett is right. It is important to think of speed as well as complexity. Searle gives the impression that he knows exactly what 'understanding' is, but I doubt if anyone else does.

7390	If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle]
	Full Idea: The argument that begins "this little bit of brain activity doesn't understand Chinese, and neither does this bigger bit..." is headed for the unwanted conclusion that even the activity of the whole brain won't account for understanding Chinese.
	From: comment on John Searle (Minds, Brains and Science [1984]) by Daniel C. Dennett - Consciousness Explained 14.1
	A reaction: In other words, Searle is guilty of a fallacy of composition (in negative form - parts don't have it, so whole can't have it). Dennett is right. The whole shebang of the full brain will obviously do wonderful (and commonplace) things brain bits can't.

24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights

20977	Natural rights are nonsense, and unspecified natural rights is nonsense on stilts [Bentham]
	Full Idea: Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense — nonsense upon stilts.
	From: Jeremy Bentham (Anarchical Fallacies: on the Declaration of Rights [1796])
	A reaction: If you want your opinion to be remembered, express it memorably! I take natural rights to be the basic principles and values which are obvious to almost everyone when they come for formulate legal rights (which are the only true rights).

24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy

21097	Modern monarchies are (like republics) rule by law, rather than by men [Hume]
	Full Idea: In modern times monarchical government seems to have made the greatest advances towards perfection. It may now be affirmed of civilized monarchies, what was formerly said in praise of republics alone, that they are a government of laws, not of men.
	From: David Hume (Of Civil Liberty [1750], p.54)
	A reaction: Dreams of simple 'government by law' disappeared with the rise of modern media, which can be controlled by wealth.

25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights

21003	Only laws can produce real rights; rights from 'law of nature' are imaginary [Bentham]
	Full Idea: Right, the substantive right, is the child of law; from real laws come real rights; but from imaginary laws, from 'law of nature' can come only imaginary rights.
	From: Jeremy Bentham (Anarchical Fallacies: on the Declaration of Rights [1796], II.523), quoted by Amartya Sen - The Idea of Justice 17 'Ethics'
	A reaction: I am coming to agree with this. What are called 'natural rights' are just self-evident good reasons why someone should be allowed a right. A right can, of course, come from an informal agreement. The question is: why award that particular legal right?