42 ideas
9376 | A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: It doesn't follow from the fact that a given sentence is being used to implicitly define one of its ingredient terms, that it is not a factual statement. 'This stick is a meter long at t' may define an ingredient terms and express something factual. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
A reaction: This looks like a rather good point, but it is tied in with a difficulty about definition, which is deciding which sentences are using a term, and which ones are defining it. If I say 'this stick in Paris is a meter long', I'm not defining it. |
9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: Conventualism is a factualist view: it presupposes that sentences of logic have truth values. It differs from a realist view in its conception of the source of those truth values, not on their existence. I call the denial of truths Non-Factualism. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
A reaction: It barely seems to count as truth is we say 'p is true because we say so'. It is a truth about an agreement, not a truth about logic. Driving on the left isn't a truth about which side of the road is best. |
2730 | Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: Taking the proposition that gold is malleable to be necessary does not commit one to considering it analytic. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.116) |
2715 | Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: The four basic kinds of belief are rooted in perception, memory, introspective consciousness, and reason. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], Intr.p.7) |
2735 | Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: Could one have just a single belief? | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.198) |
2736 | We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: The possibility of making certain of what we already know suggests that knowing a proposition does not entail its being certain. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.220) |
2721 | If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: If you imagine subtracting a book's sensory properties one by one, what is left of it? | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.42) |
2722 | Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: Where the sense-datum theory is an indirect realism, phenomenalism is a direct irrealism. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.43) |
9369 | 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: Isn't it overwhelmingly obvious that 'Either snow is white or it isn't' was true before anyone stipulated a meaning for it, and that it would have been true even if no one had thought about it, or chosen it to be expressed by one of our sentences? | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §I) | |
A reaction: Boghossian would have to believe in propositions (unexpressed truths) to hold this - which he does. I take the notion of truth to only have relevance when there are minds around. Otherwise the so-called 'truths' are just the facts. |
9367 | The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: The central impetus behind the analytic explanation of the a priori is a desire to explain the possibility of a priori knowledge without having to postulate a special evidence-gathering faculty of intuition. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §I) | |
A reaction: I don't see at all why one has to postulate a 'faculty' in order to talk about intuition. I take an intuition to be an apprehension of a probable truth, combined with an inability to articulate how the conclusion was arrived at. |
9373 | That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: The analytic theory of the apriority of logic arose indirectly, as a by-product of the attempt to explain in what a grasp of the meaning of the logical constants consists. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
A reaction: Preumably he is referring to Wittgenstein's anguish over the meaning of the word 'not' in his World War I notebooks. He first defined the constants by truth tables, then asserted that they were purely conventional - so logic is conventional. |
9380 | We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: If there is no sentence I must hold true if it is to mean what it does, then there is no basis on which to argue that I am entitled to hold it true without evidence. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
A reaction: He is exploring Quine's view. Truth by convention depends on agreeing which part of the usage of a term constitutes its defining sentence(s), and that may be rather tricky. Boghossian says this slides into the 'dreaded indeterminacy of meaning'. |
2727 | Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: The proposition that nothing is red and green all over at once is not analytic, but it is rationally graspable, so it seems to be an a priori synthetic proposition. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.100) |
2728 | The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: I may well need experience to acquire the concepts needed for knowledge of the a priori, such as the concept of a colour. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.103) |
9384 | We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: It is consistent with a belief's being a priori in the strong sense that we should have pragmatic reasons for dropping it from our best overall theory. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], n 6) | |
A reaction: Does 'dropping it' from the theory mean just ignoring it, or actually denying it? C.I. Lewis is the ancestor of this view. Could it be our 'best' theory, while conflicting with beliefs that were strongly a priori? Pragmatism can embrace falsehoods. |
2716 | To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: The propositional belief which portrays what I see in front of me AS a field requires my having a concept of one. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.17) | |
A reaction: To me this immediately invites the question of what a cow or horse experiences when they look at a familiar field. They know how to leave and enter it, and register its boundaries and qualities. Concepts? |
2717 | How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.20) |
2719 | Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: A sense-datum theory might be called a representative realism because it conceives perception as a relation in which sense-data represent perceived external (hence real) objects to us. For Locke they were resemblances only of primary qualities. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.33) |
2720 | Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: The sense-datum theory is mainly to explain hallucinations and illusions, though there might be other theories, such as the 'adverbial' theory. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.36) |
2718 | Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: Simple perceiving gives rise to objectual perceiving (attaching concepts to the object), which gives rise to propositional perceiving. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.23) |
2729 | Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: Rationalists virtually always assert or imply that, in addition to knowledge of analytic truths, there is knowledge of synthetic a priori truths. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.105) |
2741 | The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: The crucial principles of justification are a priori. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], X p.311) |
9374 | If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: If we learn geometrical truths by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
A reaction: This refers to the development of non-Euclidean geometries, though the main misleading concerns parallels, which involves infinity. Boghossian cites 'distance' as a concept the Euclideans had misunderstood. Why shouldn't intuitions be wrong? |
2725 | To remember something is to know it [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: Remembering something is so entails knowing that it is so. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], II p.68) | |
A reaction: Clearly I can say I "remember" x, but be wrong. Presumably we then say that I didn't really remember, which requires success, like "I know". It is true (as with "know") that as soon as I say that the something is false, I can't claim to remember it. |
2724 | I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: If I can neither recall nor image Jane I can still remember her, for on seeing her I might recognise her, and might remember, and even recall, our last meeting. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], II p.66) | |
A reaction: Hm. I can hardly claim to remember her if I have no concept of her, and don't recall our last meeting. If seeing her triggers recognition, I would say that I NOW remember her, but I didn't before. Memory is more conscious than Audi claims. |
2731 | Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: There are four possible kinds of epistemic chain: infinite and unanchored, circular and unanchored, anchored in a belief which is not knowledge, and anchored in a belief which is bedrock knowledge. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.183) | |
A reaction: About right, though I don't think 'chain' is the right word for what is proposed if justification is to be coherent. The justifications float like lilies in the pond of reason, and a Self (Monet?) seems needed to assess the picture |
2739 | Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: Internalists about justification tend to conceive of it as a matter of having a right to believe something. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.234) | |
A reaction: I'm an internalist, but I don't understand this, unless it refers to the social aspect of justification. Can I grant myself internal rights? I can justify my belief to other people. |
2732 | Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: That 7+5=12 and that carrots are nourishing are mutually consistent, but do not exhibit coherence. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.192) | |
A reaction: This shows how difficult it would be to define 'coherent'. Is 'carrots are nourishing' coherent with 'fish are nourishing'? Is the battle of Hastings coherent with the battle of Waterloo? |
2733 | It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: It is very difficult to specify when an explanatory relation generates enough coherence to create justification. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.193) | |
A reaction: I take coherence to be the key concept in epistemology, and quite impossible to define. This is why the 'space of reasons' is a useful concept. It is a courtroom, in which each case is different. |
2734 | A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: A schizophrenic who thinks he is Napoleon, if he has a completely consistent story with enough interlocking details, may have a belief system that is superbly coherent. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.194) | |
A reaction: This is an exaggeration, but the fact is that one isolated lie is totally coherent, so coherence can only emerge when a system is large. Sense experience must be central to coherence. |
2738 | Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: If someone consistently prophesied the winners of horse races, it appears that this man knows who will win the races, but surely he does not have justified beliefs as to who will win? | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.229) | |
A reaction: This is where internalists and externalists (notably reliabilists) sharply part company. IF a reliable clairvoyant appeared, we would eventually accept them as a knower. But they DON'T appear, because knowledge needs justification! |
2740 | A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: If one favours a reliability theory of knowledge (which is externalist) the correspondence theory of truth seems the most appropriate. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.243) | |
A reaction: Sounds right. Coherence implies some sort of internal assessment, whereas correspondence just needs to plugged into the facts. I like coherence justification and correspondence truth. |
2737 | 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: Reliabilism cannot specify how reliable a process must be before it grounds knowledge, and it cannot specify what is reliable in the first place. 'Reliable' may become circular, and may mean 'justified'. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.225) | |
A reaction: The first time you ever read an instrument, or talk to a stranger, you have no indication of reliability. Circularity looks like a big problem. Knowledge must precede reliability? |
2726 | We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R] |
Full Idea: We can have false beliefs, or some degree of ignorance, about our own mental lives. For example, about our own dispositions, such as not believing that we have a certain ignoble desire. | |
From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], III p.83) | |
A reaction: This idea, that we don't know ourselves, has become a commonplace of recent philosophy, but I am unconvinced. Mostly we know only too well that we harbour a base desire, and we feel a creeping sense of shame. Total ignorance is very rare. |
9378 | If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: Conceptual Role Semantics must explain what properties an inference or sentence involving a logical constant must have, if that inference or sentence is to be constitutive of its meaning. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
A reaction: This is my perennial request that if something is to be defined by its function (or role), we must try to explain what properties it has that make its function possible, and those properties will be the more basic explanation. |
9377 | 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: 'Conceptual role semantics' says the logical constants mean what they do by virtue of figuring in certain inferences and/or sentences involving them and not others, ..so some inferences and sentences are constitutive of an expression's meaning. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
A reaction: If the meaning of the terms derives from the sentences in which they figure, that seems to be meaning-as-use. The view that it depends on the inferences seems very different, and is a more interesting but more risky claim. |
9372 | Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: Could there be a fact of the matter about what each expression means, but no fact of the matter about whether they mean the same? | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §II) | |
A reaction: He is discussing Quine's attack on synonymy, and his scepticism about meaning. Boghossian and I believe in propositions, so we have no trouble with two statements having the same meaning. Denial of propositions breeds trouble. |
17721 | There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins] |
Full Idea: Boghossian distinguishes metaphysical analyticity (truth purely in virtue of meaning, debunked by Quine, he says) from epistemic analyticity (knowability purely in virtue of understanding - a notion in good standing). | |
From: report of Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996]) by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 2.4 | |
A reaction: [compressed] This fits with Jenkins's claim that we have a priori knowledge just through understanding and relating our concepts. She, however, rejects that idea that a priori is analytic. |
9368 | Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian] |
Full Idea: The epistemological notion of analyticity: a statement is 'true by virtue of meaning' provided that grasp of its meaning alone suffices for justified belief in its truth; the metaphysical reading is that it owes its truth to its meaning, not to facts. | |
From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §I) | |
A reaction: Kripke thinks it is neither, but is a purely semantic notion. How could grasp of meaning alone be a good justification if it wasn't meaning which was the sole cause of the statement's truth? I'm not convinced by his distinction. |
21093 | Friendship without community spirit misses out on the main part of virtue [Hume] |
Full Idea: A man who is only susceptible of friendship, without public spirit or a regard to the community, is deficient in the most material part of virtue. | |
From: David Hume (That Politics may be reduced to a Science [1750], p.21) | |
A reaction: I think this is aimed at the epicureans. If the highest virtues are focused on one's friends that can easily lead to injustice, because it can tolerate prejudice against people who are very unlike one's friends. |
21091 | It would be absurd if even a free constitution did not impose restraints, for the public good [Hume] |
Full Idea: A republican and free form of government would be an obvious absurdity, if the particular checks and controls, provided by the constitution, had really no influence, and made it not the interest, even of bad men, to act for the public good. | |
From: David Hume (That Politics may be reduced to a Science [1750], p.14) | |
A reaction: Presumably if you attain absolute power you can write any old constitution you like (Clause 1: the presidency is for life). But there does seem much point in doing it - unless it is to facilitate the use of the law for persecutions. |
21092 | Nobility either share in the power of the whole, or they compose the power of the whole [Hume] |
Full Idea: A nobility may possess power in two different ways. Either every nobleman shares the power as part of the whole body, or the whole body enjoys the power as composed of parts, which each have a distinct power and authority. | |
From: David Hume (That Politics may be reduced to a Science [1750], p.15) | |
A reaction: He says the first type is found in Venice, and is preferable to the second type, which is found in Poland. Presumably in the shared version there is some restraint on depraved nobles. The danger is each noble being an autocrat. |