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15797
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All structures are dispositional, objects are dispositions sets, and events manifest dispositions [Fetzer]
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Full Idea:
I propose a dispositional ontology for the physical world, according to which a) every structural property is a dispositional one, b) a physical object is an ordered set of dispositions, and c) every event manifests a dispositional property of the world.
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From:
J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], Intro)
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A reaction:
Mumford says this is consistent with ontology as a way of describing the world, rather than being facts about the world. I like Fetzer's sketch, which sounds to have a lot in common with 'process philosophy'.
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20062
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If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong [Chisholm]
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Full Idea:
If someone wants to kill his uncle to inherit a fortune, and having this desire makes him so agitated that he loses control of his car and kills a pedestrian, who turns out to be his uncle, the conditions of the causal theory seem to be satisfied.
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From:
Roderick Chisholm (Freedom and Action [1966]), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 6 'Deviant'
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A reaction:
This line of argument has undermined all sorts of causal theories that were fashionable in the 1960s and 70s. Explanation should lead to understanding, but a deviant causal chain doesn't explain the outcome. The causal theory can be tightened.
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20054
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There has to be a brain event which is not caused by another event, but by the agent [Chisholm]
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Full Idea:
There must be some event A, presumably some cerebral event, which is not caused by any other event, but by the agent.
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From:
Roderick Chisholm (Freedom and Action [1966], p.20), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 4 'Agent'
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A reaction:
I'm afraid this thought strikes me as quaintly ridiculous. What kind of metaphysics can allow causation outside the natural nexus, yet occuring within the physical brain? This is a relic of religious dualism. Let it go.
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21091
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It would be absurd if even a free constitution did not impose restraints, for the public good [Hume]
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Full Idea:
A republican and free form of government would be an obvious absurdity, if the particular checks and controls, provided by the constitution, had really no influence, and made it not the interest, even of bad men, to act for the public good.
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From:
David Hume (That Politics may be reduced to a Science [1750], p.14)
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A reaction:
Presumably if you attain absolute power you can write any old constitution you like (Clause 1: the presidency is for life). But there does seem much point in doing it - unless it is to facilitate the use of the law for persecutions.
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21092
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Nobility either share in the power of the whole, or they compose the power of the whole [Hume]
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Full Idea:
A nobility may possess power in two different ways. Either every nobleman shares the power as part of the whole body, or the whole body enjoys the power as composed of parts, which each have a distinct power and authority.
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From:
David Hume (That Politics may be reduced to a Science [1750], p.15)
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A reaction:
He says the first type is found in Venice, and is preferable to the second type, which is found in Poland. Presumably in the shared version there is some restraint on depraved nobles. The danger is each noble being an autocrat.
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