4 ideas
| 8074 | There is a five shilling fine for each point of divergence from the thinking of Aristotle [Oxford Univ 1350] |
| Full Idea: Bachelors and Masters of Arts who do not follow Aristotle's philosophy are subject to a fine of five shillings for each point of divergence, as well as for infractions of the rules of the Organon. | |
| From: Oxford Univ 1350 (Oxford University Statutes [1350]), quoted by Keith Devlin - Goodbye Descartes Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: Lovely quotation! We may defend the medieval period as a genuinely philosophical age, but this sort of statement suggests otherwise, and shows what intellectual heroes the few independent thinkers like William of Ockham really were. |
| 14713 | Truth in a scenario is the negation in that scenario being a priori incoherent [Chalmers] |
| Full Idea: The epistemic 1-intension for a sentence S is True at a scenario W iff (W and not-S) is a priori incoherent. | |
| From: David J.Chalmers (Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics [2004], p.180-4), quoted by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics | |
| A reaction: See Two-Dimensional Semantics (in 'Language') and Chalmers for the background to this idea. I love the coherence view of justification, but get a bit nervous when people start defining truth in that way. |
| 14712 | A sentence is a priori if no possible way the world might actually be could make it false [Chalmers] |
| Full Idea: The Core Thesis for rationalist 2D semantics is that for any sentence S, S is apriori iff S has a necessary 1-intension. (That is, there is no possible way the world might be that, if it actually obtained, would make S false). | |
| From: David J.Chalmers (Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics [2004], p.165), quoted by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics 2.3.2 | |
| A reaction: [The parenthesis is by Schroeter] A '1-intension' is defined by a diagonal on a 2D semantic matrix. Chalmers defends conceivability as the guide to possibility. This is a very traditional view of the a priori, expressed in modern terms. |
| 3115 | Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal] |
| Full Idea: It is Burge's view that what a word means should be distinguished from the concept it expresses. | |
| From: report of Tyler Burge (Frege on Extensions from Concepts [1984]) by Gabriel M.A. Segal - A Slim Book about Narrow Content 3.2 | |
| A reaction: Presumably the immediate meaning (e.g. of 'arthritis') is socially determined, while the concept is fixed by history? Or what? |