19514
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Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards [DeRose]
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Full Idea:
The great rival to contextualism is classical 'invariantism' - invariantism about the truth-conditions [for knowing], combined with variable standards for warranted assertability.
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From:
Keith DeRose (The Case for Contextualism [2009], 1.12)
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A reaction:
That is, I take it, that we might want to assert that someone 'knows' something, when the truth is that they don't. That is, either you know or you don't, but we can bend the rules as to whether we say you know. I take this view to be false.
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19511
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If contextualism is about knowledge attribution, rather than knowledge, then it is philosophy of language [DeRose]
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Full Idea:
Maybe contextualism isn't a theory about knowledge at all, but about knowledge attributions. As such, it is not a piece of epistemology at all, but of philosophy of language.
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From:
Keith DeRose (The Case for Contextualism [2009], 1.7)
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A reaction:
DeRose takes this view to be wrong. At the very least this will have to include self-attributions, by the supposed knower, because I might say 'I know that p', meaning 'but only in this rather low-standard context'.
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18424
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If two people can have phenomenally identical experiences, they can't involve the self [Brogaard]
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Full Idea:
It is plausible that you and I can have perceptual experiences with the same phenomenology of two trees at different distances from us (perhaps at different times). ..So our perceptual experiences cannot contain you or me in the content of representation.
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From:
Berit Brogaard (Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth [2009], p.223), quoted by Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh - The Inessential Indexical 08.2
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A reaction:
If you accept the example, which seems reasonable, then that pretty conclusively shows that perception is not inherently indexical.
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14080
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Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
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Full Idea:
Kaplan notes that the causal theory of reference can be understood in two quite different ways, as part of the semantics (involving descriptions of causal processes), or as metasemantics, explaining why a term has the referent it does.
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From:
report of David Kaplan (Dthat [1970]) by Jonathan Schaffer - Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson 1
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A reaction:
[Kaplan 'Afterthought' 1989] The theory tends to be labelled as 'direct' rather than as 'causal' these days, but causal chains are still at the heart of the story (even if more diffused socially). Nice question. Kaplan takes the meta- version as orthodox.
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