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All the ideas for 'Dthat', 'Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..'' and 'Letters to Foucher'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis

21546	We can't sharply distinguish variables, domains and values, if symbols frighten us [Russell]
	Full Idea: Whoever is afraid of symbols can hardly hope to acquire exact ideas where it is necessary to distinguish 1) the variable in itself as opposed to its value, 2) any value of the variable, 3) all values, 4) some value.
	From: Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905], p.84)
	A reaction: Not the best example, perhaps, of the need for precision, but a nice illustration of the new attitude Russell brought into philosophy.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence

13095	Essence is primitive force, or a law of change [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: The essence of substances consists in the primitive force of action, or the law of the sequence of changes.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Foucher [1675], 1676)
	A reaction: [a 1676 note on Foucher's reply] It take these to be the two key distinctive Leibnizian contributions to the sort of metaphysic that is needed by modern science. Nature works with intrinsic essences, which are forces determining action.

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects

21531	Common sense agrees with Meinong (rather than Russell) that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true [Lackey on Russell]
	Full Idea: Meinong's theory says that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true, while Russell's says that this assertion is false. The average man, if he knows his mythology, would probably agree with Meinong.
	From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905]) by Douglas Lackey - Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' p.19
	A reaction: It seems obvious that some disambiguation is needed here. Assenting to that assertion would be blatantly contextual. No one backs Pegasus at a race track.

21545	I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell]
	Full Idea: I should prefer to say that there is no such object as 'the round square'. The difficulties of excluding such objects can, I think, be avoided by the theory of denoting.
	From: Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905], p.81)
	A reaction: The 'theory of denoting' is his brand new theory of definite descriptions, which makes implicit claims of existence explicit, so that they can be judged. Why can't we just say that a round square can be an intentional object, but not a real object?

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

14080	Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: Kaplan notes that the causal theory of reference can be understood in two quite different ways, as part of the semantics (involving descriptions of causal processes), or as metasemantics, explaining why a term has the referent it does.
	From: report of David Kaplan (Dthat [1970]) by Jonathan Schaffer - Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson 1
	A reaction: [Kaplan 'Afterthought' 1989] The theory tends to be labelled as 'direct' rather than as 'causal' these days, but causal chains are still at the heart of the story (even if more diffused socially). Nice question. Kaplan takes the meta- version as orthodox.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity

2117	The connection in events enables us to successfully predict the future, so there must be a constant cause [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: There is a connection among our appearances that provides us the means to predict future appearances with success, and this connection must have a constant cause.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Foucher [1675])