Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Dthat', 'On the Algebra of Logic' and 'Of Miracles'

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3 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The utility of [truth-functional conditionals] is that it puts us in possession of a rule...[namely] The hypothetical proposition may be ...falsified by a single state of things, but only by one in which A [antecedent] is true and B [consequent] is false.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (On the Algebra of Logic [1895], p.218), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions
     A reaction: Personally I am rather more interested in verifying conditionals than in falsifying them. I certainly don't accept them until they are falsified, unless they have massive support from surrounding facts.
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Kaplan notes that the causal theory of reference can be understood in two quite different ways, as part of the semantics (involving descriptions of causal processes), or as metasemantics, explaining why a term has the referent it does.
     From: report of David Kaplan (Dthat [1970]) by Jonathan Schaffer - Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson 1
     A reaction: [Kaplan 'Afterthought' 1989] The theory tends to be labelled as 'direct' rather than as 'causal' these days, but causal chains are still at the heart of the story (even if more diffused socially). Nice question. Kaplan takes the meta- version as orthodox.
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
It can't be more rational to believe in natural laws than miracles if the laws are not rational [Ishaq on Hume]
     Full Idea: In Hume's argument against miracles, how can it be more rational to believe the laws than the miracles, if the laws themselves are not based on reason?
     From: comment on David Hume (Of Miracles [1748]) by Atif Ishaq - talk
     A reaction: A very nice question. Hume never presents his argument with such an overt reliance on reason. But if the argument says you are in the 'habit' of expecting no anomalies in the laws, what is to prevent you changing the habit of a lifetime?