7 ideas
7783 | Bodies, properties, relations, events, numbers, sets and propositions are 'things' if they exist [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Not only material bodies but also properties, relations, events, numbers, sets, and propositions are—if they are acknowledged as existing—to be accounted ‘things’. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Things [1995]) | |
A reaction: There might be lots of borderline cases here. Is the sky a thing? Is air a thing? How is transparency a thing? Is minus-one a thing? Is an incomplete proposition a thing? Etc. |
22142 | In future, only logical limits can be placed on divine omnipotence [Anon (Par), by Boulter] |
Full Idea: The Condemnation stipulated that all portions of the ancient intellectual heritage that placed non-logical limits on divine omnipotence were no longer to be tolerated. ...Philosophers now had to entertain the wildest ideas with all seriousness. | |
From: report of Anon (Par) (The Condemnation of 1277 [1277]) by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 3 | |
A reaction: Boulter identifies this as 'the ultimate source of Hume's philosophical delirium'. Presumably the angels-on-a-pinhead stuff originated with this. It is crazy to think that the only limit on possible existence is logic. Can God make a planet of uranium? |
16716 | It is heresy to require self-evident foundational principles in order to be certain [Anon (Par)] |
Full Idea: Heresy 151: 'To have certainty regarding any conclusion, it must be founded on self-evident principles'. | |
From: Anon (Par) (The Condemnation of 1277 [1277], 151), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.3 | |
A reaction: The correct view is obviously to found certainty on faith and authority. It is one thing to be told that foundationalism is a poor theory, but another to be told it is a heresy, and thus a potential capital crime! |
14080 | Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Kaplan notes that the causal theory of reference can be understood in two quite different ways, as part of the semantics (involving descriptions of causal processes), or as metasemantics, explaining why a term has the referent it does. | |
From: report of David Kaplan (Dthat [1970]) by Jonathan Schaffer - Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson 1 | |
A reaction: [Kaplan 'Afterthought' 1989] The theory tends to be labelled as 'direct' rather than as 'causal' these days, but causal chains are still at the heart of the story (even if more diffused socially). Nice question. Kaplan takes the meta- version as orthodox. |
1866 | It is heresy to teach that history repeats every 36,000 years [Anon (Par)] |
Full Idea: It is heresy to teach that with all the heavenly bodies coming back to the same point after a period of thirty-six thousand years, the same effects as now exist will reappear. | |
From: Anon (Par) (The Condemnation of 1277 [1277], §92) |
1865 | It is heresy to teach that natural impossibilities cannot even be achieved by God [Anon (Par)] |
Full Idea: It is heresy to teach that what is absolutely impossible according to nature cannot be brought about by God or another agent. | |
From: Anon (Par) (The Condemnation of 1277 [1277], §17) |
1864 | It is heresy to teach that we can know God by his essence in this mortal life [Anon (Par)] |
Full Idea: It is heresy to teach that we can know God by his essence in this mortal life. | |
From: Anon (Par) (The Condemnation of 1277 [1277], §9) |