8 ideas
10414 | Abstract objects are constituted by encoded collections of properties [Zalta, by Swoyer] |
Full Idea: In Zalta's view abstract objects are correlated with collections of properties. ..They encode, as well as exemplify, properties; indeed, an abstract object (such as a Euclidean triangle) is constituted by the properties it encodes. | |
From: report of Edward N. Zalta (Abstract Objects:intro to Axiomatic Metaphysics [1983]) by Chris Swoyer - Properties 6.3 | |
A reaction: If we are going to explain abstract objects with properties, then properties had better not be abstract objects. Zalta has a promising idea if we start from a nominalist and naturalistic view of properties (built from physical powers). 'Encode'? |
10415 | Properties make round squares and round triangles distinct, unlike exemplification [Zalta, by Swoyer] |
Full Idea: On Zalta's view, properties with the same encoding extensions are identical, but may be distinct with the same exemplification extension. So the properties of being a round square and a round triangle are distinct, but with the same exemplification. | |
From: report of Edward N. Zalta (Abstract Objects:intro to Axiomatic Metaphysics [1983]) by Chris Swoyer - Properties | |
A reaction: (For Zalta's view, see Idea 10414) I'm not sure about 'encoding' (cf. Hodes's use of the word), but the idea that an abstract object is just a bunch of possible properties (assuming properties have prior availability) seems promising. |
22049 | Transcendental idealism aims to explain objectivity through subjectivity [Bowie] |
Full Idea: The aim of transcendental idealism is to give a basis for objectivity in terms of subjectivity. | |
From: Andrew Bowie (German Philosophy: a very short introduction [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: Hume used subjectivity to undermine the findings of objectivity. There was then no return to naive objectivity. Kant's aim then was to thwart global scepticism. Post-Kantians feared that he had failed. |
22055 | The Idealists saw the same unexplained spontaneity in Kant's judgements and choices [Bowie] |
Full Idea: The Idealist saw in Kant that knowledge, which depends on the spontaneity of judgement, and self-determined spontaneous action, can be seen as sharing the same source, which is not accessible to scientific investigation. | |
From: Andrew Bowie (German Philosophy: a very short introduction [2010]) | |
A reaction: This is the 'spontaneity' of judgements and choices which was seen as the main idea in Kant. It inspired romantic individualism. The judgements are the rule-based application of concepts. |
22054 | German Idealism tried to stop oppositions of appearances/things and receptivity/spontaneity [Bowie] |
Full Idea: A central aim of German Idealism is to overcome Kant's oppositions between appearances and thing in themselves, and between receptivity and spontaneity. | |
From: Andrew Bowie (German Philosophy: a very short introduction [2010], 2) | |
A reaction: I have the impression that there were two strategies: break down the opposition within the self (Fichte), or break down the opposition in the world (Spinozism). |
22056 | Crucial to Idealism is the idea of continuity between receptivity and spontaneous judgement [Bowie] |
Full Idea: A crucial idea for German Idealism (from Hamann) is that apparently passive receptivity and active spontaneity are in fact different degrees of the same 'activity, and the gap between subject and world can be closed. | |
From: Andrew Bowie (German Philosophy: a very short introduction [2010], 3) | |
A reaction: The 'passive' bit seems to be Hume's 'impressions', which are Kant's 'intuitions', which need 'spontaneous' interpretation to become experiences. Critics of Kant said this implied a dualism. |
14894 | Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
Full Idea: Kaplan distinguished two different semantic features of indexical expressions: a 'character' that captures the standing meaning of the expression, and a 'content' that consists of their truth-conditional contribution in particular contexts. | |
From: report of David Kaplan (Demonstratives [1989]) by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro - Introduction to 'Two-Dimensional Semantics' 1 | |
A reaction: This seems so clearly right that there isn't much to dispute. You can't understand the word 'I' or 'now' if you don't understand both its general purpose, and what it is doing in a particular utterance. But will this generalise to other semantics? |
14700 | 'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter] |
Full Idea: Kaplan sees two aspects of meaning, the 'content', reflecting a thing's modal profile, which is modelled by standard possible worlds semantics, and 'character', giving rules for different contexts. Proper names have constant character; indexicals vary. | |
From: report of David Kaplan (Demonstratives [1989]) by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics 1.1.1 | |
A reaction: This gives rise to 2-D matrices for representing meaning, and the possible worlds are used twice, for evaluating meaning and then for evaluating context of use. I've always been struck by the two-dimensional semantics of passwords. |