Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Dthat', 'On Hippocrates and Plato' and 'The Epistemology of Essence (draft)'

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7 ideas

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible

16978	If conceivability is a priori coherence, that implies possibility [Tahko]
	Full Idea: Maybe conceivability could be understood as a priori coherence, which implies possibility.
	From: Tuomas E. Tahko (The Epistemology of Essence (draft) [2013], 3.2)
	A reaction: I'm not quite sure why 'a priori' has to be there. Assessing conceivability just is assessing coherence. That couches it as a rational activity, rather than as a purely imaginary one. Trying to conceive a square circle isn't just daydreaming.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence

16975	Essences are used to explain natural kinds, modality, and causal powers [Tahko]
	Full Idea: Essences are supposed to do a lot of explanatory work: natural kinds can be identified in terms of their essences, metaphysical modality can be reduced to essence, the causal power of objects can be explained with the help of essence.
	From: Tuomas E. Tahko (The Epistemology of Essence (draft) [2013], 1)
	A reaction: Natural kinds and modality are OK with me, but I'm dubious about the third one. If an essence explains something's causal powers, I have no idea what an essence might be. Essence are largely characterised in terms of causal powers.

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind

6003	Galen showed by experiment that the brain controls the body [Galen, by Hankinson]
	Full Idea: Galen established by experiments in neural anatomy that the brain really is, contra the Stoics and Aristotelians, the body's control centre.
	From: report of Galen (On Hippocrates and Plato [c.170]) by R.J. Hankinson - Galen (damaged)
	A reaction: And about time too. This is one of the most significant events in the development of human understanding. No one has been able to go back to the old view, even Descartes, no matter how much they may long to do so.

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

14080	Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: Kaplan notes that the causal theory of reference can be understood in two quite different ways, as part of the semantics (involving descriptions of causal processes), or as metasemantics, explaining why a term has the referent it does.
	From: report of David Kaplan (Dthat [1970]) by Jonathan Schaffer - Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson 1
	A reaction: [Kaplan 'Afterthought' 1989] The theory tends to be labelled as 'direct' rather than as 'causal' these days, but causal chains are still at the heart of the story (even if more diffused socially). Nice question. Kaplan takes the meta- version as orthodox.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

6030	Each part of the soul has its virtue - pleasure for appetite, success for competition, and rectitude for reason [Galen]
	Full Idea: We have by nature these three appropriate relationships, corresponding to each form of the soul's parts - to pleasure because of the appetitive part, to success because of the competitive part, and to rectitude because of the rational part.
	From: Galen (On Hippocrates and Plato [c.170], 5.5.8)
	A reaction: This is a nice combination of Plato's tripartite theory of soul (in 'Republic') and Aristotle's derivation of virtues from functions. Presumably, though, reason should master the other two, and there is nothing in Galen's idea to explain this.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism

16976	Scientific essentialists tend to characterise essence in terms of modality (not vice versa) [Tahko]
	Full Idea: The conception of essence taken for granted in much of the 'scientific essentialist' literature is that essence can be explained in terms of modality (rather than the other way round).
	From: Tuomas E. Tahko (The Epistemology of Essence (draft) [2013], 2.1)
	A reaction: [He cites Ellis and Bird] That is, presumably, that they are inclined to say that the essence of gold is a set of necessary properties. Maybe conceptual necessities dictate the properties of gold, and they in turn dictate metaphysical necessities?

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity

16977	If essence is modal and laws are necessary, essentialist knowledge is found by scientists [Tahko]
	Full Idea: If essence is conceived in terms of modality and the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, it seems that the laws of nature constitute essentialist knowledge, so the discovery of essences is mostly due to scientists.
	From: Tuomas E. Tahko (The Epistemology of Essence (draft) [2013], 2.1)
	A reaction: This seems muddled to me. The idea that the laws themselves are essences is way off target. No one thinks all knowledge of necessities is essentialist. Mumford, for example, doesn't even believe in laws.