Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Dthat', 'Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion' and 'The Rationalists'

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6 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance

4304	Descartes says there are two substance, Spinoza one, and Leibniz infinitely many [Cottingham]
	Full Idea: Descartes was a dualist about substance, Spinoza was a monist, and Leibniz was a pluralist (an infinity of substances).
	From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.76)
	A reaction: Spinoza is appealing. We posit a substance, as the necessary basis for existence, but it is unclear how more than one substance can be differentiated. If mind is a separate substance, why isn't iron? Why aren't numbers?

12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism

4303	The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics [Cottingham]
	Full Idea: The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics.
	From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.75)
	A reaction: The idea of 'substance' has had an interesting revival in modern philosophy (though not, obviously, in physics). Maybe physics and philosophy have views of reality which are not complementary, but are rivals.

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

14080	Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: Kaplan notes that the causal theory of reference can be understood in two quite different ways, as part of the semantics (involving descriptions of causal processes), or as metasemantics, explaining why a term has the referent it does.
	From: report of David Kaplan (Dthat [1970]) by Jonathan Schaffer - Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson 1
	A reaction: [Kaplan 'Afterthought' 1989] The theory tends to be labelled as 'direct' rather than as 'causal' these days, but causal chains are still at the heart of the story (even if more diffused socially). Nice question. Kaplan takes the meta- version as orthodox.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity

4306	For rationalists, it is necessary that effects be deducible from their causes [Cottingham]
	Full Idea: The rationalist view of causation takes it that to make effects intelligible, it must be shown that they are in principle deducible from their causes.
	From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.92)
	A reaction: This has intuitive appeal, but deduction is only possible with further premises, such as the laws of physics. The effects of human behaviour look a bit tricky, even if we cause them.

29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity

21798	To universalise 'give everything to the poor' leads to absurdity [Hegel]
	Full Idea: If everyone gave everything to the poor, then soon there would be no more poor to give anything to, or no more persons who would have anything to give.
	From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion [1827], III: 152), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 10 'Faith'
	A reaction: Matthew 5:8, 19:21. Beautifully clear. [I always believed that I had thought of this idea - but not so]. If the logic is that it is better to be poor than to be rich, then the implication is that all excess wealth should be thrown into the sea.

29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality

21797	Immortality does not come at a later time, but when pure knowing Spirit fully grasps the universal [Hegel]
	Full Idea: The immortality of the soul must not be imagined as though it first emerges into actuality at some later time; rather it is a present quality. ...As pure knowing or as thinking, Spirit has the universal for its object - this is eternity.
	From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion [1827], III: 208), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 10 'Death'
	A reaction: An unusual view of immortality, which challenges orthodoxy. The idea seems to be that 'pure knowing' is a grasping of the pure reason which embodies nature, which in turn is the nature of God. You enter eternity, rather than reside in it?