Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Dthat', 'Letters to Bouvet' and 'Self, Body and Coincidence'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


3 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Shoemaker moved from properties as powers to properties bestowing powers [Shoemaker, by Mumford/Anjum]
     Full Idea: Shoemaker ventured the theory in 1980 that properties just are clusters of powers, but he has subsequently abandoned this, and now thinks properties bestow their bearers with causal powers.
     From: report of Sydney Shoemaker (Self, Body and Coincidence [1999], p.297) by S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum - Getting Causes from Powers 1.1
     A reaction: Like Mumford and Anjum, I prefer the earlier theory. I think taking powers as basic is the only story that really makes sense. A power is intrinsic and primitive, whereas properties are complex, messy, partly subjective, and higher level.
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Kaplan notes that the causal theory of reference can be understood in two quite different ways, as part of the semantics (involving descriptions of causal processes), or as metasemantics, explaining why a term has the referent it does.
     From: report of David Kaplan (Dthat [1970]) by Jonathan Schaffer - Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson 1
     A reaction: [Kaplan 'Afterthought' 1989] The theory tends to be labelled as 'direct' rather than as 'causal' these days, but causal chains are still at the heart of the story (even if more diffused socially). Nice question. Kaplan takes the meta- version as orthodox.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
We want good education and sociability, rather than lots of moral precepts [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The true practical philosophy consists in good rules for education, intercourse and sociability among men, rather than in general precepts on virtues and duties.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Bouvet [1697], p.165)
     A reaction: I would interpret that as saying that the main aim of morality is to enable people to hold a good conversation. I've heard worse theories of morality. The remark shows why Leibniz has little to say explicitly about morality.