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All the ideas for 'Dthat', 'Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia' and 'New Foundations for Mathematical Logic'

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division

13099	Analysing right down to primitive concepts seems beyond our powers [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: An analysis of concepts such that we can reach primitive concepts...does not seem to be within human power.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia [1679], C513-14), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz
	A reaction: Leibniz is nevertheless fully committed, I think, to the existence of such primitives, and is in the grip of the rationalist dream that thoughts can become completely clear, and completely well-founded.

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth

5022	We hold a proposition true if we are ready to follow it, and can't see any objections [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: A proposition is held to be true by us when our mind is ready to follow it and no reason for doubting it can be found.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia [1679], p.7)
	A reaction: This follows on from Descartes' view, but it now sounds more like psychology than metaphysics. Clearly a false proposition could fit this desciption. Personally I follow propositions to which I can see no objection, without actually holding them true.

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets

9879	NF has no models, but just blocks the comprehension axiom, to avoid contradictions [Quine, by Dummett]
	Full Idea: Quine's New Foundations system of set theory, devised with no model in mind, but on the basis of a hunch that a purely formal restriction on the comprehension axiom would block all contradictions.
	From: report of Willard Quine (New Foundations for Mathematical Logic [1937]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.18
	A reaction: The point is that Quine (who had an ontological preference for 'desert landscapes') attempted to do without an ontological commitment to objects (and their subsequent models), with a purely formal system. Quine's NF is not now highly regarded.

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

14080	Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: Kaplan notes that the causal theory of reference can be understood in two quite different ways, as part of the semantics (involving descriptions of causal processes), or as metasemantics, explaining why a term has the referent it does.
	From: report of David Kaplan (Dthat [1970]) by Jonathan Schaffer - Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson 1
	A reaction: [Kaplan 'Afterthought' 1989] The theory tends to be labelled as 'direct' rather than as 'causal' these days, but causal chains are still at the heart of the story (even if more diffused socially). Nice question. Kaplan takes the meta- version as orthodox.