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All the ideas for 'Dthat', 'talk' and 'Metaphysical conseqs of principle of reason'

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4 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason

1403	A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG]
	Full Idea: A rational donkey faced with two totally identical piles of hay would be unable to decide which one to eat first, and would therefore starve to death
	From: report of Jean Buridan (talk [1338]) by PG - Db (ideas)
	A reaction: also De Caelo 295b32 (Idea 19740).

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads

5060	All substances analyse down to simple substances, which are souls, or 'monads' [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: What (in the analysis of substances) exist ultimately are simple substances - namely, souls, or, if you prefer a more general terms, 'monads', which are without parts.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Metaphysical conseqs of principle of reason [1712], §7)
	A reaction: This seems to me to be atomistic panpsychism. He is opposed to physical atomism, because infinite divisibility seems obvious, but unity is claimed to be equally obvious in the world of the mental. Does this mean bricks are made of souls? Odd.

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

14080	Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: Kaplan notes that the causal theory of reference can be understood in two quite different ways, as part of the semantics (involving descriptions of causal processes), or as metasemantics, explaining why a term has the referent it does.
	From: report of David Kaplan (Dthat [1970]) by Jonathan Schaffer - Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson 1
	A reaction: [Kaplan 'Afterthought' 1989] The theory tends to be labelled as 'direct' rather than as 'causal' these days, but causal chains are still at the heart of the story (even if more diffused socially). Nice question. Kaplan takes the meta- version as orthodox.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes

5059	Power rules in efficient causes, but wisdom rules in connecting them to final causes [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: In all of nature efficient causes correspond to final causes, because everything proceeds from a cause which is not only powerful, but wise; and with the rule of power through efficient causes, there is involved the rule of wisdom through final causes.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Metaphysical conseqs of principle of reason [1712], §5)
	A reaction: Nowadays this carrot-and-stick view of causation is unfashionable, but I won't rule it out. The deepest 'why?' we can ask won't just go away. This unity by a divine mind strikes me as too simple, but Leibniz is right to try to unify Aristotelian causes.