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All the ideas for 'Dthat', 'Letters to William Molyneux' and 'What Metaphors Mean'

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5 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence

12812	Things have real essences, but we categorise them according to the ideas we receive [Locke]
	Full Idea: This I do say, that there are real constitutions in things from whence simple ideas flow, which we observe combin'd in them. But we distinguish particular substances into sorts or genera not by real essences or constitutions, but by observed simple ideas.
	From: John Locke (Letters to William Molyneux [1692], 1693.01.20)
	A reaction: This is the clearest statement I can find of Locke's position on essences. He is totally committed to their reality, but strongly aware of the empirical constraints which keep us from direct knowledge of them. He would be amazed by modern discoveries.

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

14080	Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: Kaplan notes that the causal theory of reference can be understood in two quite different ways, as part of the semantics (involving descriptions of causal processes), or as metasemantics, explaining why a term has the referent it does.
	From: report of David Kaplan (Dthat [1970]) by Jonathan Schaffer - Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson 1
	A reaction: [Kaplan 'Afterthought' 1989] The theory tends to be labelled as 'direct' rather than as 'causal' these days, but causal chains are still at the heart of the story (even if more diffused socially). Nice question. Kaplan takes the meta- version as orthodox.

19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor

7776	Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean [Davidson]
	Full Idea: Metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more.
	From: Donald Davidson (What Metaphors Mean [1978], p.30)
	A reaction: This pronouncement must be the result of Davidson anguishing over the truth conditions for metaphors, which are usually either taken to have a 'metaphorical meaning', or to be abbreviated similes. He solved his problem at a stroke! Plausible.

7775	Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules [Davidson]
	Full Idea: Understanding a metaphor is as much a creative endeavour as making a metaphor, and as little guided by rules.
	From: Donald Davidson (What Metaphors Mean [1978], p.29)
	A reaction: This is good news for literature studies courses. Davidson's point is that the metaphor itself only gives you a literal meaning, so it doesn't tell you how to interpret it. It seems an attractive proposal.

7777	We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false [Davidson]
	Full Idea: It is only when a sentence is taken to be false that we accept it as a metaphor.
	From: Donald Davidson (What Metaphors Mean [1978], p.40)
	A reaction: This strikes me as a very nice and true generalisation, even though Davidson mentions "no man is an island" as a counterexample. We thirst for meaning, and switch to a second meaning when the first one looks peculiar.