Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Dthat', 'Apprehension: reason in absence of Rules' and 'Perceptual experience has conceptual content'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

3 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
22668 Apprehension is a complex intellect grasping the essence of a complex object [Holt,L]
     Full Idea: The paradigm case of apprehension is of a complex intellect confronted with a complex object, in which the intellect understands in a particular context what is 'essential' about the object.
     From: Lynn Holt (Apprehension: reason in absence of Rules [2002], 3 'Expertise')
     A reaction: My line is that this apprehension cashes out as an immediate ability to explain the object. This is an enhanced version of the rational understanding of things found in most larger animals. Holt says her account is Aristotelian.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
8875 Sense experiences must have conceptual content, since they are possible reasons for judgements [Brewer,B]
     Full Idea: Given that sense experiential states do provide reasons for empirical beliefs, they must have conceptual content, ...where a mental state with conceptual content is one where the content is of a possible judgement by the subject.
     From: Bill Brewer (Perceptual experience has conceptual content [2005], I)
     A reaction: This is, I believe, wrong. Even complex observations, like a pool of blood, only become reasons when they have been interpreted. Otherwise they are just the raw ingredients of evidence. How could an uninterpreted red patch be a 'reason'?
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14080 Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Kaplan notes that the causal theory of reference can be understood in two quite different ways, as part of the semantics (involving descriptions of causal processes), or as metasemantics, explaining why a term has the referent it does.
     From: report of David Kaplan (Dthat [1970]) by Jonathan Schaffer - Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson 1
     A reaction: [Kaplan 'Afterthought' 1989] The theory tends to be labelled as 'direct' rather than as 'causal' these days, but causal chains are still at the heart of the story (even if more diffused socially). Nice question. Kaplan takes the meta- version as orthodox.