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All the ideas for 'Dthat', 'On Cruelty' and 'Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason'

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10 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 4. Early European Thought
23122 Montaigne was the founding father of liberalism [Montaigne, by Gopnik]
     Full Idea: The first liberal, the founding father if we have one, is the great sixteenth century French essayist Michel de Montaigne.
     From: report of Michel de Montaigne (On Cruelty [1580]) by Adam Gopnik - A Thousand Small Sanities 1
     A reaction: He says this not on the basis of his politicies or achievements, but his general attitudes and values. It may be another hundred years before we can identify another obvious liberal (Locke?).
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
21918 Sufficient Reason can't be proved, because all proof presupposes it [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
     Full Idea: Schopenhauer said the principle of sufficient reason is not susceptible to proof for the simple reason that it is presupposed in any argument or proof.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813], §14 p.32-3) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
     A reaction: I would have thought it might be disproved by a counterexample, such as the Gödel sentence of his incompleteness proof, or quantum effects which seem to elude causation. Personally I believe the principle, which I see as the first axiom of philosophy.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
21920 No need for a priori categories, since sufficient reason shows the interrelations [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
     Full Idea: Schopenhauer dispenses with Kant's a priori categories, since all interrelations between representations are given through the principle of sufficient reason.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813]) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
     A reaction: I'm not sure how Schopenhauer manages this move. Is it the stoic idea that reality has a logical structure, which can be inferred? Sounds good to me. Further investigation required.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
21362 Necessity is physical, logical, mathematical or moral [Schopenhauer, by Janaway]
     Full Idea: For Schopenauer there are physical necessity, logical necessity, mathematical necessity and moral necessity.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813]) by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 2 'Fourfold'
     A reaction: These derive from four modes of explanation, by causes, by grounding in truths or facts, by mathematical reality, and by motives. Not clear why mathematics gets its own necessity. I like metaphysics derived from explanations, though. Necessity makers.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
21361 For Schopenhauer, material things would not exist without the mind [Schopenhauer, by Janaway]
     Full Idea: Schopenhauer is not a realist about material things, but an idealist: that is, material things would not exist, for him, without the mind.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813]) by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 2 'Fourfold'
     A reaction: Janaway places his views as close to Kant's, but it is not clear that Kant would agree that no mind means no world. Did Schopenhauer believe in the noumenon?
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
21919 Object for a subject and representation are the same thing [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: To be object for a subject and to be representation is to be one and the same thing. All representations are objects for a subject, all objects for a subject are representations.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813], §16 p.41-2), quoted by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
     A reaction: This is pure idealism in early Schopenhauer, derived from Kant. Are being 'an object for a subject' and being an object 'in itself' two different things? Compare Idea 21914, written later. I think Nietzsche's 'perspective' representations helps here.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
21917 The four explanations: objects by causes, concepts by ground, maths by spacetime, ethics by motive [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
     Full Idea: There are four forms of explanation, depending on their topic. Causes explain objects. Grounding explains concepts, Points and moments explain mathematics. Motives explain ethics.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813], §43 p.214) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
     A reaction: [My compression of Lewis's summary. I'm particularly pleased with this. I have done Schopenhauer a huge favour, should anyone ever visit this website]. The quirky account of mathematics derives from Kant. I greatly admire this whole idea.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
21921 Concepts are abstracted from perceptions [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
     Full Idea: For Schopenhauer concepts are abstractions from perception, what he calls 'representations of representations', and are linked to the creation of language.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813]) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
     A reaction: This is a traditional view which dates back to Aristotle, and which I personally think is entirely correct. These days I am in minority on that. This idea means that (contrary to Kant) perception is not conceptual.
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14080 Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Kaplan notes that the causal theory of reference can be understood in two quite different ways, as part of the semantics (involving descriptions of causal processes), or as metasemantics, explaining why a term has the referent it does.
     From: report of David Kaplan (Dthat [1970]) by Jonathan Schaffer - Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson 1
     A reaction: [Kaplan 'Afterthought' 1989] The theory tends to be labelled as 'direct' rather than as 'causal' these days, but causal chains are still at the heart of the story (even if more diffused socially). Nice question. Kaplan takes the meta- version as orthodox.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
21363 Motivation is causality seen from within [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: Motivation is causality seen from within.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813], p.214), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 2 'Fourfold'
     A reaction: This is more illuminating about causation than about motivation, since we can be motivated without actually doing anything.