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All the ideas for 'Dthat', 'The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals' and 'works'

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4 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
12427 All of mathematics is properties of the whole numbers [Kronecker]
     Full Idea: All the results of significant mathematical research must ultimately be expressible in the simple forms of properties of whole numbers.
     From: Leopold Kronecker (works [1885], Vol 3/274), quoted by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 09.5
     A reaction: I've always liked Kronecker's line, but I'm beginning to realise that his use of the word 'number' is simply out-of-date. Natural numbers have a special status, but not sufficient to support this claim.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
10091 God made the integers, all the rest is the work of man [Kronecker]
     Full Idea: God made the integers, all the rest is the work of man.
     From: Leopold Kronecker (works [1885]), quoted by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Intro
     A reaction: This famous remark was first quoted in Kronecker's obituary. A response to Dedekind, it seems. See Idea 10090. Did he really mean that negative numbers were the work of God? We took a long time to spot them.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
12191 Counterfactuals are true if logical or natural laws imply the consequence [Goodman, by McFetridge]
     Full Idea: Goodman's central idea was: 'If that match had been scratched, it would have lighted' is true if there are suitable truths from which, with the antecedent, the consequent can be inferred by means of a logical, or more typically natural, law.
     From: report of Nelson Goodman (The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals [1947]) by Ian McFetridge - Logical Necessity: Some Issues §4
     A reaction: Goodman then discusses the problem of identifying the natural laws, and identifying the suitable truths. I'm inclined to think counterfactuals are vaguer than that; they are plausible if coherent reasons can be offered for the inference.
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14080 Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Kaplan notes that the causal theory of reference can be understood in two quite different ways, as part of the semantics (involving descriptions of causal processes), or as metasemantics, explaining why a term has the referent it does.
     From: report of David Kaplan (Dthat [1970]) by Jonathan Schaffer - Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson 1
     A reaction: [Kaplan 'Afterthought' 1989] The theory tends to be labelled as 'direct' rather than as 'causal' these days, but causal chains are still at the heart of the story (even if more diffused socially). Nice question. Kaplan takes the meta- version as orthodox.