Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Dthat', 'Lewis's Programme' and 'On Motion'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

4 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals

8431	Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis [Horwich]
	Full Idea: In reaction to two classic difficulties in Goodman's treatment of counterfactuals - the contenability problem and the explication of law - a radically different approach was instigated by Stalnaker (1968) and has been developed by Lewis.
	From: Paul Horwich (Lewis's Programme [1987], p208)
	A reaction: [I record this for study purposes]

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

14080	Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: Kaplan notes that the causal theory of reference can be understood in two quite different ways, as part of the semantics (involving descriptions of causal processes), or as metasemantics, explaining why a term has the referent it does.
	From: report of David Kaplan (Dthat [1970]) by Jonathan Schaffer - Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson 1
	A reaction: [Kaplan 'Afterthought' 1989] The theory tends to be labelled as 'direct' rather than as 'causal' these days, but causal chains are still at the heart of the story (even if more diffused socially). Nice question. Kaplan takes the meta- version as orthodox.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation

8432	Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around [Horwich]
	Full Idea: In my view, counterfactual conditionals are analysed in terms of causation.
	From: Paul Horwich (Lewis's Programme [1987], p.208)
	A reaction: This immediately sounds more plausible to me. Counterfactual claims are rather human, whereas causation (if we accept it) seems a feature of nature. The key question is whether some sort of 'dependency' is a feature of counterfactuals.

27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity

12709	Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: In reality motion is not something absolute, but consists in relation.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Motion [1677], A6.4.1968), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 3
	A reaction: It is often thought that motion being relative was invented by Einstein, but Leibniz wholeheartedly embraced 'Galilean relativity', and refused to even consider any absolute concept of motion. Acceleration is a bit trickier than velocity.