Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Demonstratives', 'Homeostasis, Species and Higher Taxa' and 'Maxims'

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12 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
To try to be wise all on one's own is folly [Rochefoucauld]
     Full Idea: To try to be wise all on one's own is sheer folly.
     From: La Rochefoucauld (Maxims [1663], 231)
     A reaction: I agree strongly with this. There are counter-examples, of whom Spinoza may be the greatest, and Nietzsche thought that philosophy was essentially a solitary business, but most of us are not Spinoza or Nietzsche.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
La Rochefoucauld's idea of disguised self-love implies an unconscious mind [Rochefoucauld, by Sartre]
     Full Idea: La Rochefoucauld is one of the first to have made use of the unconscious without naming it: for him, amour-propre conceals itself in the most diverse disguises.
     From: report of La Rochefoucauld (Maxims [1663]) by Jean-Paul Sartre - Transcendence of the Ego I (C)
     A reaction: It seems odd that no one before that ever thought that someone might have hidden motives of which even they themselves were unaware. How about Iago, or Macbeth, or Hamlet? It is a profound change in our view of human nature.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
     Full Idea: Kaplan distinguished two different semantic features of indexical expressions: a 'character' that captures the standing meaning of the expression, and a 'content' that consists of their truth-conditional contribution in particular contexts.
     From: report of David Kaplan (Demonstratives [1989]) by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro - Introduction to 'Two-Dimensional Semantics' 1
     A reaction: This seems so clearly right that there isn't much to dispute. You can't understand the word 'I' or 'now' if you don't understand both its general purpose, and what it is doing in a particular utterance. But will this generalise to other semantics?
'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter]
     Full Idea: Kaplan sees two aspects of meaning, the 'content', reflecting a thing's modal profile, which is modelled by standard possible worlds semantics, and 'character', giving rules for different contexts. Proper names have constant character; indexicals vary.
     From: report of David Kaplan (Demonstratives [1989]) by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics 1.1.1
     A reaction: This gives rise to 2-D matrices for representing meaning, and the possible worlds are used twice, for evaluating meaning and then for evaluating context of use. I've always been struck by the two-dimensional semantics of passwords.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Judging by effects, love looks more like hatred than friendship [Rochefoucauld]
     Full Idea: If love be judged by its most visible effects it looks more like hatred than friendship.
     From: La Rochefoucauld (Maxims [1663], 072)
     A reaction: Presumably he is thinking of pursuit, possession and jealousy. The remark is plausible if you add the word 'sometimes' to it, but as a universal generalisation it is ridiculous, the product of a society where they competed to exceed in cynicism.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
Supreme cleverness is knowledge of the real value of things [Rochefoucauld]
     Full Idea: Supreme cleverness is knowledge of the real value of things.
     From: La Rochefoucauld (Maxims [1663], 244)
     A reaction: Good. Right at the heart of wisdom is some kind of grasp of right values. It is so complex and subtle that it seems like pure intuition, but I am sure that reason is involved. 'Intelligent' people tend to be better at it. Some justifications can be given.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Realising our future misery is a kind of happiness [Rochefoucauld]
     Full Idea: To realise how much misery we have to face is in itself a kind of happiness.
     From: La Rochefoucauld (Maxims [1663], 570)
     A reaction: Probably true. Knowing that you have got hold of the truth is a sort of happiness in any area, no matter how grim the truth. However, a happy life could easily be poisoned by brooding on the future. Should the happily married brood on future solitude?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtue doesn't go far without the support of vanity [Rochefoucauld]
     Full Idea: Virtue would not go far without vanity to bear it company.
     From: La Rochefoucauld (Maxims [1663], 200)
     A reaction: Rochefoucauld's cynicism gets a bit tedious, but lovers of virtue must face up to this possibility when they consider what motivates them. At the heart of Aristotle there is a missing question, of what is so good about right-functioning and virtue.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
True friendship is even rarer than true love [Rochefoucauld]
     Full Idea: Rare though true love may be, true friendship is rarer still.
     From: La Rochefoucauld (Maxims [1663], 473)
     A reaction: This seems to be true. Our culture doesn't encourage friendship as a high ideal. Are women better at friendship than men? Which culture, past or present, led to the greatest flourishing of friendship? Epicurus's Garden?
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
We are bored by people to whom we ourselves are boring [Rochefoucauld]
     Full Idea: Almost always we are bored by people to whom we ourselves are boring.
     From: La Rochefoucauld (Maxims [1663], 555)
     A reaction: An obvious exception would be a celebrity being bored with their fans. Their very excess of interest is precisely what is boring. If two people communicate well, it is unlikely that either of them will ever be bored.
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
The properties of an electron can't be explained just as 'clustering' [Chakravartty on Boyd]
     Full Idea: Boyd's homeostatic mechanisms are not responsible for the co-instantiation of the mass, charge and spin of an electron.
     From: comment on Richard Boyd (Homeostasis, Species and Higher Taxa [1999]) by Anjan Chakravarrty - Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences 3
     A reaction: I would have thought that no one has the foggiest idea (unless I have missed something?) about why electrons have those three properties. What is it about electrons that makes them do that? Explanations always run out somewhere. Substratum!
Properties cluster together, either because of intrinsic relations, or because of an underlying process [Boyd, by Chakravartty]
     Full Idea: Boyd analyses 'sociability' between properties in terms of 'homeostasis', as causal relations between properties that favour clustering, or underlying processes that favour coinstantiation, or both.
     From: report of Richard Boyd (Homeostasis, Species and Higher Taxa [1999]) by Anjan Chakravarrty - Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences 3
     A reaction: Chakravarty criticises this claim, by Boyd is clearly onto something. If, like me, you think natural kinds are overrated, you have to like his view.