15 ideas
14894 | Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macią/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
Full Idea: Kaplan distinguished two different semantic features of indexical expressions: a 'character' that captures the standing meaning of the expression, and a 'content' that consists of their truth-conditional contribution in particular contexts. | |
From: report of David Kaplan (Demonstratives [1989]) by Macią/Garcia-Carpentiro - Introduction to 'Two-Dimensional Semantics' 1 | |
A reaction: This seems so clearly right that there isn't much to dispute. You can't understand the word 'I' or 'now' if you don't understand both its general purpose, and what it is doing in a particular utterance. But will this generalise to other semantics? |
14700 | 'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter] |
Full Idea: Kaplan sees two aspects of meaning, the 'content', reflecting a thing's modal profile, which is modelled by standard possible worlds semantics, and 'character', giving rules for different contexts. Proper names have constant character; indexicals vary. | |
From: report of David Kaplan (Demonstratives [1989]) by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics 1.1.1 | |
A reaction: This gives rise to 2-D matrices for representing meaning, and the possible worlds are used twice, for evaluating meaning and then for evaluating context of use. I've always been struck by the two-dimensional semantics of passwords. |
7096 | We may still admire a person's character even if the traits are involuntary [Statman] |
Full Idea: If we focus on the evaluation of character traits, voluntariness becomes less important. We would not withdraw our admiration for a person only because we found out that his or her being such a person was not a result of voluntary choice. | |
From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §3) | |
A reaction: The need for voluntariness does not disappear. I would not admire the only generous deed you had ever performed if it was the result of hypnotism. I might admire the hypnotist. Nevertheless, I regard this idea as a crucial truth in moral theory. |
7098 | There is a new sort of moral scepticism, about the possibility of moral theories [Statman] |
Full Idea: Since the 1980s, ethics has witnessed a new sort of moral scepticism, this time about the possibility of moral theories. | |
From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §4) | |
A reaction: He cites McDowell, Williams, Nussbaum and Baier as the culprits. 'Particularism' (every situation is different, so there can't be rules) seems an essential part of virtue theory, but total absence of principles sounds to me like moral drift. |
7099 | With a broad concept of flourishing, it might be possible without the virtues [Statman] |
Full Idea: In a rich conception of human flourishing, both individuals and societies seem to be able to flourish without the virtues. | |
From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §5) | |
A reaction: I can see Aristotle clutching his head in despair at this thought. It might look like flourishing, but it couldn't be the real thing. It is Aristotle's fault, though, for including external goods. Money and pleasure offer a kind of flourishing. |
7100 | Virtue theory isn't a genuine ethical theory, because it doesn't have universal application [Statman] |
Full Idea: It can be claimed that universality is a necessary property of any ethical theory and therefore virtue theory, which fails in this respect, is not a theory, and hence poses no alternative to genuine ethical theories. | |
From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §5) | |
A reaction: Replies: a) totally universal morality is an idle dream (part of the 'Enlightenment Project' to prove everything) and we must settle for something more relative; b) virtues aren't totally universal, but they are truths about humanity. I prefer b). |
7102 | Promises create moral duties that have nothing to do with character [Statman] |
Full Idea: That duties are created irrespective of facts about character is obvious from the case of promises, which bind their makers irrespective of their motives or personality. | |
From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §5) | |
A reaction: Just occasionally a promise can be broken, by a sensitive and wise person. I promise to give your son some money; I then discover he is a drug dealer. Promises arise out of character, and cannot be made by robots. |
7095 | Moral education is better by concrete example than abstract principle [Statman] |
Full Idea: According to virtue theory, education through moral exemplars is more effective than education focused on principles and obligations, because it is far more concrete. | |
From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §3) | |
A reaction: Aristotle's view is that virtues must be developed from childhood, when principles don't mean much. The problem is that young people may witness highly virtuous behaviour in their exemplars, but totally fail to appreciate it without mention of principles. |
7094 | Friends express friendship even when no utility is involved [Statman] |
Full Idea: Being a good friend means acting in ways that express the friendship even when those ways do not promote overall utility. | |
From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §3) | |
A reaction: This implies that friendship is a true virtue of character, rather than having friends just being an 'external' good. Having friends is good; being friends is a virtue. There are duties of friendship. |
7093 | Behaviour may be disgusting or inhumane, but violate no duty [Statman] |
Full Idea: It is surely possible, and indeed often the case, that people who violate no duty nevertheless behave in an inhumane and a disgusting manner. | |
From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §1) | |
A reaction: This seems right, though it is easier to be disgusting than to be inhumane if no duty is to be violated. Social duties may not require a high degree of humanity, pure Kantian duties might. |
7104 | The ancients recognised imperfect duties, but we have added perfect duties like justice [Statman] |
Full Idea: The advantage of modern thinkers over the ancient virtue ethicists is that in addition to imperfect duties (i.e. virtues) they also recognise the existence of perfect duties, or duties of justice, which are essential for the existence of society. | |
From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §7) | |
A reaction: Even the Greeks had laws (e.g. Idea 422), so they understood that a society needs rules, but many laws don't seem to be moral rules (e.g. car parking), and the Greeks thought morality was about human excellence, not avoiding traffic jams. |
23104 | Dworkin believed we should promote equality, to increase autonomy [Dworkin, by Kekes] |
Full Idea: Egalitarians believe that most often it is by promoting equality that autonomy is increased; this is the egalitarianism of such liberals as Ronald Dworkin. | |
From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977]) by John Kekes - Against Liberalism 05.1 | |
A reaction: Not my idea of equality. The whole point is to ascribe reasonable equality to everyone, including those with a limited capacity for autonomy. Equality is a consequence of universal respect. |
23257 | We can treat people as equals, or actually treat them equally [Dworkin, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: Dworkin distinguishes between treating people as equals, that is, 'with equal concern and respect', and treating them equally. This latter can be unjust. | |
From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977]) by A.C. Grayling - The Good State 2 | |
A reaction: The big difference I see between them is that the first is mere words, and the second is actions. Cf. 'thoughts and prayers' after US school shootings. How about equal entitlements, all things being equal? |
18621 | Treating people as equals is the one basic value of all plausible political theories [Dworkin, by Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Dworkin suggests that every plausible political theory has the same ultimate value, which is equality - in the more abstract and fundamental sense of treating people 'as equals'. | |
From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977], 179-83) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) | |
A reaction: I associate this idea with Kant (who says they are equal by virtue of their rationality), so that's a pretty influential idea. I would associate the main challenge to this with Nietzsche. |
7103 | Abortion issues focus on the mother's right over her body, and the status of the foetus [Statman] |
Full Idea: Most of the debate on abortion focuses on two issues, the mother's assumed right over her body, and the status of the foetus. | |
From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §6) | |
A reaction: Personally I think society as a whole might have a say (if, perhaps, we are over- or under-populated, or we have a widely accepted state religion, or we are just very shocked). Mother's have virtues and duties as well as rights. |