Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Dthat', 'Religion and Respect' and 'The Pragmatist Account of Truth'

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5 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction

22642	Man has an intense natural interest in the consistency of his own thinking [James]
	Full Idea: After man's interest in breathing freely, the greatest of all his interests (because it never fluctuates or remits….) is his interest in consistency, in feeling that what he now thinks goes with what he thinks on other occasions.
	From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Seventh')
	A reaction: People notoriously contradict themselves all the time, but I suspect that it is when they get out of their depth in complexities such as politics. They probably achieve great consistency within their own expertise, and in common knowledge.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths

22641	Realities just are, and beliefs are true of them [James]
	Full Idea: Realities are not true, they are; and beliefs are true of them.
	From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Fourth')
	A reaction: At last, a remark by James about truth which I really like. For 'realities' I would use the word 'facts'.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism

22640	We find satisfaction in consistency of all of our beliefs, perceptions and mental connections [James]
	Full Idea: We find satisfaction in consistency between the present idea and the entire rest of our mental equipment, including the whole order of our sensations, and that of our intuitions of likeness and difference, and our whole stock previously acquired truths.
	From: William James (The Pragmatist Account of Truth [1908], 'Fourth')
	A reaction: I like this, apart from the idea that the criterion of good coherence seems to be subjective 'satisfaction'. We should ask why some large set of beliefs is coherent. I assume nature is coherent, and truth is the best explanation of our coherence about it.

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

14080	Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: Kaplan notes that the causal theory of reference can be understood in two quite different ways, as part of the semantics (involving descriptions of causal processes), or as metasemantics, explaining why a term has the referent it does.
	From: report of David Kaplan (Dthat [1970]) by Jonathan Schaffer - Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson 1
	A reaction: [Kaplan 'Afterthought' 1989] The theory tends to be labelled as 'direct' rather than as 'causal' these days, but causal chains are still at the heart of the story (even if more diffused socially). Nice question. Kaplan takes the meta- version as orthodox.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect

23223	The word 'respect' ranges from mere non-interference to the highest levels of reverence [Blackburn]
	Full Idea: The word 'respect' seems to span a spectrum from simply not interfering, passing by on the other side, through admiration, right up to reverence and deference. This makes it uniquely well placed for ideological purposes.
	From: Simon Blackburn (Religion and Respect [2005], p.2)
	A reaction: Most people understand the world perfectly well, but only when they fully understand the context. I've taken to distinguishing conditional from unconditional forms of respect. Everyone is entitled to the unconditional form, which has limits.