Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Dthat', 'Nonexistent Objects' and 'The Origin of the Species'

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3 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
There is an object for every set of properties (some of which exist, and others don't) [Parsons,T, by Sawyer]
     Full Idea: According to Terence Parsons, there is an object corresponding to every set of properties. To some of those sets of properties there corresponds an object that exists, and to others there corresponds an object that does not exist (a nonexistent object).
     From: report of Terence Parsons (Nonexistent Objects [1980]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 5
     A reaction: This I take to be the main source of the modern revival of Meinong's notorious view of objects (attacked by Russell). I always find the thought 'a round square is square' to be true, and in need of a truthmaker. But must a round square be non-triangular?
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
A false theory could hardly rival the explanatory power of natural selection [Darwin]
     Full Idea: It can hardly be supposed that a false theory would explain, in so satisfactory a manner as does the theory of natural selection, the several large classes of facts above specified.
     From: Charles Darwin (The Origin of the Species [1859], p.476), quoted by Peter Lipton - Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) 11 'The scientific'
     A reaction: More needs to be said, since the whims of God could explain absolutely everything (in a manner that would be somehow less that fully satisfying to the enquiring intellect).
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Kaplan notes that the causal theory of reference can be understood in two quite different ways, as part of the semantics (involving descriptions of causal processes), or as metasemantics, explaining why a term has the referent it does.
     From: report of David Kaplan (Dthat [1970]) by Jonathan Schaffer - Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson 1
     A reaction: [Kaplan 'Afterthought' 1989] The theory tends to be labelled as 'direct' rather than as 'causal' these days, but causal chains are still at the heart of the story (even if more diffused socially). Nice question. Kaplan takes the meta- version as orthodox.