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All the ideas for 'Dthat', 'Reductive Theories of Modality' and 'Introduction to 'Personal Identity''

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
9218 Maybe what distinguishes philosophy from science is its pursuit of necessary truths [Sider]
     Full Idea: According to one tradition, necessary truth demarcates philosophical from empirical inquiry. Science identifies contingent aspects of the world, whereas philosophical inquiry reveals the essential nature of its objects.
     From: Theodore Sider (Reductive Theories of Modality [2003], 1)
     A reaction: I don't think there is a clear demarcation, and I would think that lots of generalizations about contingent truths are in philosophical territory, but I quite like this idea - even if it does make scientists laugh at philosophers.
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
5504 Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi]
     Full Idea: Some recent philosophers have argued that we should replace the three-dimensional view of persons with a four-dimensional view according to which only time-slices, or 'stages', of persons exist at short intervals of time.
     From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3)
     A reaction: At first glance this seems to neatly eliminate lots of traditional worries. But why would I want to retain my identity, if someone threatened to brainwash me. I also want to disown my inadequate earlier selves. Interesting, though. Lewis.
5503 Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi]
     Full Idea: A modern question is whether personal identity is primarily what matters in survival; that is, people might cease and be continued by others whose continuation the original people would value as much.
     From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3)
     A reaction: When put like this, the proposal seems hard to grasp. It only makes sense if you don't really believe in a thing called 'personal identity'. I don't see how you can believe in it without also believing that for you it has central importance.
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
5502 Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi]
     Full Idea: In modern times the Lockean intrinsic relations view of personal identity has been superseded by an extrinsic relations view (also called the 'closest-continuer' or 'externalist' view).
     From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.1)
     A reaction: Sounds sweeping. My suspicion is that there is a raging fashion for externalist views of everything (justification, content etc.), but this will pass. I take Parfit to be the source of the modern views.
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14080 Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Kaplan notes that the causal theory of reference can be understood in two quite different ways, as part of the semantics (involving descriptions of causal processes), or as metasemantics, explaining why a term has the referent it does.
     From: report of David Kaplan (Dthat [1970]) by Jonathan Schaffer - Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson 1
     A reaction: [Kaplan 'Afterthought' 1989] The theory tends to be labelled as 'direct' rather than as 'causal' these days, but causal chains are still at the heart of the story (even if more diffused socially). Nice question. Kaplan takes the meta- version as orthodox.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
5505 For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi]
     Full Idea: In Aristotle's view, with the possible exception of 'nous' the psyche and all its parts come into being at the same time as its associated body; it is inseparable from the body, and perishes along with it.
     From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.8)
     A reaction: It is suggested that he thought there was only one 'nous', which all humans share (p.9). If he wants to claim that one part is immortal, he doesn't have much evidence. If psyche is the form of the body, it is bound to perish.