32 ideas
| 18290 | But what is the reasoning of the body, that it requires the wisdom you seek? [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: There is more reason in your body than in your best wisdom. For who knows for what purpose your body requires precisely your best wisdom? | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.05) | |
| A reaction: Lovely question. For years I've paid lip-service to wisdom as the rough aim of all philosophy. Not quite knowing what wisdom is doesn't bother me, but knowing why I want wisdom certainly does, especially after this idea. |
| 18303 | Reject wisdom that lacks laughter [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Let that wisdom be false to us that brought no laughter with it! | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 3.12.23) |
| 18305 | To love truth, you must know how to lie [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Inability to lie is far from being love of truth. ....He who cannot lie does not know what truth is. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 4.13.9) |
| 19718 | Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann] |
| Full Idea: Infallibility does not follow from indefeasibility. | |
| From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'Significance') | |
| A reaction: If very little evidence exists then this could clearly be the case. It is especially true of historical and archaeological evidence. |
| 19717 | Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann] |
| Full Idea: Can the original justification of a belief be regained through a successful defeat of a defeater? | |
| From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'Defeater-Defs') | |
| A reaction: [Jäger 2005 addresses this] I would have thought the answer is yes. I aspire to coherent justifications, so I don't see justifications as a chain of defeat and counter-defeat, but as collective groups of support and challenge. |
| 19716 | Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann] |
| Full Idea: An unmodified reliabilism does not accommodate defeaters, and surely there can be defeaters against reliably produced beliefs? | |
| From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'Defeaters') | |
| A reaction: [He cites Bonjour 1980] Reliabilism has plenty of problems anyway, since a generally reliable process can obviously occasionally produce a bad result. 20:20 vision is not perfect vision. Internalist seem to like defeaters. |
| 19715 | You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann] |
| Full Idea: There are 'rebutting' defeaters against the truth of a previously justified belief, 'undercutting' defeaters against the power of the evidence, and 'reason-defeating' defeaters against the truth of the reason for the belief. | |
| From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'How') | |
| A reaction: That is (I think) that you can defeat the background, the likelihood, or the truth. He cites Pollock 1986, and implies that these are standard distinctions about defeaters. |
| 19713 | Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann] |
| Full Idea: Advocates of the defeasibility theory have tried to exclude true pieces of information that are misleading defeaters. | |
| From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'What') | |
| A reaction: He gives as an example the genuine news of a claim that the suspect has a twin. |
| 19714 | Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann] |
| Full Idea: The 'defeasibility theory' of knowledge claims that knowledge is only present if there are no facts that - if they were known - would be genuine defeaters of the relevant justification. | |
| From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'What') | |
| A reaction: Something not right here. A genuine defeater would ensure the proposition was false, so it would simply fail the truth test. So we need a 'defeater' for a truth, which must therefore by definition be misleading. Many qualifications have to be invoked. |
| 19719 | 'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann] |
| Full Idea: Theories that combine basic justification with the defeasibility of this justification are referred to as 'moderate' foundationalism. | |
| From: Thomas Grundmann (Defeasibility Theory [2011], 'Significance') | |
| A reaction: I could be more sympathetic to this sort of foundationalism. But it begins to sound more like Neurath's boat (see Quine) than like Descartes' metaphor of building foundations. |
| 20757 | The powerful self behind your thoughts and feelings is your body [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Behind your thoughts and feelings stands a powerful commander, an unknown wise man - he is called a self. He lives in your body; he is your body. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], I.4), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 5 'Creature' | |
| A reaction: I find Nietzsche's view of the self very congenial, though I tend to see the self as certain central functions of the brain. The brain is enmeshed in the body (as in the location of pains). |
| 18289 | Forget the word 'I'; 'I' is performed by the intelligence of your body [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: You say 'I' and you are proud of this word. But greater than this - although you will not believe in it - is your body and its great intelligence, which does not say 'I' but performs 'I'. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.05) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure if I understand this, but I offer it as a candidate for the most profound idea ever articulated about personal identity. |
| 14894 | Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
| Full Idea: Kaplan distinguished two different semantic features of indexical expressions: a 'character' that captures the standing meaning of the expression, and a 'content' that consists of their truth-conditional contribution in particular contexts. | |
| From: report of David Kaplan (Demonstratives [1989]) by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro - Introduction to 'Two-Dimensional Semantics' 1 | |
| A reaction: This seems so clearly right that there isn't much to dispute. You can't understand the word 'I' or 'now' if you don't understand both its general purpose, and what it is doing in a particular utterance. But will this generalise to other semantics? |
| 14700 | 'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter] |
| Full Idea: Kaplan sees two aspects of meaning, the 'content', reflecting a thing's modal profile, which is modelled by standard possible worlds semantics, and 'character', giving rules for different contexts. Proper names have constant character; indexicals vary. | |
| From: report of David Kaplan (Demonstratives [1989]) by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics 1.1.1 | |
| A reaction: This gives rise to 2-D matrices for representing meaning, and the possible worlds are used twice, for evaluating meaning and then for evaluating context of use. I've always been struck by the two-dimensional semantics of passwords. |
| 18299 | The will is constantly frustrated by the past [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Powerless against that which has been done, the will is an angry spectator of all things past. The will cannot will backwards; that it cannot break time and time's desire - that is the will's most lonely affliction. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 2.20) |
| 18297 | We created meanings, to maintain ourselves [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Man first implanted values into things to maintain himself - he first created the meaning of things, a human meaning! | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.16) | |
| A reaction: It is certainly hard to see anything resembling values or meaning in the cosmos, if you remove the human beings. We should expect an evolutionary grounding in their explanation. |
| 18293 | The noble man wants new virtues; the good man preserves what is old [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The noble man wants to create new things and a new virtue. The good man wants the old things and that the old things shall be preserved. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.09) | |
| A reaction: There is a limit to how many plausible virtues the noble men can come up with. We may already have run out. Are we going to have to re-run the Iliad? |
| 18301 | We only really love children and work [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: One loves from the very heart only one's child and one's work. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 3.03) | |
| A reaction: Very Nietzchean (and masculine?) to cite one's work. Rachmaninov said he was 85% musician and 15% human being, so I guess he loved music from the very heart. |
| 18307 | I want my work, not happiness! [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Do I aspire after happiness? I aspire after my work! | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 4.20) | |
| A reaction: I empathise with aspiring to do something, rather than be something. But what do we wish for our children? Happiness first, then achievement? |
| 18291 | Virtues can destroy one another, through jealousy [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Every virtue is jealous of the others, and jealousy is a terrible thing. Even virtues can be destroyed through jealousy. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.07) | |
| A reaction: How much more subtle and plausible than the picture of accumulating virtues, like medals! Zarathustra says it is best to have just one virtue. |
| 18287 | People now find both wealth and poverty too much of a burden [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Nobody grows rich or poor any more: both are too much of a burden. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.01) | |
| A reaction: True. Most people I know are just puzzled by people who actually seem to want to be extremely wealthy. |
| 18295 | If you want friends, you must be a fighter [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: If you want a friend, you must be willing to wage war for him: and to wage war, you must be capable of being an enemy. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.15) |
| 18286 | The greatest experience possible is contempt for your own happiness, reason and virtue [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: What is the greatest thing you can experience? It is the hour of the great contempt. The hour in which even your happiness grows loathsome to you, and your reason and your virtue also. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.01) | |
| A reaction: This would be a transient state for Nietzsche, in which you realise the hollowness of those traditional ideas, and begin to seek something else. |
| 18296 | An enduring people needs its own individual values [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: No people could live without evaluating; but if it wishes to maintain itself it must not evaluate as its neighbour evaluates. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.16) | |
| A reaction: Political philosophers say plenty about a 'people', but little about what unifies them, or about what keeps one people distinct from another. Most people's are proud of their local values. |
| 18294 | The state coldly claims that it is the people, but that is a lie [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The state is the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly it lies, too; and this lie creeps from its mouth: 'I, the state, am the people'. It is a lie! | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.12) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as just as true even after everyone gets the vote. Rulers can't help gradually forgetting about the people. |
| 18304 | Saints want to live as they desire, or not to live at all [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: 'To live as I desire to live or not to live at all': that is what I want, that is what the most saintly man wants. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 4.09) | |
| A reaction: [spoken by Zarathustra] |
| 18300 | Whenever we have seen suffering, we have wanted the revenge of punishment [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The spirit of revenge: my friends, that, up to now, has been mankind's chief concern; and where there was suffering, there was always supposed to be punishment. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 2.20) |
| 18302 | Man and woman are deeply strange to one another! [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Who has fully conceived how strange man and woman are to one another! | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 3.10.2) |
| 18292 | I can only believe in a God who can dance [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: I should believe only in a God who understood how to dance. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.08) |
| 18298 | Not being a god is insupportable, so there are no gods! [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: If there were gods, how could I endure not to be a god! Therefore there are no gods. ...For what would there to be create if gods - existed! | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 2.02) | |
| A reaction: [Zarathustra says this, not Nietzsche!] |
| 18288 | Heaven was invented by the sick and the dying [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: It was the sick and dying who despised the body and the earth and invented the things of heaven and the redeeming drops of blood. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 1.04) |
| 18306 | We don't want heaven; now that we are men, we want the kingdom of earth [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: We certainly do not want to enter into the kingdom of heaven: we have become men, so we want the kingdom of earth. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra [1884], 4.18.2) |