Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Dthat', 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind' and 'Reference and Essence: seven appendices'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness

14742	It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x [Salmon,N]
	Full Idea: Insofar as identity seems vague, it is provably mistaken. If it is vague whether x and y are identical (as in the Ship of Theseus), then x,y is definitely not the same as x,x, since the first pair is indeterminate and the second pair isn't.
	From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence: seven appendices [2005], App I)
	A reaction: [compressed; Gareth Evans 1978 made a similar point] This strikes me as begging the question in the Ship case, since we are shoehorning the new ship into either the slot for x or the slot for y, but that was what we couldn’t decide. No rough identity?

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique

6382	The 'grain problem' says physical objects are granular, where sensations appear not to be [Sellars, by Polger]
	Full Idea: Sellars' Grain Problem contended that it was a problem for materialism that physical objects have a granularity whereas sensations are homogeneous and without grain.
	From: report of Wilfrid Sellars (Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind [1956], Ch. n22) by Thomas W. Polger - Natural Minds Ch.1 n22
	A reaction: This doesn't strike me as a serious problem. I assume that my sensations are granular, but at a level too fine for me to introspect. There are three hundred trillion connections in the brain (Idea 2952), a lot of them involved in sensations.

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference

18885	Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism [Salmon,N]
	Full Idea: Kripke and Putnam made unsubstantiated claims, indeed false claims, to the effect that the theory of direct reference has nontrivial essentialist import.
	From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence: seven appendices [2005], Pref to Exp Ed)
	A reaction: Kripke made very few claims, and is probably innocent of the charge. Most people agree with Salmon that you can't derive metaphysics from a theory of reference.

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

14080	Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
	Full Idea: Kaplan notes that the causal theory of reference can be understood in two quite different ways, as part of the semantics (involving descriptions of causal processes), or as metasemantics, explaining why a term has the referent it does.
	From: report of David Kaplan (Dthat [1970]) by Jonathan Schaffer - Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson 1
	A reaction: [Kaplan 'Afterthought' 1989] The theory tends to be labelled as 'direct' rather than as 'causal' these days, but causal chains are still at the heart of the story (even if more diffused socially). Nice question. Kaplan takes the meta- version as orthodox.