16 ideas
7910 | Pursue truth with the urgency of someone whose clothes are on fire [Ashvaghosha] |
Full Idea: As though your turban or your clothes were on fire, so with a sense of urgency should you apply your intellect to the comprehension of the truths. | |
From: Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI) | |
A reaction: The best philosophers need no such urging. I retain a romantic view that we should be 'natural' in these things. See Plato's views in Idea 2153 and 1638. However, maybe I should be confronted with this quotation every morning when I awake. |
11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
Full Idea: So-called 'Aristotelian essentialism' is the doctrine of essences not relative to specifications. | |
From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], III) | |
A reaction: In other words, they are so-called 'real essences', understood as de re. Quine says essences are all de dicto, and relative to some specification. I vote for Aristotle. |
11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Just as a sentence is necessary if it holds in all worlds, so it is causally necessary if it holds in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature. | |
From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], V) | |
A reaction: I don't believe in the so-called 'laws of nature', so I'm not buying that. Is there no distinction in Lewis's view between those sentences which must hold, and those which happen to hold universally? |
11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Even if Humphrey is a modal continuant, it doesn't take the whole of him to do such things as winning. | |
From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], Post B) | |
A reaction: This responds to Kripke's famous example, that people only care about what happens to themselves, and not to some 'counterpart' of themselves. |
16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
Full Idea: Probably Humphrey could not care less whether someone else, no matter how much resembling him, would have been victorious in another possible world. Thus Lewis's view seems even more bizarre that the usual transworld identification it replaces. | |
From: comment on David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968]) by Saul A. Kripke - Naming and Necessity notes and addenda note 13 | |
A reaction: I begin to see this as a devastating reply to a theory I previously found quite congenial. |
11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Your counterparts resemble you closely in content and context in important respects. They resemble you more closely than do the other things in their worlds. But they are not really you. | |
From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], I) | |
A reaction: It is a dilemma. If my counterpart were exactly me, I couldn't contemplate possibly losing a leg, or my sanity. But if my counterpart isn't exactly me, then I don't have much interest in its fate. Only essences can save us here. Cf. me tomorrow. |
11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
Full Idea: If whatever thing in world w6 it is that resembles you more closely than anything else in w6 is nevertheless quite unlike you; nothing in w6 resembles you at all closely. If so, you have no counterpart in w6. | |
From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], I) | |
A reaction: This is the nub, because the whole theory rests on deciding whether two things resemble sufficiently 'closely'. But then we need a criterion of closeness, so we must start talking about which properties matter. Essences loom. |
11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
Full Idea: An essential attribute of something is an attribute it shares with all its counterparts. | |
From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], III) | |
A reaction: I don't like this. It ties essence entirely to identity, but I think essence precedes identity. Essence is a nexus of causal and explanatory powers which bestows an identity on each thing. But essence might be unstable, and identity with it. |
17066 | 3: If an analogous pair explain another analogous pair, then they all cohere [Thagard, by Smart] |
Full Idea: 3: If two analogous propositions separately explain different ones of a further pair of analogous propositions, then the first pair cohere with one another, and so do the second (explananda) pair. | |
From: report of Paul Thagard (Explanatory Coherence [1989], 3) by J.J.C. Smart - Explanation - Opening Address p.04 |
17064 | 1: Coherence is a symmetrical relation between two propositions [Thagard, by Smart] |
Full Idea: 1: Coherence and incoherence are symmetrical between pairs of propositions. | |
From: report of Paul Thagard (Explanatory Coherence [1989], 1) by J.J.C. Smart - Explanation - Opening Address p.04 |
17067 | 4: For coherence, observation reports have a degree of intrinsic acceptability [Thagard, by Smart] |
Full Idea: 4: Observation reports (for coherence) have a degree of acceptability on their own. | |
From: report of Paul Thagard (Explanatory Coherence [1989], 4) by J.J.C. Smart - Explanation - Opening Address p.04 | |
A reaction: Thagard makes this an axiom, but Smart rejects that and says there is no reason why observation reports should not also be accepted because of their coherence (with our views about our senses etc.). I agree with Smart. |
17068 | 5: Contradictory propositions incohere [Thagard, by Smart] |
Full Idea: 5: Contradictory propositions incohere. | |
From: report of Paul Thagard (Explanatory Coherence [1989], 5) by J.J.C. Smart - Explanation - Opening Address p.04 | |
A reaction: This has to be a minimal axiom for coherence, but coherence is always taken to be more than mere logical consistency. Mutual relevance is the first step. At least there must be no category mistakes. |
17069 | 6: A proposition's acceptability depends on its coherence with a system [Thagard, by Smart] |
Full Idea: 6: Acceptability of a proposition in a system depends on its coherence with the propositions in that system. | |
From: report of Paul Thagard (Explanatory Coherence [1989], 6) by J.J.C. Smart - Explanation - Opening Address p.04 | |
A reaction: Thagard tried to build an AI system for coherent explanations, but I would say he has no chance with these six axioms, because they never grasp the nettle of what 'coherence' means. You first need rules for how things relate. What things are comparable? |
17065 | 2: An explanation must wholly cohere internally, and with the new fact [Thagard, by Smart] |
Full Idea: 2: If a set of propositions explains a further proposition, then each proposition in the set coheres with that proposition, and propositions in the set cohere pairwise with one another. | |
From: report of Paul Thagard (Explanatory Coherence [1989], 2) by J.J.C. Smart - Explanation - Opening Address p.04 |
7909 | The Eightfold Path concerns morality, wisdom, and tranquillity [Ashvaghosha] |
Full Idea: The Eightfold Path has three steps concerning morality - right speech, right bodily action, and right livelihood; three of wisdom - right views, right intentions, and right effort; and two of tranquillity - right mindfulness and right concentration. | |
From: Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI) | |
A reaction: Most of this translates quite comfortably into the aspirations of western philosophy. For example, 'right effort' sounds like Kant's claim that only a good will is truly good (Idea 3710). The Buddhist division is interesting for action theory. |
7908 | At the end of a saint, he is not located in space, but just ceases to be disturbed [Ashvaghosha] |
Full Idea: When an accomplished saint comes to the end, he does not go anywhere down in the earth or up in the sky, nor into any of the directions of space, but because his defilements have become extinct he simply ceases to be disturbed. | |
From: Ashvaghosha (Saundaranandakavya [c.50], XVI) | |
A reaction: To 'cease to be disturbed' is the most attractive account of heaven I have encountered. It all sounds a bit dull though. I wonder, as usual, how they know all this stuff. |