6 ideas
| 15549 | If it were true that nothing at all existed, would that have a truthmaker? [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: If there was absolutely nothing at all, then it would have been true that there was nothing. Would there have been a truthmaker for this truth? | |
| From: David Lewis (A world of truthmakers? [1998], p.220) | |
| A reaction: This is a problem for Lewis's own claim that 'truth supervenes on being', as well as the more restricted truthmakers invoked by Armstrong. |
| 13365 | Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902]) by Graham Priest - The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference §2 |
| 10711 | Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's paradox showed that we cannot consistently assume what is sometimes called the 'naïve comprehension principle', namely that every property is collectivizing. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902]) by Michael Potter - Set Theory and Its Philosophy 03.6 |
| 9127 | Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen] |
| Full Idea: Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902], 1904.12.12) by Roy Sorensen - Vagueness and Contradiction 6.1 | |
| A reaction: This is the principle stumbling block to any attempt to explain properties purely in terms of sets. I would say that Russell proved there couldn't be a set for each predicate. You can't glibly equate proper properties with predicates. |
| 7531 | We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell] |
| Full Idea: I believe Mont Blanc itself is a component part of what is actually asserted in the proposition 'Mont Blanc is more than 4000 metres high'; we do not assert the thought, which is a private psychological matter, but the object of the thought. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902], 1904.12.12), quoted by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: This would appear to be pretty much externalism about concepts, given that Russell would accept that other people know much more about Mont Blanc than he does, and their knowledge is included in what he asserts. |
| 18285 | All translation loses some content (but language does not create reality) [Carnap] |
| Full Idea: I do not believe in translatability without loss of content, and therefore I think that the content of a world description is influenced to a certain degree by choice of a language form. But that does not mean that reality is created through language. | |
| From: Rudolph Carnap (Letters to Schlick [1935], 1935.12.04), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 19 'Truth' | |
| A reaction: It is a mistake to think Quine was the first to spot the interest of translation in philosophy of language. 'Does translation always lose content?' is a very nice question for focusing the problem. |