43 ideas
6961 | An analogy begins to break down as soon as the two cases differ [Hume] |
Full Idea: But wherever you depart, in the least, from the similarity of the cases, you diminish proportionably the evidence; and may at last bring it to a very weak analogy. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 2) |
13831 | Logic is based on transitions between sentences [Prawitz] |
Full Idea: I agree entirely with Dummett that the right way to answer the question 'what is logic?' is to consider transitions between sentences. | |
From: Dag Prawitz (Gentzen's Analysis of First-Order Proofs [1974], §04) | |
A reaction: I always protest at this point that reliance on sentences is speciesism against animals, who are thereby debarred from reasoning. See the wonderful Idea 1875 of Chrysippus. Hacking's basic suggestion seems right. Transition between thoughts. |
13825 | Natural deduction introduction rules may represent 'definitions' of logical connectives [Prawitz] |
Full Idea: With Gentzen's natural deduction, we may say that the introductions represent, as it were, the 'definitions' of the logical constants. The introductions are not literally understood as 'definitions'. | |
From: Dag Prawitz (Gentzen's Analysis of First-Order Proofs [1974], 2.2.2) | |
A reaction: [Hacking, in 'What is Logic? §9' says Gentzen had the idea that his rules actually define the constants; not sure if Prawitz and Hacking are disagreeing] |
13823 | In natural deduction, inferences are atomic steps involving just one logical constant [Prawitz] |
Full Idea: In Gentzen's natural deduction, the inferences are broken down into atomic steps in such a way that each step involves only one logical constant. The steps are the introduction or elimination of the logical constants. | |
From: Dag Prawitz (Gentzen's Analysis of First-Order Proofs [1974], 1.1) |
9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
Full Idea: Maybe a disposition is a more fundamental notion than a cause, in which case Lewis has from the very start erred in seeking a causal analysis, in a traditional, conceptual sense, of disposition terms. | |
From: comment on David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 2.2.8 | |
A reaction: Is this right about Lewis? I see him as reducing both dispositions and causes to a set of bald facts, which exist in possible and actual worlds. Conditionals and counterfactuals also suffer the same fate. |
8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
Full Idea: A counterfactual is non-vacuously true iff it takes less of a departure from actuality to make the consequent true along with the antecedent than it does to make the antecedent true without the consequent. | |
From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.197) | |
A reaction: Almost every theory proposed by Lewis hangs on the meaning of the word 'close', as used here. If you visited twenty Earth-like worlds (watch Startrek?), it would be a struggle to decide their closeness to ours in rank order. |
21285 | Events are baffling before experience, and obvious after experience [Hume] |
Full Idea: Every event, before experience, is equally difficult and incomprehensible; and every event, after experience, is equally easy and intelligible. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 8) | |
A reaction: If you don't believe this, spend some time watching documentaries about life in the deep oceans. Things beyond imagination swim around in front of you. But we can extrapolate, once the possibilities are revealed by experience. |
8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
Full Idea: By determinism I mean that the prevailing laws of nature are such that there do not exist any two possible worlds which are exactly alike up to that time, which differ thereafter, and in which those laws are never violated. | |
From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.196) | |
A reaction: This would mean that the only way an action of free will could creep in would be if it accepted being a 'violation' of the laws of nature. Fans of free will would probably prefer to call it a 'natural' phenomenon. I'm with Lewis. |
8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I identify a proposition with the set of possible worlds where it is true. | |
From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.193) | |
A reaction: As it stands, I'm baffled by this. How can 'it is raining' be a set of possible worlds? I assume it expands to refer to the truth-conditions, among possibilities as well as actualities. 'It is raining' fits all worlds where it is raining. |
8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
Full Idea: Lewis thinks it is a major defect in a theory of causation that it builds in the condition that the time of the cause precede that of the effect: that cause precedes effect is something we ought to explain (which his counterfactual theory claims to do). | |
From: report of David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by Hartry Field - Causation in a Physical World | |
A reaction: My immediate reaction is that the chances of explaining such a thing are probably nil, and that we might as well just accept the direction of causation as a given. Even philosophers balk at the question 'why doesn't time go backwards?' |
8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
Full Idea: One might stipulate that a cause must always precede its effect, but I reject this solution. It won't solve the problem of epiphenomena, it rejects a priori any backwards causation, and it trivializes defining time-direction through causation. | |
From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.203) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Not strong arguments, I would say. Maybe apparent causes are never epiphenomenal. Maybe backwards causation is impossible. Maybe we must use time to define causal direction, and not vice versa. |
10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
Full Idea: We sometimes single out one among all the causes of some event and call it 'the' cause. ..We may select the abnormal causes, or those under human control, or those we deem good or bad, or those we want to talk about. This is invidious discrimination. | |
From: David Lewis (Causation [1973]) | |
A reaction: This is the standard view expressed by Mill - presumably the obvious empiricist line. But if we specify 'the pre-conditions' for an event, we can't just mention ANY fact prior to the effect - there is obvious relevance. So why not for 'the' cause as well? |
8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
Full Idea: In present-day regularity analyses, a cause is defined (roughly) as any member of any minimal set of actual conditions that are jointly sufficient, given the laws, for the existence of the effect. | |
From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.193) | |
A reaction: This is the view Lewis is about to reject. It seem to summarise the essence of the Mackie INUS theory. This account would make the presence of oxygen a cause of almost every human event. |
8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
Full Idea: In the regularity analysis of causes, instead of c causing e, c might turn out to be an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or an inefficacious effect of a genuine cause, or a pre-empted cause (by some other cause) of e. | |
From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.194) | |
A reaction: These are Lewis's reasons for rejecting the general regularity account, in favour of his own particular counterfactual account. It is unlikely that c would be regularly pre-empted or epiphenomenal. If we build time's direction in, it won't be an effect. |
17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
Full Idea: The Humean idea, developed by Lewis, is that rather than being sufficient for their effects, causes are (counterfactual) necessary for their effects. | |
From: report of David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by Alexander Bird - Causation and the Manifestation of Powers p.162 |
17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
Full Idea: Lewis's basic account has a basic causal relation, counterfactual dependence, and the general causal relation is the ancestral of this basic one. ...This is motivated by counterfactual dependence failing to be general because of the pre-emption problem. | |
From: report of David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by Alexander Bird - Causation and the Manifestation of Powers p.161 | |
A reaction: It is so nice when you struggle for ages with a topic, and then some clever person summarises it clearly for you. |
8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
Full Idea: Some counterfactuals are based on non-causal laws, such as Newton's Third Law of Motion. 'If no force one way, then no force the other'. Lewis's counterfactual analysis implies that one force causes the other, which is not the case. | |
From: comment on David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience 5.2 | |
A reaction: So what exactly does 'cause' my punt to move forwards? Basing causal laws on counterfactual claims looks to me like putting the cart before the horse. |
8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
Full Idea: My (counterfactual) analysis is meant to apply to causation in particular cases; it is not an analysis of causal generalizations. Those presumably quantify over particulars, but it is hard to match natural language to the quantifiers. | |
From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.195) | |
A reaction: What authority could you have for asserting a counterfactual claim, if you only had one observation? Isn't the counterfactual claim the hallmark of a generalisation? For one case, 'if not-c, then not-e' is just a speculation. |
8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
Full Idea: One event is the cause of another iff there exists a causal chain leading from the first to the second. | |
From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.200) | |
A reaction: It will be necessary to both explain and identify a 'chain'. Some chains are extremely tenuous (Alexander could stop a barrel of beer). Go back a hundred years, and the cause of any present event is everything back then. |
4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |
Full Idea: Lewis can elucidate the logic of counterfactuals on the assumption that you are not at all puzzled about what a law of nature is. But if you are puzzled about this, it cannot contribute anything towards resolving your puzzlement. | |
From: comment on David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by L. Jonathan Cohen - The Problem of Natural Laws p.219 | |
A reaction: This seems like a penetrating remark. The counterfactual theory is wrong, partly because it is epistemological instead of ontological, and partly because it refuses to face the really difficult problem, of what is going on out there. |
6959 | We can't assume God's perfections are like our ideas or like human attributes [Hume] |
Full Idea: But let us beware, lest we think, that our ideas anywise correspond to his perfections, or that his attributes have any resemblance to these qualities among men. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 2) |
6957 | The objects of theological reasoning are too big for our minds [Hume] |
Full Idea: But in theological reasonings … we are employed upon objects, which, we must be sensible, are too large for our grasp. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 1) |
21255 | No being's non-existence can imply a contradiction, so its existence cannot be proved a priori [Hume] |
Full Idea: Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive of as existent we can also conceive as non-existent. So there is no being whose non-existence implies a contradiction. So no being's existence is demonstrable. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 9) | |
A reaction: I totally subscribe to this idea, and take claims that nature actually contains contradictions (based on the inevitable quantum mechanics) to be ridiculous. Nature is the embodiment, chief exemplar and prime test of consistency. |
21254 | A chain of events requires a cause for the whole as well as the parts, yet the chain is just a sum of parts [Hume] |
Full Idea: The whole chain or succession [of causes and effects], taken together, is not caused by anything, and yet it is evident that it requires a cause or reason, as much as any particular object which begins to exist in time. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 9) | |
A reaction: This is such a major and significant idea. With blinkers on we think our questions are answered. Then someone (a philosopher, inevitably) makes you pull back and ask a much wider and more difficult question. |
1435 | If something must be necessary so that something exists rather than nothing, why can't the universe be necessary? [Hume] |
Full Idea: What was it that determined something to exist rather than nothing? ...This implies a necessary being… But why may not the material universe be the necessarily existent being? | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 9) | |
A reaction: There certainly seems no need for whatever the necessary thing is that it qualify as a 'god'. If could be a necessary subatomic particle that suddenly triggers reactions. |
6962 | The thing which contains order must be God, so see God where you see order [Hume] |
Full Idea: By supposing something to contain the principle of its order within itself, we really assert it to be God; and the sooner we arrive at that divine being, so much the better. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 4) |
6960 | Analogy suggests that God has a very great human mind [Hume] |
Full Idea: Since the effects resemble, we must infer by analogy that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of his work. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 2) |
6963 | Why would we infer an infinite creator from a finite creation? [Hume] |
Full Idea: By this method of reasoning, you renounce all claim to infinity in any of the attributes of the deity. For … the cause ought only to be proportioned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it falls under our cognizance, is not infinite. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 5) |
21279 | If the divine cause is proportional to its effects, the effects are finite, so the Deity cannot be infinite [Hume] |
Full Idea: By this method of reasoning you renounce all claim to infinity in any of the attributes of the Deity. The cause ought to be proportional to the effect, and the effect, so far as it falls under our cognizance, is not infinite. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 5) | |
A reaction: You cannot deny that the Deity MAY be infinite, be only accept that your evidence is not enough to prove it. But if nothing infinite has been observed, it is a reasonable provisional inference that nothing infinite exists. |
21280 | From a ship you would judge its creator a genius, not a mere humble workman [Hume] |
Full Idea: It is uncertain whether all the excellences of the work can justly be ascribed to the workman. If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form of the ingenuity of the carpenter ...and what surprise must we feel when we find him a stupid mechanic. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 5) | |
A reaction: You can at least infer that the ship was not made entirely by makers who are ignorant of carpentry. Somewhere in the divine team there must exist the skills that produce whatever we observe? |
21282 | Design cannot prove a unified Deity. Many men make a city, so why not many gods for a world? [Hume] |
Full Idea: How can you prove the unity of a Deity? A great number of men join in building a house or ship, in rearing a city; why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing a world? | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 5) | |
A reaction: You might look at the Cistine Chapel ceiling and conclude that only a team could have achieve such a thing. Since there is no way to infer how many gods might be involved, then one god is a possible theory. |
21281 | This excellent world may be the result of a huge sequence of trial-and-error [Hume] |
Full Idea: Many worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, ere this system was struck out; many fruitless trials made, and a slow but continued improvement carried on during infinite ages in the art of world-making. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 5) | |
A reaction: Lee Smolin, a modern cosmographer, suggests that this evolution may have led to the current universe, after a long train of selective creations. The idea of natural selection was waiting to happen in 1760. |
21283 | Humans renew their species sexually. If there are many gods, would they not do the same? [Hume] |
Full Idea: Men are mortal and renew their species by generation. Why must this circumstance, so universal, so essential, be excluded from those numerous and limited deities? | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 5) | |
A reaction: Hume observes that this would be like the Greek gods. Hume makes mincemeat of attempts to prove the existence of God merely by analogy with human affairs. |
21284 | This Creator god might be an infant or incompetent or senile [Hume] |
Full Idea: [Maybe] this world ...was only the first essay of some infant deity ...or it is the work only of some dependent, inferior deity, the object of derision to his superiors ...or it is the product of the dotage of some superannuated deity... | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 5) | |
A reaction: His opponent in the dialogue rejoices that, in the face of these sacreligious fantasies, Hume still accepts the likelihood of some sort of design. Hume is right that it is not much of a theory if nothing can be said about the Designer. |
21286 | Motion often begins in matter, with no sign of a controlling agent [Hume] |
Full Idea: Motion in many instances begins in matter, without any known voluntary agent; to suppose always, in these cases, an unknown voluntary agent is mere hypothesis, attended with no advantages. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 8) | |
A reaction: This is the modern 'powers' view of science, and a direct contradiction of Plato's claims in The Laws. It seems a bit primitive to assume that magnetism must be the work of some god. |
21287 | The universe could settle into superficial order, without a designer [Hume] |
Full Idea: The universe goes on in a succession of chaos and disorder. But is it not possible that it may settle at last, so as not to lose its inherent motion and active force, yet so as to produce a uniformity of appearance, amidst the continual fluctuation. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 8) | |
A reaction: From what I know of the constant fluctuation of virtual particles (e.g. inside protons) this is exactly what actually is happening. There is an 'appearance' of order, but at the lowest level this is not the case. |
21288 | Ideas arise from objects, not vice versa; ideas only influence matter if they are linked [Hume] |
Full Idea: In all known instances, ideas are copied from real objects. You reverse this order and give thought the precedence. ...Thought has no influence upon matter except where that matter is so conjoined with it as to have an equal reciprocal influence upon it. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 8) | |
A reaction: He allows something like mental causation, provided mind and brain are closely linked. Hume brings out the close relationship between divine design theories, and the mind-body problem. |
21256 | A surprise feature of all products of 9 looks like design, but is actually a necessity [Hume] |
Full Idea: The products of 9 always compose either 9 or some lesser product of 9, if you add the characters of the product. To a superficial observer this regularity appears as chance or design, but a skilful algebraist sees it as necessity. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 9) | |
A reaction: An example of this universal generality is that 369 is a product of 9 (9x41), and if you add 3, 6 and 9 you get 18, which is 2x9. Similar examples occur in nature, such as crystals, which are necessary once the atomic structure is known. |
6958 | How can we pronounce on a whole after a brief look at a very small part? [Hume] |
Full Idea: A very small part of this great system, during a very short time, is very imperfectly discovered to us: and do we thence pronounce decisively concerning the origin of the whole? | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 2) |
6965 | The universe may be the result of trial-and-error [Hume] |
Full Idea: Many worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, ere this system was struck out. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 5) |
6964 | From our limited view, we cannot tell if the universe is faulty [Hume] |
Full Idea: It is impossible for us to tell, from our limited views, whether this system contains any great faults. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 5) |
6966 | Creation is more like vegetation than human art, so it won't come from reason [Hume] |
Full Idea: If the universe is more like animal bodies and vegetables than works of human art, it is more probable that its cause resembles the cause of the former than of the latter, and its cause should be ascribed to generation rather than to reason of design. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 7) |
6967 | Order may come from an irrational source as well as a rational one [Hume] |
Full Idea: Why an orderly system may not be spun from the belly as well as from the brain, it will be difficult … to give a satisfactory reason. | |
From: David Hume (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [1751], Part 7) |