3 ideas
| 11003 | The best version of reductionist actualism around is Armstrong's combinatorial account [Armstrong, by Read] |
| Full Idea: Armstrong's combinatorial theory of possibility is perhaps the most sophisticated and best worked out reductionist version of actualism to date. | |
| From: report of David M. Armstrong (The Nature of Possibility [1986]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.4 |
| 6624 | Dennett denies the existence of qualia [Dennett, by Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Dennett goes to the extreme of denying the existence of qualia altogether. | |
| From: report of Daniel C. Dennett (Quining Qualia [1988]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: I sympathise with Dennett. Once you know how physically complex and rapid a quale is (about nine billion connections, all firing continuously), the notion that it seems to be some new 'thing', while just being a process, seems fine. Like a waterfall. |
| 9425 | Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few) [Mumford on Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Later Lewis said we must choose between the intersection of the axioms of the tied best systems. He chose for laws the axioms that are in all the tied systems (but then there may be few or no axioms in the intersection). | |
| From: comment on David Lewis (Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance [1980], p.124) by Stephen Mumford - Laws in Nature |