21 ideas
| 11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: So-called 'Aristotelian essentialism' is the doctrine of essences not relative to specifications. | |
| From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], III) | |
| A reaction: In other words, they are so-called 'real essences', understood as de re. Quine says essences are all de dicto, and relative to some specification. I vote for Aristotle. |
| 11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Just as a sentence is necessary if it holds in all worlds, so it is causally necessary if it holds in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature. | |
| From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], V) | |
| A reaction: I don't believe in the so-called 'laws of nature', so I'm not buying that. Is there no distinction in Lewis's view between those sentences which must hold, and those which happen to hold universally? |
| 11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Even if Humphrey is a modal continuant, it doesn't take the whole of him to do such things as winning. | |
| From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], Post B) | |
| A reaction: This responds to Kripke's famous example, that people only care about what happens to themselves, and not to some 'counterpart' of themselves. |
| 16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Probably Humphrey could not care less whether someone else, no matter how much resembling him, would have been victorious in another possible world. Thus Lewis's view seems even more bizarre that the usual transworld identification it replaces. | |
| From: comment on David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968]) by Saul A. Kripke - Naming and Necessity notes and addenda note 13 | |
| A reaction: I begin to see this as a devastating reply to a theory I previously found quite congenial. |
| 11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Your counterparts resemble you closely in content and context in important respects. They resemble you more closely than do the other things in their worlds. But they are not really you. | |
| From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], I) | |
| A reaction: It is a dilemma. If my counterpart were exactly me, I couldn't contemplate possibly losing a leg, or my sanity. But if my counterpart isn't exactly me, then I don't have much interest in its fate. Only essences can save us here. Cf. me tomorrow. |
| 11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: If whatever thing in world w6 it is that resembles you more closely than anything else in w6 is nevertheless quite unlike you; nothing in w6 resembles you at all closely. If so, you have no counterpart in w6. | |
| From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], I) | |
| A reaction: This is the nub, because the whole theory rests on deciding whether two things resemble sufficiently 'closely'. But then we need a criterion of closeness, so we must start talking about which properties matter. Essences loom. |
| 11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: An essential attribute of something is an attribute it shares with all its counterparts. | |
| From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], III) | |
| A reaction: I don't like this. It ties essence entirely to identity, but I think essence precedes identity. Essence is a nexus of causal and explanatory powers which bestows an identity on each thing. But essence might be unstable, and identity with it. |
| 7096 | We may still admire a person's character even if the traits are involuntary [Statman] |
| Full Idea: If we focus on the evaluation of character traits, voluntariness becomes less important. We would not withdraw our admiration for a person only because we found out that his or her being such a person was not a result of voluntary choice. | |
| From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §3) | |
| A reaction: The need for voluntariness does not disappear. I would not admire the only generous deed you had ever performed if it was the result of hypnotism. I might admire the hypnotist. Nevertheless, I regard this idea as a crucial truth in moral theory. |
| 8108 | Aesthetics presupposes a distinctive sort of experience, and a unified essence for art [Gardner] |
| Full Idea: Aesthetics traditionally has two presuppositions: the first is that there is a distinctive form of experience which is common to the appreciation of art and natural beauty; the second is that art has an essence or some sort of underlying unity. | |
| From: Sebastian Gardner (Aesthetics [1995], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Both must come up for discussion. I think the biggest problem for the first one is the place of sexual attraction, or even fancying a prawn sandwich. The second has been weakened by Marcel Duchamp's urinal, and modern fringe arts. |
| 8112 | Art works originate in the artist's mind, and appreciation is re-creating this mental object [Gardner] |
| Full Idea: A strong tradition in aesthetics (the 'idealist' view) regards works of art as existing originally in the artist's mind, and the appreciation of art as a matter of re-creating the artist's mental object. | |
| From: Sebastian Gardner (Aesthetics [1995], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: He mentions Collingwood and Croce. Against this is the view (Idea 7268) that what goes on in the artist's mind is just irrelevant. Freud is important here, suggesting that the artist doesn't quite know what he or she is doing. |
| 8111 | Aesthetic objectivists must explain pleasure being essential, but not in the object [Gardner] |
| Full Idea: The aesthetic objectivist faces the difficulty of accounting for the fact that pleasure is not in the object, and is necessary for, and not just a contingent accompaniment to, aesthetic response. | |
| From: Sebastian Gardner (Aesthetics [1995], 1.2.3) | |
| A reaction: The objectivist has to claim, not utterly implausibly, that if you don't get pleasure from certain works, then you 'ought' to. You can ignore a good work, but to deny that it gives pleasure is a failing in you. |
| 7098 | There is a new sort of moral scepticism, about the possibility of moral theories [Statman] |
| Full Idea: Since the 1980s, ethics has witnessed a new sort of moral scepticism, this time about the possibility of moral theories. | |
| From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §4) | |
| A reaction: He cites McDowell, Williams, Nussbaum and Baier as the culprits. 'Particularism' (every situation is different, so there can't be rules) seems an essential part of virtue theory, but total absence of principles sounds to me like moral drift. |
| 8109 | Aesthetic judgements necessarily require first-hand experience, unlike moral judgements [Gardner] |
| Full Idea: I am not within my rights to declare an object beautiful until I have seen it myself, ..unlike moral judgement, which (arguably) does not presuppose either a felt response or personal acquaintance. | |
| From: Sebastian Gardner (Aesthetics [1995], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: Particularists might argue that moral judgements also require exposure to the actual situation, if they are to be authentic and authoritative. We can also discuss principles of aesthetics in the absence of examples. |
| 7099 | With a broad concept of flourishing, it might be possible without the virtues [Statman] |
| Full Idea: In a rich conception of human flourishing, both individuals and societies seem to be able to flourish without the virtues. | |
| From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §5) | |
| A reaction: I can see Aristotle clutching his head in despair at this thought. It might look like flourishing, but it couldn't be the real thing. It is Aristotle's fault, though, for including external goods. Money and pleasure offer a kind of flourishing. |
| 7100 | Virtue theory isn't a genuine ethical theory, because it doesn't have universal application [Statman] |
| Full Idea: It can be claimed that universality is a necessary property of any ethical theory and therefore virtue theory, which fails in this respect, is not a theory, and hence poses no alternative to genuine ethical theories. | |
| From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §5) | |
| A reaction: Replies: a) totally universal morality is an idle dream (part of the 'Enlightenment Project' to prove everything) and we must settle for something more relative; b) virtues aren't totally universal, but they are truths about humanity. I prefer b). |
| 7102 | Promises create moral duties that have nothing to do with character [Statman] |
| Full Idea: That duties are created irrespective of facts about character is obvious from the case of promises, which bind their makers irrespective of their motives or personality. | |
| From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §5) | |
| A reaction: Just occasionally a promise can be broken, by a sensitive and wise person. I promise to give your son some money; I then discover he is a drug dealer. Promises arise out of character, and cannot be made by robots. |
| 7095 | Moral education is better by concrete example than abstract principle [Statman] |
| Full Idea: According to virtue theory, education through moral exemplars is more effective than education focused on principles and obligations, because it is far more concrete. | |
| From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §3) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle's view is that virtues must be developed from childhood, when principles don't mean much. The problem is that young people may witness highly virtuous behaviour in their exemplars, but totally fail to appreciate it without mention of principles. |
| 7094 | Friends express friendship even when no utility is involved [Statman] |
| Full Idea: Being a good friend means acting in ways that express the friendship even when those ways do not promote overall utility. | |
| From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §3) | |
| A reaction: This implies that friendship is a true virtue of character, rather than having friends just being an 'external' good. Having friends is good; being friends is a virtue. There are duties of friendship. |
| 7104 | The ancients recognised imperfect duties, but we have added perfect duties like justice [Statman] |
| Full Idea: The advantage of modern thinkers over the ancient virtue ethicists is that in addition to imperfect duties (i.e. virtues) they also recognise the existence of perfect duties, or duties of justice, which are essential for the existence of society. | |
| From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §7) | |
| A reaction: Even the Greeks had laws (e.g. Idea 422), so they understood that a society needs rules, but many laws don't seem to be moral rules (e.g. car parking), and the Greeks thought morality was about human excellence, not avoiding traffic jams. |
| 7093 | Behaviour may be disgusting or inhumane, but violate no duty [Statman] |
| Full Idea: It is surely possible, and indeed often the case, that people who violate no duty nevertheless behave in an inhumane and a disgusting manner. | |
| From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §1) | |
| A reaction: This seems right, though it is easier to be disgusting than to be inhumane if no duty is to be violated. Social duties may not require a high degree of humanity, pure Kantian duties might. |
| 7103 | Abortion issues focus on the mother's right over her body, and the status of the foetus [Statman] |
| Full Idea: Most of the debate on abortion focuses on two issues, the mother's assumed right over her body, and the status of the foetus. | |
| From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §6) | |
| A reaction: Personally I think society as a whole might have a say (if, perhaps, we are over- or under-populated, or we have a widely accepted state religion, or we are just very shocked). Mother's have virtues and duties as well as rights. |