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All the ideas for 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic', 'Intention' and 'Notebooks'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Seek wisdom rather than truth; it is easier [Joubert]
     Full Idea: To seek wisdom rather than truth. It is more within our grasp.
     From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1797)
     A reaction: A nice challenge to the traditional goal of philosophy. The idea that we should 'seek truth' only seems to have emerged during the Reformation. The Greeks may well never have dreamed of such a thing.
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
We must think with our entire body and soul [Joubert]
     Full Idea: Everything we think must be thought with our entire being, body and soul.
     From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1798)
     A reaction: Not just that thinking must be a whole-hearted activity, but that the very contents of our thinking will be better if it arises out of being a physical creature, and not just a disembodied reasoner. Maybe the bowels are not needed to analyse set theory.
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
The love of certainty holds us back in metaphysics [Joubert]
     Full Idea: What stops or holds us back in metaphysics is a love of certainty.
     From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1814)
     A reaction: This is a prominent truth from the age of Descartes, but may have diminished in the twenty-first century. The very best metaphysicians (e.g. Aristotle and Lewis) always end in a trail of dots when things become unsure.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
The truths of reason instruct, but they do not illuminate [Joubert]
     Full Idea: There are truths that instruct, perhaps, but they do not illuminate. In this class are all the truths of reasoning.
     From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1800)
     A reaction: A rather romantic view, which strikes me as false. An inspiring truth can suddenly collapse when you see why it must be false. Equally a line of reasoning can lead to a truth which need becomes an illumination.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth consists of having the same idea about something that God has [Joubert]
     Full Idea: Truth consists of having the same idea about something that God has.
     From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1800)
     A reaction: Presumably sceptics about the existence of objective truth must also be sceptical about the possibility of such a God. I think Joubert is close to the nature of truth here. It is a remote and barely imaginable ideal.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis]
     Full Idea: So-called 'Aristotelian essentialism' is the doctrine of essences not relative to specifications.
     From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], III)
     A reaction: In other words, they are so-called 'real essences', understood as de re. Quine says essences are all de dicto, and relative to some specification. I vote for Aristotle.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Just as a sentence is necessary if it holds in all worlds, so it is causally necessary if it holds in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature.
     From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], V)
     A reaction: I don't believe in the so-called 'laws of nature', so I'm not buying that. Is there no distinction in Lewis's view between those sentences which must hold, and those which happen to hold universally?
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Even if Humphrey is a modal continuant, it doesn't take the whole of him to do such things as winning.
     From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], Post B)
     A reaction: This responds to Kripke's famous example, that people only care about what happens to themselves, and not to some 'counterpart' of themselves.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
     Full Idea: Probably Humphrey could not care less whether someone else, no matter how much resembling him, would have been victorious in another possible world. Thus Lewis's view seems even more bizarre that the usual transworld identification it replaces.
     From: comment on David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968]) by Saul A. Kripke - Naming and Necessity notes and addenda note 13
     A reaction: I begin to see this as a devastating reply to a theory I previously found quite congenial.
Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Your counterparts resemble you closely in content and context in important respects. They resemble you more closely than do the other things in their worlds. But they are not really you.
     From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], I)
     A reaction: It is a dilemma. If my counterpart were exactly me, I couldn't contemplate possibly losing a leg, or my sanity. But if my counterpart isn't exactly me, then I don't have much interest in its fate. Only essences can save us here. Cf. me tomorrow.
If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
     Full Idea: If whatever thing in world w6 it is that resembles you more closely than anything else in w6 is nevertheless quite unlike you; nothing in w6 resembles you at all closely. If so, you have no counterpart in w6.
     From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], I)
     A reaction: This is the nub, because the whole theory rests on deciding whether two things resemble sufficiently 'closely'. But then we need a criterion of closeness, so we must start talking about which properties matter. Essences loom.
Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
     Full Idea: An essential attribute of something is an attribute it shares with all its counterparts.
     From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], III)
     A reaction: I don't like this. It ties essence entirely to identity, but I think essence precedes identity. Essence is a nexus of causal and explanatory powers which bestows an identity on each thing. But essence might be unstable, and identity with it.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
To know is to see inside oneself [Joubert]
     Full Idea: To know: it is to see inside oneself.
     From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1800)
     A reaction: Extreme internalism about justification! Personally I am becoming convinced that 'know' (unlike 'believe' and 'true') is an entirely social concept. Fools spend a lot of time instrospecting; wise people ask around, and check in books.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
The imagination has made more discoveries than the eye [Joubert]
     Full Idea: The imagination has made more discoveries than the eye.
     From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1797)
     A reaction: As a fan of the imagination, I love this one. I suspect that imagination, which was marginalised by Descartes, is actually the single most important aspect of thought (in slugs as well as humans). Abstraction requires imagination.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
A thought is as real as a cannon ball [Joubert]
     Full Idea: A thought is a thing as real as a cannon ball.
     From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1801)
     A reaction: Nice. The realisation of a thought can strike someone as if they have been assaulted, and hearing some remarks can be as bad as being stabbed. That is quite apart from political consequences. Joubert is good on the physicality of thinking.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
Where does the bird's idea of a nest come from? [Joubert]
     Full Idea: The idea of the nest in the bird's mind, where does it come from?
     From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1800)
     A reaction: I think this is a very striking example in support of innate ideas. Most animal behaviour can be explained as responses to stimuli, but the bird seems to hold a model in its mind while it collects its materials.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting [Anscombe]
     Full Idea: Intentional actions are those to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; the sense is of course that in which the answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting.
     From: G.E.M. Anscombe (Intention [1957], p.9), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 2 'Two kinds'
     A reaction: This works better for grand large-scale actions than for small ones, like taking the knife out of the drawer before the fork. Kahnemann nowadays tells us that the reasons we articulate might not be the ones that are operative.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
He gives his body up to pleasure, but not his soul [Joubert]
     Full Idea: He gives his body up to pleasure, but not his soul.
     From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1799)
     A reaction: A rather crucial distinction in the world of hedonism. There seems something sincere about someone who pursues pleasure body and soul, and something fractured about the pursuit of pleasure without real commitment. The split seems possible.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
What will you think of pleasures when you no longer enjoy them? [Joubert]
     Full Idea: What will you think of pleasures when you no longer enjoy them?
     From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1802)
     A reaction: A lovely test question for aspiring young hedonists! It doesn't follow at all that we will despise past pleasures. The judgement may be utilitarian - that we regret the pleasures that harmed others, but love the harmless ones. Shame is social.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Virtue is hard if we are scorned; we need support [Joubert]
     Full Idea: It would be difficult to be scorned and to live virtuously. We have need of support.
     From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1800)
     A reaction: He seems to have hit on what I take to be one of the keys to Aristotle: that virtue is a social matter, requiring both upbringing and a healthy culture. But we can help to create that culture, as well as benefiting from it.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
In raising a child we must think of his old age [Joubert]
     Full Idea: In raising a child we must think of his old age.
     From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1809)
     A reaction: Very nice, and Aristotle would approve. If educators think much about the future, it rarely extends before the child's first job. We should be preparing good grand-parents, as well as parents and employees. Educate for retirement!
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
We can't exactly conceive virtue without the idea of God [Joubert]
     Full Idea: If we exclude the idea of God, it is impossible to have an exact idea of virtue.
     From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1808)
     A reaction: I suspect that an 'exact' idea is impossible even with an idea of God. This is an interesting defence of the importance of God in moral thinking, but it only requires the concept of a supreme being, and not belief.
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
We cannot speak against Christianity without anger, or speak for it without love [Joubert]
     Full Idea: We cannot speak against Christianity without anger, or speak for it without love.
     From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1801)
     A reaction: This seems to be rather true at the present time, when a wave of anti-religious books is sweeping through our culture. Presumably this remark used to be true of ancient paganism, but it died away. Christianity, though, is very personal.