10 ideas
8679 | We perceive the objects of set theory, just as we perceive with our senses [Gödel] |
Full Idea: We have something like perception of the objects of set theory, shown by the axioms forcing themselves on us as being true. I don't see why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception (i.e. mathematical intuition) than in sense perception. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964], p.483), quoted by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 2.4 | |
A reaction: A famous strong expression of realism about the existence of sets. It is remarkable how the ingredients of mathematics spread themselves before the mind like a landscape, inviting journeys - but I think that just shows how minds cope with abstractions. |
9942 | Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L [Gödel, by Putnam] |
Full Idea: Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L (which implies the axiom of choice and the generalized continuum hypothesis). This established the full independence of the continuum hypothesis from the other axioms. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964]) by Hilary Putnam - Mathematics without Foundations | |
A reaction: Gödel initially wanted to make V = L an axiom, but the changed his mind. Maddy has lots to say on the subject. |
16886 | The truth of an axiom must be independently recognisable [Frege] |
Full Idea: It is part of the concept of an axiom that it can be recognised as true independently of other truths. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (On Euclidean Geometry [1900], 183/168), quoted by Tyler Burge - Frege on Knowing the Foundations 4 | |
A reaction: Frege thinks the axioms of arithmetic all reside in logic. |
18062 | Set-theory paradoxes are no worse than sense deception in physics [Gödel] |
Full Idea: The set-theoretical paradoxes are hardly any more troublesome for mathematics than deceptions of the senses are for physics. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964], p.271), quoted by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 03.4 |
10868 | The Continuum Hypothesis is not inconsistent with the axioms of set theory [Gödel, by Clegg] |
Full Idea: Gödel proved that the Continuum Hypothesis was not inconsistent with the axioms of set theory. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964]) by Brian Clegg - Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable Ch.15 |
13517 | If set theory is consistent, we cannot refute or prove the Continuum Hypothesis [Gödel, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Gödel proved that (if set theory is consistent) we cannot refute the continuum hypothesis, and Cohen proved that (if set theory is consistent) we cannot prove it either. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 10 |
10271 | Basic mathematics is related to abstract elements of our empirical ideas [Gödel] |
Full Idea: Evidently the 'given' underlying mathematics is closely related to the abstract elements contained in our empirical ideas. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964], Suppl) | |
A reaction: Yes! The great modern mathematical platonist says something with which I can agree. He goes on to hint at a platonic view of the structure of the empirical world, but we'll let that pass. |
14979 | Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Lewis, by Sider] |
Full Idea: The property of 'being alone in the world' is an extrinsic property, even though it has had by an object that is alone in the world. | |
From: report of David Lewis (Extrinsic Properties [1983]) by Theodore Sider - Writing the Book of the World 01.2 | |
A reaction: I always choke on my cornflakes whenever anyone cites a true predicate as if it were a genuine property. This is a counterexample to Idea 14978. Sider offers another more elaborate example from Lewis. |
15454 | Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling' [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Properties may be more or less intrinsic; being a brother has more of an admixture of intrinsic structure than being a sibling does, yet both are extrinsic. | |
From: David Lewis (Extrinsic Properties [1983], I) | |
A reaction: I suppose the point is that a brother is intrinsically male - but then a sibling is intrinsically human. A totally extrinsic relation would be one between entities which shared virtually no categories of existence. |
15455 | Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The way something is is given by the totality of its intrinsic properties. | |
From: David Lewis (Extrinsic Properties [1983], I) | |
A reaction: No. Some properties are intrinsic but trivial. The 'important' ones fix the identity (if the identity is indeed 'fixed'). |