12 ideas
13201 | ∈ says the whole set is in the other; ⊆ says the members of the subset are in the other [Enderton] |
Full Idea: To know if A ∈ B, we look at the set A as a single object, and check if it is among B's members. But if we want to know whether A ⊆ B then we must open up set A and check whether its various members are among the members of B. | |
From: Herbert B. Enderton (Elements of Set Theory [1977], 1:04) | |
A reaction: This idea is one of the key ideas to grasp if you are going to get the hang of set theory. John ∈ USA ∈ UN, but John is not a member of the UN, because he isn't a country. See Idea 12337 for a special case. |
13204 | The 'ordered pair' <x,y> is defined to be {{x}, {x,y}} [Enderton] |
Full Idea: The 'ordered pair' <x,y> is defined to be {{x}, {x,y}}; hence it can be proved that <u,v> = <x,y> iff u = x and v = y (given by Kuratowski in 1921). ...The definition is somewhat arbitrary, and others could be used. | |
From: Herbert B. Enderton (Elements of Set Theory [1977], 3:36) | |
A reaction: This looks to me like one of those regular cases where the formal definitions capture all the logical behaviour of the concept that are required for inference, while failing to fully capture the concept for ordinary conversation. |
13206 | A 'linear or total ordering' must be transitive and satisfy trichotomy [Enderton] |
Full Idea: A 'linear ordering' (or 'total ordering') on A is a binary relation R meeting two conditions: R is transitive (of xRy and yRz, the xRz), and R satisfies trichotomy (either xRy or x=y or yRx). | |
From: Herbert B. Enderton (Elements of Set Theory [1977], 3:62) |
13200 | Note that {Φ} =/= Φ, because Φ ∈ {Φ} but Φ ∉ Φ [Enderton] |
Full Idea: Note that {Φ} =/= Φ, because Φ ∈ {Φ} but Φ ∉ Φ. A man with an empty container is better off than a man with nothing. | |
From: Herbert B. Enderton (Elements of Set Theory [1977], 1.03) |
13199 | The empty set may look pointless, but many sets can be constructed from it [Enderton] |
Full Idea: It might be thought at first that the empty set would be a rather useless or even frivolous set to mention, but from the empty set by various set-theoretic operations a surprising array of sets will be constructed. | |
From: Herbert B. Enderton (Elements of Set Theory [1977], 1:02) | |
A reaction: This nicely sums up the ontological commitments of mathematics - that we will accept absolutely anything, as long as we can have some fun with it. Sets are an abstraction from reality, and the empty set is the very idea of that abstraction. |
13203 | The singleton is defined using the pairing axiom (as {x,x}) [Enderton] |
Full Idea: Given any x we have the singleton {x}, which is defined by the pairing axiom to be {x,x}. | |
From: Herbert B. Enderton (Elements of Set Theory [1977], 2:19) | |
A reaction: An interesting contrivance which is obviously aimed at keeping the axioms to a minimum. If you can do it intuitively with a new axiom, or unintuitively with an existing axiom - prefer the latter! |
13202 | Fraenkel added Replacement, to give a theory of ordinal numbers [Enderton] |
Full Idea: It was observed by several people that for a satisfactory theory of ordinal numbers, Zermelo's axioms required strengthening. The Axiom of Replacement was proposed by Fraenkel and others, giving rise to the Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) axioms. | |
From: Herbert B. Enderton (Elements of Set Theory [1977], 1:15) |
13205 | We can only define functions if Choice tells us which items are involved [Enderton] |
Full Idea: For functions, we know that for any y there exists an appropriate x, but we can't yet form a function H, as we have no way of defining one particular choice of x. Hence we need the axiom of choice. | |
From: Herbert B. Enderton (Elements of Set Theory [1977], 3:48) |
22293 | Hilbert said (to block paradoxes) that mathematical existence is entailed by consistency [Hilbert, by Potter] |
Full Idea: Hilbert proposed to circuvent the paradoxes by means of the doctrine (already proposed by Poincaré) that in mathematics consistency entails existence. | |
From: report of David Hilbert (On the Concept of Number [1900], p.183) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 19 'Exist' | |
A reaction: Interesting. Hilbert's idea has struck me as weird, but it makes sense if its main motive is to block the paradoxes. Roughly, the idea is 'it exists if it isn't paradoxical'. A low bar for existence (but then it is only in mathematics!). |
14979 | Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Lewis, by Sider] |
Full Idea: The property of 'being alone in the world' is an extrinsic property, even though it has had by an object that is alone in the world. | |
From: report of David Lewis (Extrinsic Properties [1983]) by Theodore Sider - Writing the Book of the World 01.2 | |
A reaction: I always choke on my cornflakes whenever anyone cites a true predicate as if it were a genuine property. This is a counterexample to Idea 14978. Sider offers another more elaborate example from Lewis. |
15454 | Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling' [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Properties may be more or less intrinsic; being a brother has more of an admixture of intrinsic structure than being a sibling does, yet both are extrinsic. | |
From: David Lewis (Extrinsic Properties [1983], I) | |
A reaction: I suppose the point is that a brother is intrinsically male - but then a sibling is intrinsically human. A totally extrinsic relation would be one between entities which shared virtually no categories of existence. |
15455 | Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The way something is is given by the totality of its intrinsic properties. | |
From: David Lewis (Extrinsic Properties [1983], I) | |
A reaction: No. Some properties are intrinsic but trivial. The 'important' ones fix the identity (if the identity is indeed 'fixed'). |