24 ideas
21059 | General rules of action also need a judgement about when to apply them [Kant] |
Full Idea: A concept of the understanding, which contains the general rule, must be supplemented by an act of judgement whereby the practitioner distinguishes instances where the rule applies from those where it does not. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is Aristotle's phronesis, and Hart's 'rules of recognition' in law courts. So is the link between theory and practice an intellectual one, or a sort of inarticulate intuition? I like 'common sense' for this ability. |
21061 | Duty does not aim at an end, but gives rise to universal happiness as aim of the will [Kant] |
Full Idea: My conception of duty does not need to be based on any particular end, but rather itself occasions a new end for the human will, that of striving with all one's power towards the highest good possible on earth, the universal happiness of the whole world. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 1B) | |
A reaction: I see nothing in the categorical imperative that demands 'all one's power', and nothing that specifies happiness as what has to be universalised. Nietzsche, for one, thinks happiness is overrated. |
21060 | It can't be a duty to strive after the impossible [Kant] |
Full Idea: It would not be a duty to strive after a certain effect of our will if this effect were impossible in experience. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], Intro) | |
A reaction: 'Ought implies can' has become a familiar slogan. The quickest way to get shot of a tiresome duty is to persuade yourself that it is impossible. The seemingly impossible is occasionally achieved. |
21062 | The will's motive is the absolute law itself, and moral feeling is receptivity to law [Kant] |
Full Idea: The will must have motives. But these are not objects of physical feeling as predetermined ends in themselves. They are none other than the absolute law itself, and the will's receptivity to it as an absolute compulsion is known as moral feeling. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 1Bb) | |
A reaction: This sounds like our natural motivation to get the right answer when doing arithmetic, which is the innate motivation towards truth. I once heard it said that truth is the only value. So why does Donald Trump fail to value truth? |
21071 | There can be no restraints on freedom if reason does not reveal some basic rights [Kant] |
Full Idea: If there is nothing which commands immediate respect through reason, such as the basic rights of man, no influence can prevail upon man's arbitrary will and restrain his freedom. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2-Concl) | |
A reaction: I think this is the nearest Kant gets to natural rights. It is hard to see how basic rights can be identified by pure reason, without some inbuilt human values. Kant's usual move is to say denial of them leads to a contradiction, but I'm going off that. |
23418 | Liberal state legitimacy is based on a belief in justice, not in some conception of the good life [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: For liberals the basis of state legitimacy is a shared sense of justice, not a shared conception of the good. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'legitimacy') | |
A reaction: For a liberal state to work, the citizens have to roughly believe in the core values of liberalism, which are primarily freedom and equality (and hence justice). |
21063 | Personal contracts are for some end, but a civil state contract involves a duty to share [Kant] |
Full Idea: In all social contracts, we find a union of many individuals for some common end which they all share. But a union as an end in itself which they all ought to share …is only found in a society insofar as it constitutes a civil state i.e. a commonwealth. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2 Intro) | |
A reaction: This makes a nice link between the contractarian individual morality of Hobbes and his social contract view of society. Kant seems to reject the first but accept the second. Presumably because the first implies benefit and the second implies duty. |
21068 | There must be a unanimous contract that citizens accept majority decisions [Kant] |
Full Idea: The actual principle of being content with majority decisions must be accepted unanimously and embodied in a contract, and this itself must be the ultimate basis on which a civil constitution is established. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2-3) | |
A reaction: This is the contract which combines a social contract with democracy. We unanimously agree not to be unanimous? Cf Idea 21065. What should the minority do when the majority elect criminal Nazi leaders? |
21069 | A contract is theoretical, but it can guide rulers to make laws which the whole people will accept [Kant] |
Full Idea: The original contract …is merely an idea of reason, which nonetheless has undoubted practical reality; for it can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by the united will of a whole nation. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2-Concl) | |
A reaction: The contractualist theory of morality of Thomas Scanlon approaches this. Note that Kant says it 'can' oblige the legislators. Nothing would compel them to follow such a principle. |
21070 | A law is unjust if the whole people could not possibly agree to it [Kant] |
Full Idea: If the law is such that a whole people could not possibly agree to it …it is unjust. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2-Concl) | |
A reaction: Kant is explicitly trying to approximate Rousseau's general will. The categorical imperative was greatly influenced by Rousseau. The key point is not whether they accept it, but that unanimous acceptance is unthinkable. Unfair laws will fail. |
21067 | A citizen must control his own life, and possess property or an important skill [Kant] |
Full Idea: The only qualification required by a citizen (apart, of course, from being an adult male) is that he must be his own master, and must have some property (which can include any skill, trade, fine art or science) to support himself. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2-3) | |
A reaction: Of course! Being one's own master evidently allows for being an employee, as long as this is a free contract, and not exploitation. Invites lots of interesting test cases. We need a Marxist commentary on this idea. |
23414 | Liberals say state intervention in culture restricts people's autonomy [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: According to liberal theory, a state which intervenes in the cultural market place to encourage any particular way of life restricts people's autonomy. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'social') | |
A reaction: The communitarian idea is that the state should intervene, in order to foster the best aspects of communal culture. The dangers are obvious, and can be seen in any totalitarian state. A gentle hand on the tiller, perhaps? Increase the options? |
21064 | A lawful civil state must embody freedom, equality and independence for its members [Kant] |
Full Idea: The civil state, regarded purely as a lawful state, is based on the following a priori principles. 1) the freedom of every member as a human being, 2) the equality of each as a subject, 3) the independence of each as a subject. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2 Intro) | |
A reaction: Written in 1792, three years after the start of the French Revolution. He says that a state with an inbuilt hierarchy or aristocracy is unlawful. Which freedoms, equality in what respects, and independence from what? |
23410 | Modern liberals see a community as simply a society which respects freedom and equality [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Most contemporary liberal philosophers have little to say about the ideal of community. …It is often seen as derivative of liberty and equality - a society lives up to the ideal of community if its members are treated as free and equal persons. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: He cites Rawls as an example. This is the central idea which was attacked by modern communitarians. A collection of scattered self-seeking isolated individuals doesn't seem to amount to a healthy communal life. Maybe community needs further rights? |
23409 | Community can focus on class or citizenship or ethnicity or culture [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: In recent centuries the ideal of community has taken many forms, from class solidarity or shared citizenship to a common ethnic descent or cultural identity. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: Language and religion are not explicitly mentioned, but must be implied. Supporting a major sports team is also worth mentioning. |
23419 | Communitarianism struggles with excluded marginalised groups [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: The problem of the exclusion of historically marginalised groups is endemic to the communitarian project. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'legitimacy') | |
A reaction: Put simply, old-fashioned styles of community are probably impossible in large modern states, some with rather arbitrary borders. |
23413 | Feminism has shown that social roles are far from fixed (as communitarians tend to see them) [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Communitarians say that some of our social roles must be regarded as fixed when planning our lives, …but the women's movement has shown how deeply entrenched social roles can be questioned and rejected. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'Embedded') | |
A reaction: True, but parents walking out on young children also shows that. The ideal must be some sort of balance. |
23415 | Participation aids the quest for the good life, but why should that be a state activity? [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Communitarians rarely distinguish between collective activities and political activities. Shared participation aids intelligent decisions about the good life, but why should that be organised through the state, rather than by free individuals? | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'need') | |
A reaction: Kylicka points out later that local groups can be very unintelligent or prejudiced. Modern media have changed that picture, because participation can be with geographically remote people. |
21066 | Citizens can rise to any rank that talent, effort and luck can achieve [Kant] |
Full Idea: Every member of the commonwealth must be entitled to reach any degree of rank which a subject can earn through his talent, his industry and his good fortune. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2-2) | |
A reaction: This is equality of opportunity, which is a mantra for liberals, but has been subjected to good criticisms in modern times. The main question is whether there is formal and legal equality, or actual practical equality. |
21065 | You can't make a contract renouncing your right to make contracts! [Kant] |
Full Idea: No one can voluntarily renounce his rights by a contract ..to the effect that he has no rights but only duties, for such a contract would deprive him of the right to make a contract, and would thus invalidate the one he had already made. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 2-2) | |
A reaction: Kant tries to establish all of his principles by showing that their denial is contradictory. But this example is blatantly wrong. King Lear didn't nullify his previous legislation when he abdicated, and his two daughters legally kept their territories. |
23411 | Communitarians see justice as primarily a community matter, rather than a principle [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Communitarians believe either that community replaces the need for principles of justice, or that the community is either the source of such principles or should play a greater role in deciding their content. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: [compressed] The idea that a racist or chauvinist or puritanical or insular community should decide justice for all its members sounds horrible. It drives you to liberal individualism, just thinking about it. |
23412 | Justice resolves conflicts, but may also provoke them [Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Justice can help mediate conflicts, but it also tends to creat conflicts, and to decrease the natural expression of sociability. | |
From: Will Kymlicka (Community [1993], 'limits') | |
A reaction: [He is discussing Michael Sandel on liberalism] Family life might not go well if all of its members continually demanded justice for themselves as individuals. Maybe our concept of justice is too individualistic? Do we need a sense of 'group' justice? |
21072 | The people (who have to fight) and not the head of state should declare a war [Kant] |
Full Idea: Each state must be organised so that the head of state, for whom the war costs nothing (for he wages it at the expense of the people) must no longer have the deciding vote on whether war is to be declared or not, for the people who pay for it must decide. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (True in Theory, but not in Practice [1792], 3) | |
A reaction: I would guess that he has Louis XIV particularly in mind. Imagine if Kant's proposal had been implemented in 1914. A referendum takes ages, and the people would need the facts (from the intelligence agencies). |
9425 | Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few) [Mumford on Lewis] |
Full Idea: Later Lewis said we must choose between the intersection of the axioms of the tied best systems. He chose for laws the axioms that are in all the tied systems (but then there may be few or no axioms in the intersection). | |
From: comment on David Lewis (Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance [1980], p.124) by Stephen Mumford - Laws in Nature |