54 ideas
15879 | The Square of Opposition has two contradictory pairs, one contrary pair, and one sub-contrary pair [Harré] |
Full Idea: Square of Opposition: 'all A are B' and 'no A are B' are contraries; 'some A are B' and 'some A are not B' are sub-contraries; the pairs 'all A are B'/'some A are B' and 'no A are B'/'some A are B' are contradictories. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 3) | |
A reaction: [the reader may construct his own diagram from this description!] The contraries are at the extremes of contradiction, but the sub-contraries are actual compatible. You could add possible worlds to this picture. |
15891 | Traditional quantifiers combine ordinary language generality and ontology assumptions [Harré] |
Full Idea: The generalising function and the ontological function of discourse are elided in the traditional quantifier. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 5) | |
A reaction: This simple point strikes me as helping enormously to disentangle the mess created by over-emphasis on formal logic in ontology, and especially in the Quinean concept of 'ontological commitment'. |
15878 | Some quantifiers, such as 'any', rule out any notion of order within their range [Harré] |
Full Idea: The quantifier 'any' unambiguously rules out any presupposition of order in the members of the range of individuals quantified. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 3) | |
A reaction: He contrasts this with 'all', 'each' and 'every', which are ambiguous in this respect. |
15874 | Scientific properties are not observed qualities, but the dispositions which create them [Harré] |
Full Idea: The properties of material things with which the sciences deal are not the qualities we observe them to have, but the dispositions of those things to engender the states and qualities we observe. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 2) | |
A reaction: I take this to be the correct use of the word 'qualities', so that properties are not qualities (in the way Heil would like). |
9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
Full Idea: Maybe a disposition is a more fundamental notion than a cause, in which case Lewis has from the very start erred in seeking a causal analysis, in a traditional, conceptual sense, of disposition terms. | |
From: comment on David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 2.2.8 | |
A reaction: Is this right about Lewis? I see him as reducing both dispositions and causes to a set of bald facts, which exist in possible and actual worlds. Conditionals and counterfactuals also suffer the same fate. |
15884 | Laws of nature remain the same through any conditions, if the underlying mechanisms are unchanged [Harré] |
Full Idea: A statement is a law of nature if it is true in all those worlds which differ only as to their initial conditions, that is in which the underlying mechanisms of nature are the same. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 4) | |
A reaction: Harré takes it that laws of nature have to be necessary, by definition. I like this way of expressing natural necessity, in terms of 'mechanisms' rather than of 'laws'. Where do the mechanisms get their necessity? |
8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
Full Idea: A counterfactual is non-vacuously true iff it takes less of a departure from actuality to make the consequent true along with the antecedent than it does to make the antecedent true without the consequent. | |
From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.197) | |
A reaction: Almost every theory proposed by Lewis hangs on the meaning of the word 'close', as used here. If you visited twenty Earth-like worlds (watch Startrek?), it would be a struggle to decide their closeness to ours in rank order. |
15880 | In physical sciences particular observations are ordered, but in biology only the classes are ordered [Harré] |
Full Idea: In the physical sciences the particular observations and experimental results are usually orderable, while in the biological sciences it is the classes of organism which are ordered, not the particular organisms. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 3) | |
A reaction: Harré is interesting on the role of ordering in science. Functions can be defined by an order. Maths feeds on orderings. Physics, he notes, focuses on things which vary together. |
15869 | Reports of experiments eliminate the experimenter, and present results as the behaviour of nature [Harré] |
Full Idea: In accounts of experiments, by Faraday and others, the role of the guiding hand of the actual experimenter is written out in successive accounts. The effect is to display the phenomenon as a natural occurrence, existing independently of the experiments. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 1) | |
A reaction: He records three stages in Faraday's reports. The move from active to passive voice is obviously part of it. The claim of universality is thus implicit rather than explicit. |
15881 | We can save laws from counter-instances by treating the latter as analytic definitions [Harré] |
Full Idea: When we come upon a counter-instance to a generalisation we can save the putative law, by treating it as potentially analytic and claiming it as a definition. ...Thus magnetism doesn't hold for phosphorus, so we say phosphorus is not a magnetic substance. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 3) | |
A reaction: He notes this as being particularly true when the laws concern the dispositions of substances, rather than patterns of events. |
15882 | Since there are three different dimensions for generalising laws, no one system of logic can cover them [Harré] |
Full Idea: Since there are three different dimensions of generality into which every law of nature is generalised, there can be no one system of logic which will govern inference to or from every law of every kind. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 3) | |
A reaction: This is aimed at the covering-law approach, which actually aims to output observations as logical inferences from laws. Wrong. |
15888 | The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science [Harré] |
Full Idea: The grue problem illustrates the enormous importance that the concept of a natural-kind plays in real science. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 5) | |
A reaction: The point is that we took emeralds to be a natural kind, but 'grue' proposes that they aren't, since stability is the hallmark of a natural kind. |
15887 | 'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour [Harré] |
Full Idea: In introducing the predicate 'grue' we also introduce an additional causal hypothesis into our chemistry and physics; namely, that when observed grue emeralds change from blue to green. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 5) | |
A reaction: [The 'when observered' is a Harré addition] I hate 'grue'. Only people who think our predicates have very little to do with reality are impressed by it. Grue is a behaviour, not a colour. |
15889 | It is because ravens are birds that their species and their colour might be connected [Harré] |
Full Idea: It is because ravens are birds that it makes sense to contemplate the possibility of a lawful relation between their species and their colour. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 5) | |
A reaction: Compare the 'laws' concerning leaf colour in autumn, and the 'laws' concerning packaging colour in supermarkets. Harré's underlying point is that raven colour concerns mechanism. |
15890 | Non-black non-ravens just aren't part of the presuppositions of 'all ravens are black' [Harré] |
Full Idea: Non-black non-ravens have no role to play in assessing the plausibility of 'All ravens are black' because their existence is not among the existential presuppositions of that statement. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 5) | |
A reaction: [He cites Strawson for the 'presupposition' approach] |
15885 | The necessity of Newton's First Law derives from the nature of material things, not from a mechanism [Harré] |
Full Idea: The 'must' of Newton's First Law is different. There is no deeper level relative to the processes described to give a mechanism which generates uniform motion. There is no such mechanism. ..It specifies what it is for something to be a material thing. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 4) | |
A reaction: Harré says the law can only exist as part of a network of other ideas. |
15868 | Idealisation idealises all of a thing's properties, but abstraction leaves some of them out [Harré] |
Full Idea: An 'idealisation' preserves all the properties of the source but it possesses these properties in some ideal or perfect form. ...An 'abstraction', on the other hand, lacks certain features of its source. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 1) | |
A reaction: Yet another example in contemporary philosophy of a clear understanding of the sort of abstraction which Geach and others have poured scorn on. |
8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
Full Idea: By determinism I mean that the prevailing laws of nature are such that there do not exist any two possible worlds which are exactly alike up to that time, which differ thereafter, and in which those laws are never violated. | |
From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.196) | |
A reaction: This would mean that the only way an action of free will could creep in would be if it accepted being a 'violation' of the laws of nature. Fans of free will would probably prefer to call it a 'natural' phenomenon. I'm with Lewis. |
8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
Full Idea: I identify a proposition with the set of possible worlds where it is true. | |
From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.193) | |
A reaction: As it stands, I'm baffled by this. How can 'it is raining' be a set of possible worlds? I assume it expands to refer to the truth-conditions, among possibilities as well as actualities. 'It is raining' fits all worlds where it is raining. |
7352 | Jesus said learning was unnecessary, and only the spirit of the Law was needed [Jesus, by Johnson,P] |
Full Idea: Jesus was a learned Jew who said that learning was not necessary, who took the spirit and not the letter as the essence of the Law. | |
From: report of Jesus (reports [c.32]) by Paul Johnson - The History of the Jews Pt II | |
A reaction: This seems to me the perfect opposite of Socrates's intellectualism, offering the essence of morality as 'purity of heart', rather than careful thought about virtue or principles. On the whole I am with Socrates, but the idea is interesting. |
6292 | Love thy neighbour as thyself [Jesus] |
Full Idea: Love thy neighbour as thyself. | |
From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 19.19 | |
A reaction: It would be stronger and better to say 'Love your neighbour, even if you don't love yourself'. Self-loathing and vicious hatred often go together. For once Jesus does not attach an instant heavenly reward to obedience of the command. |
6289 | Love your enemies [Jesus] |
Full Idea: Love your enemies. | |
From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 05.44 | |
A reaction: The germ of this idea had been around for several hundred years, but this very forceful statement is perhaps Jesus' most distinctive contribution to moral thought. It has the same clarion call as the Stoic demand for pure virtue. What about deserving? |
5356 | Treat others as you would have them treat you [Jesus] |
Full Idea: All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, so ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets. | |
From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 07.12 | |
A reaction: A problem which probably didn't occur to Jesus and the prophets is that of masochists. Personally I like buying philosophy books, but most people have no such desire. The Rule needs restricting to the basics of pleasure and pain. |
6286 | Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy [Jesus] |
Full Idea: Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy. | |
From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 05.07 | |
A reaction: This appears to be a straightforward application of social contract morality, with God playing the role of Hobbes' absolute monarch. It highlights the uncomfortable fact at the heart of Christian morality, that the motivation for altruism is selfish. |
6290 | Except ye become as little children, ye shall not enter heaven [Jesus] |
Full Idea: Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. | |
From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 18.03 | |
A reaction: The appeal of such purity of heart is undeniable, but essentially I dislike this remark. It is the opponent of education, reason, autonomy, responsibility, democracy and maturity. It confirms the view that religion is the opium of the people. |
6287 | If you lust after a woman, you have committed adultery [Jesus] |
Full Idea: Whosoever look on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart. | |
From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 05.28 | |
A reaction: Compare Democritus, Idea 503. Literally this idea seems absurd, but it is also at the heart of Greek virtue theory. Aristotle (Idea 34) defines virtue as an activity 'of the soul', not an action in the world. Excellence has become purity of soul. |
6285 | Blessed are the meek; for they shall inherit the earth [Jesus] |
Full Idea: Blessed are the meek; for they shall inherit the earth. | |
From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 05.05 | |
A reaction: If they are truly meek, why would they want to inherit the earth? This is the classic statement of Nietzsche's 'inversion of values', where the qualities of a good slave are elevated above those of the greatest human beings. |
6288 | Don't resist evil, but turn the other cheek [Jesus] |
Full Idea: Ye have heard it said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth; But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil, but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. | |
From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 05.38-9 | |
A reaction: Compare Socrates, Idea 346. The viciousness of many Hollywood movies is that they set up a character as thoroughly evil so that we can have the pleasure of watching him pulverised. On the whole, Jesus gives bad advice. 'Doormats' in game theory. |
6293 | It is almost impossible for the rich to go to heaven [Jesus] |
Full Idea: It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God. | |
From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 19.24 | |
A reaction: Aristotle and others (Margaret Thatcher) have observed that you cannot practise charity if you are poor. Jesus implies that the human race should remain in poverty. No wonder autocratic medieval rulers taught Christianity to peasants. Cf. Matt 25.30. |
15886 | Science rests on the principle that nature is a hierarchy of natural kinds [Harré] |
Full Idea: The animating principle behind the material and discursive practices of science is the thesis that nature exemplifies multiple hierarchies of natural kinds. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 5) | |
A reaction: I agree. I take it to be a brute fact that there seem to be lots of stable natural kinds, which are worth investigating as long as they stay stable. If they are unstable, there needs to be something stable to measure that by - or we give up. |
8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
Full Idea: Lewis thinks it is a major defect in a theory of causation that it builds in the condition that the time of the cause precede that of the effect: that cause precedes effect is something we ought to explain (which his counterfactual theory claims to do). | |
From: report of David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by Hartry Field - Causation in a Physical World | |
A reaction: My immediate reaction is that the chances of explaining such a thing are probably nil, and that we might as well just accept the direction of causation as a given. Even philosophers balk at the question 'why doesn't time go backwards?' |
8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
Full Idea: One might stipulate that a cause must always precede its effect, but I reject this solution. It won't solve the problem of epiphenomena, it rejects a priori any backwards causation, and it trivializes defining time-direction through causation. | |
From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.203) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Not strong arguments, I would say. Maybe apparent causes are never epiphenomenal. Maybe backwards causation is impossible. Maybe we must use time to define causal direction, and not vice versa. |
10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
Full Idea: We sometimes single out one among all the causes of some event and call it 'the' cause. ..We may select the abnormal causes, or those under human control, or those we deem good or bad, or those we want to talk about. This is invidious discrimination. | |
From: David Lewis (Causation [1973]) | |
A reaction: This is the standard view expressed by Mill - presumably the obvious empiricist line. But if we specify 'the pre-conditions' for an event, we can't just mention ANY fact prior to the effect - there is obvious relevance. So why not for 'the' cause as well? |
8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
Full Idea: In present-day regularity analyses, a cause is defined (roughly) as any member of any minimal set of actual conditions that are jointly sufficient, given the laws, for the existence of the effect. | |
From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.193) | |
A reaction: This is the view Lewis is about to reject. It seem to summarise the essence of the Mackie INUS theory. This account would make the presence of oxygen a cause of almost every human event. |
8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
Full Idea: In the regularity analysis of causes, instead of c causing e, c might turn out to be an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or an inefficacious effect of a genuine cause, or a pre-empted cause (by some other cause) of e. | |
From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.194) | |
A reaction: These are Lewis's reasons for rejecting the general regularity account, in favour of his own particular counterfactual account. It is unlikely that c would be regularly pre-empted or epiphenomenal. If we build time's direction in, it won't be an effect. |
17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
Full Idea: The Humean idea, developed by Lewis, is that rather than being sufficient for their effects, causes are (counterfactual) necessary for their effects. | |
From: report of David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by Alexander Bird - Causation and the Manifestation of Powers p.162 |
17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
Full Idea: Lewis's basic account has a basic causal relation, counterfactual dependence, and the general causal relation is the ancestral of this basic one. ...This is motivated by counterfactual dependence failing to be general because of the pre-emption problem. | |
From: report of David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by Alexander Bird - Causation and the Manifestation of Powers p.161 | |
A reaction: It is so nice when you struggle for ages with a topic, and then some clever person summarises it clearly for you. |
8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
Full Idea: Some counterfactuals are based on non-causal laws, such as Newton's Third Law of Motion. 'If no force one way, then no force the other'. Lewis's counterfactual analysis implies that one force causes the other, which is not the case. | |
From: comment on David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience 5.2 | |
A reaction: So what exactly does 'cause' my punt to move forwards? Basing causal laws on counterfactual claims looks to me like putting the cart before the horse. |
8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
Full Idea: My (counterfactual) analysis is meant to apply to causation in particular cases; it is not an analysis of causal generalizations. Those presumably quantify over particulars, but it is hard to match natural language to the quantifiers. | |
From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.195) | |
A reaction: What authority could you have for asserting a counterfactual claim, if you only had one observation? Isn't the counterfactual claim the hallmark of a generalisation? For one case, 'if not-c, then not-e' is just a speculation. |
8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
Full Idea: One event is the cause of another iff there exists a causal chain leading from the first to the second. | |
From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.200) | |
A reaction: It will be necessary to both explain and identify a 'chain'. Some chains are extremely tenuous (Alexander could stop a barrel of beer). Go back a hundred years, and the cause of any present event is everything back then. |
15864 | Classification is just as important as laws in natural science [Harré] |
Full Idea: Classification systems, or taxonomies, are as important a part of the natural sciences as are the laws of nature. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 1) | |
A reaction: This illustrates how our view of science is radically shifted if we give biology equal prominence with physics. |
15865 | Newton's First Law cannot be demonstrated experimentally, as that needs absence of external forces [Harré] |
Full Idea: We can never devise an experimental situation in which there are no external forces to act on a body. It follows that Newton's First Law could never be demonstrated by means of experiment or observation. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 1) | |
A reaction: It can't be wholly demonstrated, but certain observations conform to it, such as the movement of low friction bodies, or the movements of planetary bodies. |
15862 | Laws can come from data, from theory, from imagination and concepts, or from procedures [Harré] |
Full Idea: Boyle's Law generalises a mass of messy data culled from an apparatus; Snell's Law is an experimentally derived law deducible from theory; Newton's First Law derives from concepts and thought experiments; Mendel's Law used an experimental procedure. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 1) | |
A reaction: Nice examples, especially since Boyle's and Newton's laws are divided by a huge gulf, and arrived at about the same time. On p.35 Harré says these come down to two: abstraction from experiment, and derivation from deep assumptions. |
15870 | Are laws of nature about events, or types and universals, or dispositions, or all three? [Harré] |
Full Idea: What is Newton's First Law about? Is it about events? Is it about types or universals? Is it about dispositions? Or is it, in some peculiar way, about all three? | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 2) | |
A reaction: If laws merely chart regularities, then I suppose they are about events (which exhibit the regular patterns). If laws explain, which would be nice, then they are only about universals if you are a platonist. Hence laws are about dispositions. |
15871 | Are laws about what has or might happen, or do they also cover all the possibilities? [Harré] |
Full Idea: Is Newton's First Law about what has actually happened or is it about what might, or could possibly happen? Is it about the actual events and states of the world, or possible events and states? | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 2) | |
A reaction: I presume the first sentence distinguishes between what 'might (well)' happen, and what 'could (just) possibly happen'. I take it for granted that laws predict the actual future. The question is are they true of situations which will never occur? |
15876 | Maybe laws of nature are just relations between properties? [Harré] |
Full Idea: The idea of the Dretske-Armstrong-Tooley view is very simple: the laws of nature relate properties to properties. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 2) | |
A reaction: Presumably the relations are necessary ones. I don't see why we need to mention these wretched 'universals' in order to expound this theory. It sounds much more plausible if you just say a property is defined by the way it relates to other properties. |
15872 | Must laws of nature be universal, or could they be local? [Harré] |
Full Idea: Is a law of nature about everything in the universe or just about a restricted group of things? | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 2) | |
A reaction: I presume the answer is that while a law may only refer to a small group of things, the law would still have to apply if that group moved or spread or enlarged, so it would have to be universals. A laws confined to one time or place? Maybe. |
15867 | Laws describe abstract idealisations, not the actual mess of nature [Harré] |
Full Idea: The laws of nature are not simple descriptions of what can be seen to happen. They are descriptions of abstractions and idealisations from a somewhat messy reality. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 1) | |
A reaction: This view seems to have increasingly gripped modern philosophers, so that the old view of God decreeing a few simple equations to run the world has faded away. |
15860 | We take it that only necessary happenings could be laws [Harré] |
Full Idea: We do not take laws to be recordings of what happens perchance or for the most part, but specifications of what happens necessarily | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 1) | |
A reaction: This sounds like a plausible necessary condition for a law, but it may not be a sufficient one. Are trivial necessities laws? On this view if there are no necessities then there are no laws. |
15892 | Laws of nature state necessary connections of things, events and properties, based on models of mechanisms [Harré] |
Full Idea: A law of nature tells us what kinds of things, events and properties (all else being equal) go along with what. The 'must' of natural necessity has its place here because it is bound up with a model or analogy representing generative mechanisms. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 5) | |
A reaction: This is Harré's final page summary of laws. I agree with it. I would say that the laws are therefore descriptive, of the patterns of behaviour that arise when generative mechanisms meet. Maybe laws concern 'transformations'. |
15875 | In counterfactuals we keep substances constant, and imagine new situations for them [Harré] |
Full Idea: In drawing 'countefactual' conclusions we can be thought imaginatively to vary the conditions under which the substance, set-up etc. is manipulated or stimulated, while maintaining constant our conception of the nature of the being in question. | |
From: Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 2) | |
A reaction: Presumably you could vary the substance and keep the situation fixed, but then the counterfactual seems to be 'about' something different. Either that or the 'situation' is a actually a set of substances to be tested. |
4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |
Full Idea: Lewis can elucidate the logic of counterfactuals on the assumption that you are not at all puzzled about what a law of nature is. But if you are puzzled about this, it cannot contribute anything towards resolving your puzzlement. | |
From: comment on David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by L. Jonathan Cohen - The Problem of Natural Laws p.219 | |
A reaction: This seems like a penetrating remark. The counterfactual theory is wrong, partly because it is epistemological instead of ontological, and partly because it refuses to face the really difficult problem, of what is going on out there. |
6291 | No one is good except God [Jesus] |
Full Idea: Why callest thou me good? There is none good but one, that is, God. | |
From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 19.17 | |
A reaction: This remark raises the problem that if God is good, there must be some separate moral standard by which he can be judged good. What is that standard? It is related to the problem of whether Plato's Form of the Beautiful is itself beautiful. |
7351 | Jesus turned the ideas of Hillel into a theology reduced to its moral elements [Jesus, by Johnson,P] |
Full Idea: Jesus was a member of the school of Hillel the Elder, and may have sat under him. He repeated some of the sayings of Hillel, ...and turned his ideas into a moral theology, stripping the law of all but its moral and ethical elements. | |
From: report of Jesus (reports [c.32]) by Paul Johnson - The History of the Jews Pt II | |
A reaction: The crucial move, it seems to me, is to strip Judaism of its complexity, and reduce it to very simple moral maxims, which means that ordinary illiterate people no longer need priests to understand and follow it. Jesus was, above all, a great teacher. |