28 ideas
10888 | Sets can be defined by 'enumeration', or by 'abstraction' (based on a property) [Zalabardo] |
Full Idea: We can define a set by 'enumeration' (by listing the items, within curly brackets), or by 'abstraction' (by specifying the elements as instances of a property), pretending that they form a determinate totality. The latter is written {x | x is P}. | |
From: José L. Zalabardo (Introduction to the Theory of Logic [2000], §1.3) |
10889 | The 'Cartesian Product' of two sets relates them by pairing every element with every element [Zalabardo] |
Full Idea:
The 'Cartesian Product' of two sets, written A x B, is the relation which pairs every element of A with every element of B. So A x B = { |
|
From: José L. Zalabardo (Introduction to the Theory of Logic [2000], §1.6) |
10890 | A 'partial ordering' is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive [Zalabardo] |
Full Idea: A binary relation in a set is a 'partial ordering' just in case it is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive. | |
From: José L. Zalabardo (Introduction to the Theory of Logic [2000], §1.6) |
10886 | Determinacy: an object is either in a set, or it isn't [Zalabardo] |
Full Idea: Principle of Determinacy: For every object a and every set S, either a is an element of S or a is not an element of S. | |
From: José L. Zalabardo (Introduction to the Theory of Logic [2000], §1.2) |
10887 | Specification: Determinate totals of objects always make a set [Zalabardo] |
Full Idea: Principle of Specification: Whenever we can specify a determinate totality of objects, we shall say that there is a set whose elements are precisely the objects that we have specified. | |
From: José L. Zalabardo (Introduction to the Theory of Logic [2000], §1.3) | |
A reaction: Compare the Axiom of Specification. Zalabardo says we may wish to consider sets of which we cannot specify the members. |
10897 | A first-order 'sentence' is a formula with no free variables [Zalabardo] |
Full Idea: A formula of a first-order language is a 'sentence' just in case it has no free variables. | |
From: José L. Zalabardo (Introduction to the Theory of Logic [2000], §3.2) |
10899 | Γ |= φ if φ is true when all of Γ is true, for all structures and interpretations [Zalabardo] |
Full Idea: A formula is the 'logical consequence' of a set of formulas (Γ |= φ) if for every structure in the language and every variable interpretation of the structure, if all the formulas within the set are true and the formula itself is true. | |
From: José L. Zalabardo (Introduction to the Theory of Logic [2000], §3.5) |
10893 | Γ |= φ for sentences if φ is true when all of Γ is true [Zalabardo] |
Full Idea: A propositional logic sentence is a 'logical consequence' of a set of sentences (written Γ |= φ) if for every admissible truth-assignment all the sentences in the set Γ are true, then φ is true. | |
From: José L. Zalabardo (Introduction to the Theory of Logic [2000], §2.4) | |
A reaction: The definition is similar for predicate logic. |
10896 | Propositional logic just needs ¬, and one of ∧, ∨ and → [Zalabardo] |
Full Idea: In propositional logic, any set containing ¬ and at least one of ∧, ∨ and → is expressively complete. | |
From: José L. Zalabardo (Introduction to the Theory of Logic [2000], §2.8) |
10898 | The semantics shows how truth values depend on instantiations of properties and relations [Zalabardo] |
Full Idea: The semantic pattern of a first-order language is the ways in which truth values depend on which individuals instantiate the properties and relations which figure in them. ..So we pair a truth value with each combination of individuals, sets etc. | |
From: José L. Zalabardo (Introduction to the Theory of Logic [2000], §3.3) | |
A reaction: So truth reduces to a combination of 'instantiations', which is rather like 'satisfaction'. |
10902 | We can do semantics by looking at given propositions, or by building new ones [Zalabardo] |
Full Idea: We can look at semantics from the point of view of how truth values are determined by instantiations of properties and relations, or by asking how we can build, using the resources of the language, a proposition corresponding to a given semantic pattern. | |
From: José L. Zalabardo (Introduction to the Theory of Logic [2000], §3.6) | |
A reaction: The second version of semantics is model theory. |
10892 | We make a truth assignment to T and F, which may be true and false, but merely differ from one another [Zalabardo] |
Full Idea: A truth assignment is a function from propositions to the set {T,F}. We will think of T and F as the truth values true and false, but for our purposes all we need to assume about the identity of these objects is that they are different from each other. | |
From: José L. Zalabardo (Introduction to the Theory of Logic [2000], §2.4) | |
A reaction: Note that T and F are 'objects'. This remark is important in understanding modern logical semantics. T and F can be equated to 1 and 0 in the language of a computer. They just mean as much as you want them to mean. |
10895 | 'Logically true' (|= φ) is true for every truth-assignment [Zalabardo] |
Full Idea: A propositional logic sentence is 'logically true', written |= φ, if it is true for every admissible truth-assignment. | |
From: José L. Zalabardo (Introduction to the Theory of Logic [2000], §2.4) |
10900 | Logically true sentences are true in all structures [Zalabardo] |
Full Idea: In first-order languages, logically true sentences are true in all structures. | |
From: José L. Zalabardo (Introduction to the Theory of Logic [2000], §3.5) |
10894 | A sentence-set is 'satisfiable' if at least one truth-assignment makes them all true [Zalabardo] |
Full Idea: A propositional logic set of sentences Γ is 'satisfiable' if there is at least one admissible truth-assignment that makes all of its sentences true. | |
From: José L. Zalabardo (Introduction to the Theory of Logic [2000], §2.4) |
10901 | Some formulas are 'satisfiable' if there is a structure and interpretation that makes them true [Zalabardo] |
Full Idea: A set of formulas of a first-order language is 'satisfiable' if there is a structure and a variable interpretation in that structure such that all the formulas of the set are true. | |
From: José L. Zalabardo (Introduction to the Theory of Logic [2000], §3.5) |
10903 | A structure models a sentence if it is true in the model, and a set of sentences if they are all true in the model [Zalabardo] |
Full Idea: A structure is a model of a sentence if the sentence is true in the model; a structure is a model of a set of sentences if they are all true in the structure. | |
From: José L. Zalabardo (Introduction to the Theory of Logic [2000], §3.6) |
10891 | If a set is defined by induction, then proof by induction can be applied to it [Zalabardo] |
Full Idea: Defining a set by induction enables us to use the method of proof by induction to establish that all the elements of the set have a certain property. | |
From: José L. Zalabardo (Introduction to the Theory of Logic [2000], §2.3) |
18933 | Not-Being obviously doesn't exist, and the five modes of Being are all impossible [Gorgias, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: I. Nothing exists. a) Not-Being does not exist. b) Being does not exist as everlasting, as created, as both, as One, or as Many. II. If anything does exist, it is incomprehensible. III. If existence is comprehensible, it is incommunicable. | |
From: report of Gorgias (fragments/reports [c.443 BCE], B03) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09 | |
A reaction: [Also Sextus Empiricus, Against Logicians I.65-] For Part I he works through all the possible modes of being he can think of, and explains why none of them are possible. It is worth remembering that Gorgias loved rhetoric, not philosophy! |
11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
Full Idea: So-called 'Aristotelian essentialism' is the doctrine of essences not relative to specifications. | |
From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], III) | |
A reaction: In other words, they are so-called 'real essences', understood as de re. Quine says essences are all de dicto, and relative to some specification. I vote for Aristotle. |
11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Just as a sentence is necessary if it holds in all worlds, so it is causally necessary if it holds in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature. | |
From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], V) | |
A reaction: I don't believe in the so-called 'laws of nature', so I'm not buying that. Is there no distinction in Lewis's view between those sentences which must hold, and those which happen to hold universally? |
11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Even if Humphrey is a modal continuant, it doesn't take the whole of him to do such things as winning. | |
From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], Post B) | |
A reaction: This responds to Kripke's famous example, that people only care about what happens to themselves, and not to some 'counterpart' of themselves. |
16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
Full Idea: Probably Humphrey could not care less whether someone else, no matter how much resembling him, would have been victorious in another possible world. Thus Lewis's view seems even more bizarre that the usual transworld identification it replaces. | |
From: comment on David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968]) by Saul A. Kripke - Naming and Necessity notes and addenda note 13 | |
A reaction: I begin to see this as a devastating reply to a theory I previously found quite congenial. |
11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Your counterparts resemble you closely in content and context in important respects. They resemble you more closely than do the other things in their worlds. But they are not really you. | |
From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], I) | |
A reaction: It is a dilemma. If my counterpart were exactly me, I couldn't contemplate possibly losing a leg, or my sanity. But if my counterpart isn't exactly me, then I don't have much interest in its fate. Only essences can save us here. Cf. me tomorrow. |
11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
Full Idea: If whatever thing in world w6 it is that resembles you more closely than anything else in w6 is nevertheless quite unlike you; nothing in w6 resembles you at all closely. If so, you have no counterpart in w6. | |
From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], I) | |
A reaction: This is the nub, because the whole theory rests on deciding whether two things resemble sufficiently 'closely'. But then we need a criterion of closeness, so we must start talking about which properties matter. Essences loom. |
11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
Full Idea: An essential attribute of something is an attribute it shares with all its counterparts. | |
From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], III) | |
A reaction: I don't like this. It ties essence entirely to identity, but I think essence precedes identity. Essence is a nexus of causal and explanatory powers which bestows an identity on each thing. But essence might be unstable, and identity with it. |
9866 | Gorgias says rhetoric is the best of arts, because it enslaves without using force [Gorgias, by Plato] |
Full Idea: Gorgias insists that the art of persuasion is superior to all others because it enslaves all the rest, with their own consent, not by force, and is therefore by far the best of all the arts. | |
From: report of Gorgias (fragments/reports [c.443 BCE]) by Plato - Philebus 58a | |
A reaction: A nice point, and it is not unreasonable to rank the arts in order of their power. To enchant, without achieving agreement, and to speak truth without persuading, are both very fine, but there is something about success that cannot be gainsaid. |
5864 | Destroy seriousness with laughter, and laughter with seriousness [Gorgias] |
Full Idea: Destroy the seriousness of others with laughter, and their laughter with seriousness. | |
From: Gorgias (fragments/reports [c.443 BCE]), quoted by Aristotle - The Art of Rhetoric 1419b | |
A reaction: This sounds like brilliant tactical advice, which should be on the wall of every barrister's chambers. This is a case of rhetoric having something to teach us which is nothing at all to do with truth. It is more like learning karate. |