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9212
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Possible states of affairs are not propositions; a proposition can't be a state of affairs! [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
Possible states of affairs have often been taken to be propositions, but this cannot be correct, since any possible state of affairs is possibly a state of affairs, but no proposition is possibly a state of affairs.
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From:
Kit Fine (The Problem of Possibilia [2003], 2)
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A reaction:
The point is, presumably, that the state of affairs cannot be the proposition itself, but (at least) what the proposition refers to. I can't see any objection to that.
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9213
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The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
A possible world can't be defined (by Stalnaker and Plantinga) as a way the world might have been, because a possible world is possibly the world, yet no way the world might have been is possibly the world.
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From:
Kit Fine (The Problem of Possibilia [2003], 2)
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A reaction:
His point is that any definition of a possible world must cover the actual world, because that is one of them. 'Might have been' is not applicable to the actual world. It seems a fairly important starting point for discussion of possible worlds.
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7254
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If you try to get elected, you should be permanently barred from seeking office [More,T]
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Full Idea:
In Utopia, anyone who deliberately tries to get himself elected to a public office is permanently disqualified from holding one.
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From:
Thomas More (Utopia [1516], Bk 2)
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A reaction:
This echoes a thought found in Plato (Idea 2149). I've always liked this idea. Why can't we have elections were a group of the best people are invited to stand? Well, yes, it would lead to corruption... Still, the best should be pushed to the front.
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8433
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There are few traces of an event before it happens, but many afterwards [Lewis, by Horwich]
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Full Idea:
Lewis claims that most events are over-determined by subsequent states of the world, but not by their history. That is, the future of every event contains many independent traces of its occurrence, with little prior indication that it would happen.
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From:
report of David Lewis (Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow [1979]) by Paul Horwich - Lewis's Programme p.209
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A reaction:
Lewis uses this asymmetry to deduce the direction of causation, and hence the direction of time. Most people (including me, I think) would prefer to use the axiomatic direction of time to deduce directions of causation. Lewis was very wicked.
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