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All the ideas for 'Causation', 'Chemistry' and 'The Scope and Language of Science'

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29 ideas

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Maths can be reduced to logic and set theory [Quine]
     Full Idea: Researches in the foundations of mathematics have made it clear that all of (interpreted) mathematics can be got down to logic and set theory, and the objects needed for mathematics can be got down to the category of classes (and classes of classes..).
     From: Willard Quine (The Scope and Language of Science [1954], §VI)
     A reaction: This I take to be a retreat from pure logicism, presumably influenced by Gödel. So can set theory be reduced to logic? Crispin Wright is the one the study.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Supervenience is simply modally robust property co-variance [Hendry]
     Full Idea: Supervenience is not an ontological relationship, being just modally robust property co-variance.
     From: Robin F. Hendry (Chemistry [2008], 'Ontol')
     A reaction: I take supervenience to be nothing more than an interesting phenomenon that requires explanation. I suppose Humean Supervenience is a priori metaphysics, since you could hardly explain it.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
The category of objects incorporates the old distinction of substances and their modes [Quine]
     Full Idea: The category of objects embraces indiscriminately what would anciently have been distinguished as substances and as modes or states of substances.
     From: Willard Quine (The Scope and Language of Science [1954], §6)
     A reaction: This nicely captures Quine's elimination of properties, by presenting them as inseparable from their objects/substances. Armstrong calls this 'Ostrich Nominalism' (for refusing to address the universals problem) but Quineans are unshaken.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis]
     Full Idea: Maybe a disposition is a more fundamental notion than a cause, in which case Lewis has from the very start erred in seeking a causal analysis, in a traditional, conceptual sense, of disposition terms.
     From: comment on David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by Alexander Bird - Nature's Metaphysics 2.2.8
     A reaction: Is this right about Lewis? I see him as reducing both dispositions and causes to a set of bald facts, which exist in possible and actual worlds. Conditionals and counterfactuals also suffer the same fate.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis]
     Full Idea: A counterfactual is non-vacuously true iff it takes less of a departure from actuality to make the consequent true along with the antecedent than it does to make the antecedent true without the consequent.
     From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.197)
     A reaction: Almost every theory proposed by Lewis hangs on the meaning of the word 'close', as used here. If you visited twenty Earth-like worlds (watch Startrek?), it would be a struggle to decide their closeness to ours in rank order.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Nuclear charge (plus laws) explains electron structure and spectrum, but not vice versa [Hendry]
     Full Idea: Given relevant laws of nature (quantum mechanics, the exclusion principle) nuclear charge determines and explains electronic structure and spectroscopic behaviour, but not vice versa.
     From: Robin F. Hendry (Chemistry [2008], 'Micro')
     A reaction: I argue that the first necessary condition for essentialism is a direction of explanation, and here we seem to have one.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis]
     Full Idea: By determinism I mean that the prevailing laws of nature are such that there do not exist any two possible worlds which are exactly alike up to that time, which differ thereafter, and in which those laws are never violated.
     From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.196)
     A reaction: This would mean that the only way an action of free will could creep in would be if it accepted being a 'violation' of the laws of nature. Fans of free will would probably prefer to call it a 'natural' phenomenon. I'm with Lewis.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
A hallucination can, like an ague, be identified with its host; the ontology is physical, the idiom mental [Quine]
     Full Idea: A physical ontology has a place for states of mind. An inspiration or a hallucination can, like the fit of ague, be identified with its host for the duration. It leaves our mentalistic idioms fairly intact, but reconciles them with a physical ontology.
     From: Willard Quine (The Scope and Language of Science [1954], §VI)
     A reaction: Quine is employing the same strategy that he uses for substances and properties (Idea 8461): take the predication as basic, rather than reifying the thing being predicated. The ague analogy suggests that Quine is an incipient functionalist.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis]
     Full Idea: I identify a proposition with the set of possible worlds where it is true.
     From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.193)
     A reaction: As it stands, I'm baffled by this. How can 'it is raining' be a set of possible worlds? I assume it expands to refer to the truth-conditions, among possibilities as well as actualities. 'It is raining' fits all worlds where it is raining.
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
Maybe two kinds are the same if there is no change of entropy on isothermal mixing [Hendry]
     Full Idea: One suggestion is that any two different substance, however alike, exhibit a positive entropy change on mixing. So absence of entropy change on isothermal mixing provides a criterion of sameness of kind.
     From: Robin F. Hendry (Chemistry [2008], 'Micro')
     A reaction: [He cites Paul Needham 2000] This sounds nice, because at a more amateur level we can say that stuff is the same if mixing two samples of it produces no difference. I call it the Upanishads Test.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H]
     Full Idea: Lewis thinks it is a major defect in a theory of causation that it builds in the condition that the time of the cause precede that of the effect: that cause precedes effect is something we ought to explain (which his counterfactual theory claims to do).
     From: report of David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by Hartry Field - Causation in a Physical World
     A reaction: My immediate reaction is that the chances of explaining such a thing are probably nil, and that we might as well just accept the direction of causation as a given. Even philosophers balk at the question 'why doesn't time go backwards?'
I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis]
     Full Idea: One might stipulate that a cause must always precede its effect, but I reject this solution. It won't solve the problem of epiphenomena, it rejects a priori any backwards causation, and it trivializes defining time-direction through causation.
     From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.203)
     A reaction: [compressed] Not strong arguments, I would say. Maybe apparent causes are never epiphenomenal. Maybe backwards causation is impossible. Maybe we must use time to define causal direction, and not vice versa.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
     Full Idea: We sometimes single out one among all the causes of some event and call it 'the' cause. ..We may select the abnormal causes, or those under human control, or those we deem good or bad, or those we want to talk about. This is invidious discrimination.
     From: David Lewis (Causation [1973])
     A reaction: This is the standard view expressed by Mill - presumably the obvious empiricist line. But if we specify 'the pre-conditions' for an event, we can't just mention ANY fact prior to the effect - there is obvious relevance. So why not for 'the' cause as well?
The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
     Full Idea: In present-day regularity analyses, a cause is defined (roughly) as any member of any minimal set of actual conditions that are jointly sufficient, given the laws, for the existence of the effect.
     From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.193)
     A reaction: This is the view Lewis is about to reject. It seem to summarise the essence of the Mackie INUS theory. This account would make the presence of oxygen a cause of almost every human event.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis]
     Full Idea: In the regularity analysis of causes, instead of c causing e, c might turn out to be an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or an inefficacious effect of a genuine cause, or a pre-empted cause (by some other cause) of e.
     From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.194)
     A reaction: These are Lewis's reasons for rejecting the general regularity account, in favour of his own particular counterfactual account. It is unlikely that c would be regularly pre-empted or epiphenomenal. If we build time's direction in, it won't be an effect.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird]
     Full Idea: The Humean idea, developed by Lewis, is that rather than being sufficient for their effects, causes are (counterfactual) necessary for their effects.
     From: report of David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by Alexander Bird - Causation and the Manifestation of Powers p.162
Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird]
     Full Idea: Lewis's basic account has a basic causal relation, counterfactual dependence, and the general causal relation is the ancestral of this basic one. ...This is motivated by counterfactual dependence failing to be general because of the pre-emption problem.
     From: report of David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by Alexander Bird - Causation and the Manifestation of Powers p.161
     A reaction: It is so nice when you struggle for ages with a topic, and then some clever person summarises it clearly for you.
Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis]
     Full Idea: Some counterfactuals are based on non-causal laws, such as Newton's Third Law of Motion. 'If no force one way, then no force the other'. Lewis's counterfactual analysis implies that one force causes the other, which is not the case.
     From: comment on David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience 5.2
     A reaction: So what exactly does 'cause' my punt to move forwards? Basing causal laws on counterfactual claims looks to me like putting the cart before the horse.
My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis]
     Full Idea: My (counterfactual) analysis is meant to apply to causation in particular cases; it is not an analysis of causal generalizations. Those presumably quantify over particulars, but it is hard to match natural language to the quantifiers.
     From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.195)
     A reaction: What authority could you have for asserting a counterfactual claim, if you only had one observation? Isn't the counterfactual claim the hallmark of a generalisation? For one case, 'if not-c, then not-e' is just a speculation.
One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis]
     Full Idea: One event is the cause of another iff there exists a causal chain leading from the first to the second.
     From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.200)
     A reaction: It will be necessary to both explain and identify a 'chain'. Some chains are extremely tenuous (Alexander could stop a barrel of beer). Go back a hundred years, and the cause of any present event is everything back then.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
The nature of an element must survive chemical change, so it is the nucleus, not the electrons [Hendry]
     Full Idea: Whatever earns something membership of the extension of 'krypton' must be a property that can survive chemical change and, therefore, the gain and loss of electrons. Hence what makes it krypton must be a nuclear property.
     From: Robin F. Hendry (Chemistry [2008], 'Micro')
     A reaction: A very nice illuminating example of essentialism in chemistry. The 'nature' is what survives through change, just like what Aristotle said, innit?
Maybe water is the smallest part of it that still counts as water (which is H2O molecules) [Hendry]
     Full Idea: If they do count as water, individual H2O molecules are the smallest items that can qualify as water on their own account. Hydroxyl ions and protons, in contrast, qualify as water only as part of a larger body.
     From: Robin F. Hendry (Chemistry [2008], 'Micro')
     A reaction: As Aristotle might say, this is the homoeomerous aspect of water. This is Hendry's own proposal, and seems rather good.
Maybe the nature of water is macroscopic, and not in the microstructure [Hendry]
     Full Idea: Some deny that that microstructure is what makes it water; substance identity and difference should be determined instead by macroscopic similarities and differences.
     From: Robin F. Hendry (Chemistry [2008], 'Micro')
     A reaction: Very plausible. Is the essential nature of human beings to be found in the structure of our cells?
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis]
     Full Idea: Lewis can elucidate the logic of counterfactuals on the assumption that you are not at all puzzled about what a law of nature is. But if you are puzzled about this, it cannot contribute anything towards resolving your puzzlement.
     From: comment on David Lewis (Causation [1973]) by L. Jonathan Cohen - The Problem of Natural Laws p.219
     A reaction: This seems like a penetrating remark. The counterfactual theory is wrong, partly because it is epistemological instead of ontological, and partly because it refuses to face the really difficult problem, of what is going on out there.
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
Compounds can differ with the same collection of atoms, so structure matters too [Hendry]
     Full Idea: The distinctness of the isomers ethanol (CH3CH2OH, boiling at 78.4°) and dimethyl ether (CH3OCH3, boiling at -24.9°) must lie in their different molecular structures. ...But structure has continuously varying quantities, like bond length and angle.
     From: Robin F. Hendry (Chemistry [2008], 'Micro')
     A reaction: [compressed] This seems to imply that what matters is an idealised abstraction of the structure (i.e. its topology), which is a reason for denying that chemistry is reducible to mere physics.
Water continuously changes, with new groupings of molecules [Hendry]
     Full Idea: Macroscopic bodies of water are complex and dynamic congeries of different molecular species, in which there is a constant dissociation of individual molecules, re-association of ions, and formation, growth and disassociation of oligomers.
     From: Robin F. Hendry (Chemistry [2008], 'Micro')
     A reaction: The point is that these activities are needed to explain the behaviour of water (such as its conductivity).
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
Elements survive chemical change, and are tracked to explain direction and properties [Hendry]
     Full Idea: Elements survive chemical change, and chemical explanations track them from one composite substance to another, thereby explaining both the direction of the chemical change, and the properties of the substances they compose.
     From: Robin F. Hendry (Chemistry [2008], Intro)
     A reaction: [The 16,000th idea of this database, entered on Guy Fawkes' Day 2013]
Defining elements by atomic number allowed atoms of an element to have different masses [Hendry]
     Full Idea: In 1923 elements were defined as populations of atoms with the same nuclear charge (i.e. atomic number), allowing that atoms of the same element may have different masses.
     From: Robin F. Hendry (Chemistry [2008], 'Chem')
     A reaction: The point is that it allowed isotopes of the same element to come under one heading. This is fine for the heavier elements, but a bit dubious for the very light ones (where an isotope makes a bigger difference).
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
Generally it is nuclear charge (not nuclear mass) which determines behaviour [Hendry]
     Full Idea: In general, nuclear charge is the overwhelming determinant of an element's chemical behaviour, while nuclear mass is a negligible factor.
     From: Robin F. Hendry (Chemistry [2008], 'Micro')
     A reaction: The exception is the isotopes of very light elements light hydrogen.