Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Extrinsic Properties', 'Short History of Modern Philosophy' and 'Letters to Samuel Masson'

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8 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Nowadays logic is seen as the science of extensions, not intensions [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Logicians have come increasingly to realise that logic is the science not of the intension, but of the extension of terms.
     From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Ch.4)
     A reaction: I take this to be because the notion of a 'set' is basic, which is defined strictly in terms of its members. This move is probably because we can be clear about extensions, but not intensions. Tidiness is no substitute for complex truth.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
I don't admit infinite numbers, and consider infinitesimals to be useful fictions [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Notwithstanding my infinitesimal calculus, I do not admit any real infinite numbers, even though I confess that the multitude of things surpasses any finite number, or rather any number. ..I consider infinitesimal quantities to be useful fictions.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Masson [1716], 1716)
     A reaction: With the phrase 'useful fictions' we seem to have jumped straight into Harty Field. I'm with Leibniz on this one. The history of mathematics is a series of ingenious inventions, whenever they seem to make further exciting proofs possible.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Lewis, by Sider]
     Full Idea: The property of 'being alone in the world' is an extrinsic property, even though it has had by an object that is alone in the world.
     From: report of David Lewis (Extrinsic Properties [1983]) by Theodore Sider - Writing the Book of the World 01.2
     A reaction: I always choke on my cornflakes whenever anyone cites a true predicate as if it were a genuine property. This is a counterexample to Idea 14978. Sider offers another more elaborate example from Lewis.
Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling' [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Properties may be more or less intrinsic; being a brother has more of an admixture of intrinsic structure than being a sibling does, yet both are extrinsic.
     From: David Lewis (Extrinsic Properties [1983], I)
     A reaction: I suppose the point is that a brother is intrinsically male - but then a sibling is intrinsically human. A totally extrinsic relation would be one between entities which shared virtually no categories of existence.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is [Lewis]
     Full Idea: The way something is is given by the totality of its intrinsic properties.
     From: David Lewis (Extrinsic Properties [1983], I)
     A reaction: No. Some properties are intrinsic but trivial. The 'important' ones fix the identity (if the identity is indeed 'fixed').
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Cartesian 'ideas' confuse concepts and propositions [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Cartesian 'ideas' seem to be both concepts and propositions at once.
     From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Ch.4)
     A reaction: This seems to be the simple reason why modern philosophers don't like this seventeenth century notion. There is something slightly too tidy about the modern notion of propositions built out of concepts. Animals see propositions in a flash.
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Allegiance is prior to the recognition of individual rights [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Personally I regard allegiance, in the manner of Hegel, as prior to the recognition of individual rights.
     From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Bibliog)
     A reaction: Scruton notoriously generates rather right-wing views from this basis, but it is also the basis of communitarianism, which can take a softer form. It seems to me self-evident that rights cannot be the prime concept in a society. What society?
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
A right is a power which is enforced in the name of justice [Scruton]
     Full Idea: Rights are enforced in the name of justice, whereas power is enforced come what may.
     From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Ch.14)
     A reaction: Presumably rights can be claimed as well as enforced, and the notion of a natural right is at least a discussable concept, as in the 'right' of self-defence. Scruton offers us a very right-wing definition of rights.