Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance', 'works' and 'Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology'

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4 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
19729 'Modal epistemology' demands a connection between the belief and facts in possible worlds [Black,T]
     Full Idea: In 'modal epistemologies' a belief counts as knowledge only if there is a modal connection - a connection not only to the actual world, but also to other non-actual possible worlds - between the belief and the facts of the matter.
     From: Tim Black (Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology [2011], 1)
     A reaction: [Pritchard 2005 seems to be a source for this] This sounds to me a bit like Nozick's tracking or sensitivity theory. Nozick is, I suppose, diachronic (time must pass, for the tracking), where this theory is synchronic.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
19728 Gettier and lottery cases seem to involve luck, meaning bad connection of beliefs to facts [Black,T]
     Full Idea: The protagonists in Gettier cases and in lottery cases fail to have knowledge because their beliefs are true simply as a matter of luck, where this means that their beliefs themselves are not appropriately connected to the facts.
     From: Tim Black (Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology [2011], 1)
     A reaction: The lottery problem is you correctly believe 'my ticket won't win the lottery' even though you don't seem to actually know it won't. Is the Gettier problem simply the problem of lucky knowledge? 'Luck' is a rather vague concept.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
3447 All theory is against free will, and all experience is in favour of it [Johnson,S]
     Full Idea: All theory is against free will, and all experience is in favour of it.
     From: Samuel Johnson (works [1770]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
9425 Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few) [Mumford on Lewis]
     Full Idea: Later Lewis said we must choose between the intersection of the axioms of the tied best systems. He chose for laws the axioms that are in all the tied systems (but then there may be few or no axioms in the intersection).
     From: comment on David Lewis (Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance [1980], p.124) by Stephen Mumford - Laws in Nature