9 ideas
15549 | If it were true that nothing at all existed, would that have a truthmaker? [Lewis] |
Full Idea: If there was absolutely nothing at all, then it would have been true that there was nothing. Would there have been a truthmaker for this truth? | |
From: David Lewis (A world of truthmakers? [1998], p.220) | |
A reaction: This is a problem for Lewis's own claim that 'truth supervenes on being', as well as the more restricted truthmakers invoked by Armstrong. |
18935 | Semantic theory should specify when an act of naming is successful [Sawyer] |
Full Idea: A semantic theory of names should deliver a specification of the conditions under which a name names an individual, and hence a specification of the conditions under which a name is empty. | |
From: Sarah Sawyer (Empty Names [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: Naming can be private, like naming my car 'Bertrand', but never tell anyone. I like Plato's remark that names are 'tools'. Do we specify conditions for successful spanner-usage? The first step must be individuation, preparatory to naming. |
18945 | Millians say a name just means its object [Sawyer] |
Full Idea: The Millian view of direct reference says that the meaning of a name is the object named. | |
From: Sarah Sawyer (Empty Names [2012], 4) | |
A reaction: Any theory that says meaning somehow is features of the physical world strikes me as totally misguided. Napoleon is a man, so he can't be part of a sentence. He delegates that job to words (such as 'Napoleon'). |
18934 | Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer] |
Full Idea: Some empty names sentences can be understood, so appear to be meaningful ('Pegasus was sired by Poseidon'), ...some appear to be co-referential ('Santa Claus'/'Father Christmas'), and some appear to be straightforwardly true ('Pegasus doesn't exist'). | |
From: Sarah Sawyer (Empty Names [2012], 1) | |
A reaction: Hang on to this, when the logicians arrive and start telling you that your talk of empty names is vacuous, because there is no object in the 'domain' to which a predicate can be attached. Meaning, reference and truth are the issues around empty names. |
18938 | Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer] |
Full Idea: In Frege's account sentences such as 'Pegasus does not exist' will be neither true nor false, since the truth-value of a sentence is its referent, and the referent of a complex expression is determined by the referent of its parts. | |
From: Sarah Sawyer (Empty Names [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: We can keep the idea of 'sense', which is very useful for dealing with empty names, but tweak his account of truth-values to evade this problem. I'm thinking that meaning is compositional, but truth-value isn't. |
18947 | Definites descriptions don't solve the empty names problem, because the properties may not exist [Sawyer] |
Full Idea: If it were possible for a definite description to be empty - not in the sense of there being no object that satisfies it, but of there being no set of properties it refers to - the problem of empty names would not have been solved. | |
From: Sarah Sawyer (Empty Names [2012], 5) | |
A reaction: Swoyer is thinking of properties like 'is a unicorn', which are clearly just as vulnerable to being empty as 'the unicorn' was. It seems unlikely that 'horse', 'white' and 'horn' would be empty. |
9409 | Laws are the best axiomatization of the total history of world events or facts [Lewis, by Mumford] |
Full Idea: The Mill-Ramsey-Lewis theory takes laws to be axioms (or theorems) of the best possible systematizations of the world's total history, where such a history is a history of events or facts. | |
From: report of David Lewis (Psychophysical and theoretical identifications [1972]) by Stephen Mumford - Laws in Nature 1.3 |
9423 | If simplicity and strength are criteria for laws of nature, that introduces a subjective element [Mumford on Lewis] |
Full Idea: Lewis's simplicity and strength criteria introduce an element of subjectivity into the laws, because the best system seems to be determined by what we take to be simple and strong in a system. | |
From: comment on David Lewis (Psychophysical and theoretical identifications [1972]) by Stephen Mumford - Laws in Nature 3.5 | |
A reaction: [Mumford cites Armstrong 1983:67 for this] |
9424 | A number of systematizations might tie as the best and most coherent system [Mumford on Lewis] |
Full Idea: Since the best system view is a coherence theory, the possibility could not be ruled out that a number of different systematizations of the same history might be tied for first place as equally best. | |
From: comment on David Lewis (Psychophysical and theoretical identifications [1972]) by Stephen Mumford - Laws in Nature 3.5 | |
A reaction: [Mumord cites Armstrong 1983:70] Personally I am a fan of coherence theories, and this problem doesn't bother me. |