Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A world of truthmakers?', 'Empty Names' and 'Identity in Substances and True Propositions'

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7 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
If it were true that nothing at all existed, would that have a truthmaker? [Lewis]
     Full Idea: If there was absolutely nothing at all, then it would have been true that there was nothing. Would there have been a truthmaker for this truth?
     From: David Lewis (A world of truthmakers? [1998], p.220)
     A reaction: This is a problem for Lewis's own claim that 'truth supervenes on being', as well as the more restricted truthmakers invoked by Armstrong.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Semantic theory should specify when an act of naming is successful [Sawyer]
     Full Idea: A semantic theory of names should deliver a specification of the conditions under which a name names an individual, and hence a specification of the conditions under which a name is empty.
     From: Sarah Sawyer (Empty Names [2012], 1)
     A reaction: Naming can be private, like naming my car 'Bertrand', but never tell anyone. I like Plato's remark that names are 'tools'. Do we specify conditions for successful spanner-usage? The first step must be individuation, preparatory to naming.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Millians say a name just means its object [Sawyer]
     Full Idea: The Millian view of direct reference says that the meaning of a name is the object named.
     From: Sarah Sawyer (Empty Names [2012], 4)
     A reaction: Any theory that says meaning somehow is features of the physical world strikes me as totally misguided. Napoleon is a man, so he can't be part of a sentence. He delegates that job to words (such as 'Napoleon').
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer]
     Full Idea: Some empty names sentences can be understood, so appear to be meaningful ('Pegasus was sired by Poseidon'), ...some appear to be co-referential ('Santa Claus'/'Father Christmas'), and some appear to be straightforwardly true ('Pegasus doesn't exist').
     From: Sarah Sawyer (Empty Names [2012], 1)
     A reaction: Hang on to this, when the logicians arrive and start telling you that your talk of empty names is vacuous, because there is no object in the 'domain' to which a predicate can be attached. Meaning, reference and truth are the issues around empty names.
Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer]
     Full Idea: In Frege's account sentences such as 'Pegasus does not exist' will be neither true nor false, since the truth-value of a sentence is its referent, and the referent of a complex expression is determined by the referent of its parts.
     From: Sarah Sawyer (Empty Names [2012], 2)
     A reaction: We can keep the idea of 'sense', which is very useful for dealing with empty names, but tweak his account of truth-values to evade this problem. I'm thinking that meaning is compositional, but truth-value isn't.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Definites descriptions don't solve the empty names problem, because the properties may not exist [Sawyer]
     Full Idea: If it were possible for a definite description to be empty - not in the sense of there being no object that satisfies it, but of there being no set of properties it refers to - the problem of empty names would not have been solved.
     From: Sarah Sawyer (Empty Names [2012], 5)
     A reaction: Swoyer is thinking of properties like 'is a unicorn', which are clearly just as vulnerable to being empty as 'the unicorn' was. It seems unlikely that 'horse', 'white' and 'horn' would be empty.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Substances are in harmony, because they each express the one reality in themselves [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Every substance expresses the whole sequence of the universe in accordance with its own viewpoint or relationship to the rest, so that all are in perfect correspondence with one another.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Identity in Substances and True Propositions [1686], p.98)
     A reaction: Thus 'expression' (something like mapping what is exterior) is the mechanism through which God achieves harmony in the universe. Instants of time are said to be successive moments of perfect harmony.