Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Extrinsic Properties', 'Against the Professors (six books)' and 'Lectures on Ethics'

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9 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 8.74)
     A reaction: This makes assertions truth-bearers, rather than propositions. But a proposition can be true or false if it is stamped with a date and/or place. "Shakespeare was born in Stratford on 23rd April 1664". No one needs to assert that.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
'Man is a rational mortal animal' is equivalent to 'if something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal' [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: Definitions are identical to universal propositions in meaning, and only differ in syntax, for whoever says 'Man is a rational mortal animal' says the same thing in meaning as whoever says 'If something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal'.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 11.8)
     A reaction: How strikingly like Bertrand Russell's interest and solutions. Sextus shows a straightforward interest in logical form, of a kind we associate with the twentieth century. Did Sextus Empiricus invent quantification?
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Lewis, by Sider]
     Full Idea: The property of 'being alone in the world' is an extrinsic property, even though it has had by an object that is alone in the world.
     From: report of David Lewis (Extrinsic Properties [1983]) by Theodore Sider - Writing the Book of the World 01.2
     A reaction: I always choke on my cornflakes whenever anyone cites a true predicate as if it were a genuine property. This is a counterexample to Idea 14978. Sider offers another more elaborate example from Lewis.
Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling' [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Properties may be more or less intrinsic; being a brother has more of an admixture of intrinsic structure than being a sibling does, yet both are extrinsic.
     From: David Lewis (Extrinsic Properties [1983], I)
     A reaction: I suppose the point is that a brother is intrinsically male - but then a sibling is intrinsically human. A totally extrinsic relation would be one between entities which shared virtually no categories of existence.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is [Lewis]
     Full Idea: The way something is is given by the totality of its intrinsic properties.
     From: David Lewis (Extrinsic Properties [1983], I)
     A reaction: No. Some properties are intrinsic but trivial. The 'important' ones fix the identity (if the identity is indeed 'fixed').
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
How can you investigate without some preconception of your object? [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: A preconception and conception must precede every object of investigation, for how can anyone even investigate without some conception of the object of investigation?
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 8.331a)
     A reaction: The Duhem-Quine thesis about the 'theory-ladenness of observation' is just a revival of some routine ancient scepticism. As well as a conceptual scheme to accommodate the observation, there must also be some motivation for the investigation.
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 9. Contractualism
Right actions, once done, are those with a reasonable justification [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: Right action is whatever, once it has been done, has a reasonable justification.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 7.158)
     A reaction: Why does he add 'once it has been done'? Wouldn't a proposed action be right if it had a reasonable justification? This grows out of the classical and Stoic emphasis on reason in ethics, and leads towards Scanlon's Contractualism.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
The maxim for suicide is committed to the value of life, and is thus contradictory [Kant]
     Full Idea: If my maxim is to shorten my life if its continuance threatens more evil than pleasure ...it is seen that a system of nature by whose law the feeling intended to further life should actually destroy life would contradict itself, and could not subsist.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Lectures on Ethics [1780], 422:53)
     A reaction: [compressed] I take it this means that a potential suicide is assessing what is best for life, and is therefore implicitly committed to life. Not persuasive! Should we not terminate the life of a mass murderer in mid-crime?
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
The tektraktys (1+2+3+4=10) is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature' [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: The tektraktys (1+2+3+4=10) is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature', because nature is a harmony of three concords (4th,5th and octave), and these ratios (4:3, 3:2, and 2:1) are found in the tektraktys.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 7.95)