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20166
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A man is a responsible agent to the extent he has an intention, and knows what he is doing [Hampshire]
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Full Idea:
A man becomes more and more a free and responsible agent the more he at all times knows what he is doing, in every sense of this phrase, and the more he acts with a definite and clearly formed intention.
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From:
Stuart Hampshire (Thought and Responsibility [1960], p.178), quoted by John Kekes - The Human Condition 07.1
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A reaction:
Kekes quote this (along with Frankfurt, Hart etc) as the 'received view' of responsibility, which he attacks.
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4022
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Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C]
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Full Idea:
The injunction of Epictetus is well known, that in commiserating with another for his misfortune, we ought to talk consolingly, but not be moved by pity.
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From:
report of Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], §16) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §15.1
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A reaction:
This goes strongly against the grain of the Christian tradition, but strikes me as an appealing attitude (even if I am the sufferer).
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23365
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If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus]
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Full Idea:
When you see someone weeping is sorrow …do not shrink from sympathising with him, and even groaning with him, but be careful not to groan inwardly too.
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From:
Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 16)
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A reaction:
The point is that the person's suffering is an 'indifferent' because nothing can be done about it, and we should only really care about what we are able to choose. He is not opposed to the man's suffering, or his need for support.
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