36 ideas
| 326 | For relaxation one can consider the world of change, instead of eternal things [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If, for relaxation, one gives up discussing eternal things, it is pleasant to consider likely accounts of the world of change. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 59c) | |
| A reaction: To understand this, examine Plato's example of the Line at 'Republic' 509d. |
| 315 | Philosophy is the supreme gift of the gods to mortals [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy is the greatest gift the gods have ever given or ever will give to mortals. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 47b) | |
| A reaction: I wonder why they gave it to us? |
| 306 | Nothing can come to be without a cause [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Nothing can come to be without a cause. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 28a) |
| 324 | Before the existence of the world there must have been being, space and becoming [Plato] |
| Full Idea: There were, before the world came into existence, being, space, and becoming, three distinct realities. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 52d) |
| 20364 | The apprehensions of reason remain unchanging, but reasonless sensation shows mere becoming [Plato] |
| Full Idea: That which is apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in the same state, but that which is conceived by opinion with the help of sensation and without reason is always in a process of becoming and perishing, and never really is. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 28a) | |
| A reaction: Lots of problems with this, of which I take the main one to be the idea that sensation is 'without reason', as if there were a sharp dichotomy in our ways of evaluating reality. Laws of nature seem to be laws of change, not of stasis. |
| 12042 | Plato's Forms were seen as part of physics, rather than of metaphysics [Plato, by Annas] |
| Full Idea: In the ancient world Plato's Theory of Forms was mostly seen as one aspect of Plato's 'physics' or theory of the world (rather than as 'metaphysics'). | |
| From: report of Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE]) by Julia Annas - Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction Ch.5 | |
| A reaction: This is how I also see the theory, but then I am inclined to see religion as a rather startling branch of speculative physics. Annas cites 'Timaeus' as the key text for this. |
| 307 | Something will always be well-made if the maker keeps in mind the eternal underlying pattern [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Whenever the maker of anything keeps his eye on the eternally unchanging and uses it as his pattern for the form and function of his product the result must be good. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 28b) |
| 318 | In addition to the underlying unchanging model and a changing copy of it, there must also be a foundation of all change [Plato] |
| Full Idea: In addition to an eternal unchanging model and a visible and changing copy of reality, there must be a third part, the receptacle and nurse of all becoming and change. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 49b) | |
| A reaction: cf Aristotle's criticism in Metaphysics |
| 321 | For knowledge and true opinion to be different there must be Forms; otherwise we are just stuck with sensations [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If intelligence and true opinion are different, then the forms must exist, but if they are the same, then what our senses perceive must be the most certain reality. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 51d) |
| 317 | The universe is basically an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Our basic description of the universe contained an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 48e) |
| 11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: So-called 'Aristotelian essentialism' is the doctrine of essences not relative to specifications. | |
| From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], III) | |
| A reaction: In other words, they are so-called 'real essences', understood as de re. Quine says essences are all de dicto, and relative to some specification. I vote for Aristotle. |
| 11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Just as a sentence is necessary if it holds in all worlds, so it is causally necessary if it holds in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature. | |
| From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], V) | |
| A reaction: I don't believe in the so-called 'laws of nature', so I'm not buying that. Is there no distinction in Lewis's view between those sentences which must hold, and those which happen to hold universally? |
| 11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Even if Humphrey is a modal continuant, it doesn't take the whole of him to do such things as winning. | |
| From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], Post B) | |
| A reaction: This responds to Kripke's famous example, that people only care about what happens to themselves, and not to some 'counterpart' of themselves. |
| 16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Probably Humphrey could not care less whether someone else, no matter how much resembling him, would have been victorious in another possible world. Thus Lewis's view seems even more bizarre that the usual transworld identification it replaces. | |
| From: comment on David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968]) by Saul A. Kripke - Naming and Necessity notes and addenda note 13 | |
| A reaction: I begin to see this as a devastating reply to a theory I previously found quite congenial. |
| 11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Your counterparts resemble you closely in content and context in important respects. They resemble you more closely than do the other things in their worlds. But they are not really you. | |
| From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], I) | |
| A reaction: It is a dilemma. If my counterpart were exactly me, I couldn't contemplate possibly losing a leg, or my sanity. But if my counterpart isn't exactly me, then I don't have much interest in its fate. Only essences can save us here. Cf. me tomorrow. |
| 11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: If whatever thing in world w6 it is that resembles you more closely than anything else in w6 is nevertheless quite unlike you; nothing in w6 resembles you at all closely. If so, you have no counterpart in w6. | |
| From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], I) | |
| A reaction: This is the nub, because the whole theory rests on deciding whether two things resemble sufficiently 'closely'. But then we need a criterion of closeness, so we must start talking about which properties matter. Essences loom. |
| 11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: An essential attribute of something is an attribute it shares with all its counterparts. | |
| From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], III) | |
| A reaction: I don't like this. It ties essence entirely to identity, but I think essence precedes identity. Essence is a nexus of causal and explanatory powers which bestows an identity on each thing. But essence might be unstable, and identity with it. |
| 5691 | The adverbial account of sensation says not 'see a red image' but be 'appeared to redly' [Shoemaker] |
| Full Idea: Some who reject the act-object conception of sensation favour an 'adverbial' account, where (instead of the act of 'seeing a red image') it is better to speak of 'being appeared to redly'. | |
| From: Sydney Shoemaker (Introspection [1994], p.398) | |
| A reaction: The point is that you couldn't perceive without a colour (or travel without a speed), so the qualifying adverb is intrinsic to the process, not a separate object. The adverbial theory will imply a fairly minimal account of universals. |
| 334 | Only bird-brained people think astronomy is entirely a matter of evidence [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Birds are empty-headed men who grew feathers instead of hair, because they were interested in astronomy but thought it was entirely a matter of physical evidence. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 91d) |
| 5962 | Plato says the soul is ordered by number [Plato, by Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Plato regards the substance of soul not as number but as being ordered by number. | |
| From: report of Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE]) by Plutarch - 68: Generation of the soul in 'Timaeus' 1023 | |
| A reaction: This remark points towards Plato's esoteric doctrines, which are some sort of mathematical metaphysics. The idea that order and numbers are in some way connected is one of the most powerful in western civilization, with undeniable appeal. |
| 5687 | For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker] |
| Full Idea: Some writers distinguish introspection from a pre-introspective awareness of mental phenomena, saying one is not properly introspecting unless one is not only aware of the phenomena, but aware that one is aware of them. | |
| From: Sydney Shoemaker (Introspection [1994], p.395) | |
| A reaction: The test question might be what we think animals do. I think I agree with the 'writers'. You are either just aware of the contents or qualia or images of thought, which is not introspection, or you become introspectively aware that you are having them. |
| 5688 | Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker] |
| Full Idea: Foundationalist epistemology takes all empirical knowledge to be grounded in the introspective knowledge each mind has of its own states, …holding that introspective judgements are 'incorrigible' or 'infallible', and mental states are 'self-intimating'. | |
| From: Sydney Shoemaker (Introspection [1994], p.396) | |
| A reaction: Descartes' foundationalist Cogito also seems to be based on introspection, making introspection the essence of all foundationalism. The standard modern view is that introspective states are incorrigible, but not infallible. |
| 330 | No one wants to be bad, but bad men result from physical and educational failures, which they do not want or choose [Plato] |
| Full Idea: No one wishes to be bad, but a bad man is bad because of some flaw in his physical makeup and failure in his education, neither of which he likes or chooses. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 86e) |
| 316 | Music has harmony like the soul, and serves to reorder disharmony within us [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Music has harmonic motions like the orbits of the soul, and is not for irrational pleasure, but to reduce to order any disharmony in the revolutions within us. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 47d) |
| 332 | One should exercise both the mind and the body, to avoid imbalance [Plato] |
| Full Idea: One should preserve a balance and avoid exercising the mind or body without the other; mathematicians should exercise physically, and athletes mentally. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 88c) | |
| A reaction: Excellent, and very modern. Use it or lose it. It suggests that Plato had a fairly holistic view of a human being, and saw mind and body as closely integrated. |
| 328 | Everything that takes place naturally is pleasant [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Everything that takes place naturally is pleasant. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 81e) | |
| A reaction: Not many people would agree with this. I recently watched a sparrowhawk eat a pigeon in my garden. This is the source of the stoic formula of living according to nature. |
| 322 | Intelligence is the result of rational teaching; true opinion can result from irrational persuasion [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Intelligence is produced by teaching, involves truth and reason, and cannot be moved; true opinion involves persuasion, is irrational and can be moved. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 51e) |
| 331 | Bad governments prevent discussion, and discourage the study of virtue [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Under a bad government discussion, both public and private, is bad, and no courses of study are available to cure faults of character. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 87b) |
| 311 | The cosmos must be unique, because it resembles the creator, who is unique [Plato] |
| Full Idea: So that our universe can resemble the perfect living creature in being unique, the universe was, is and will continue to be its maker's only creation. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 31c) |
| 310 | The creator of the cosmos had no envy, and so wanted things to be as like himself as possible [Plato] |
| Full Idea: This changing cosmos was made because its maker is good, and therefore lacks envy; he therefore wished all things to be as like himself as possible. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 29e) |
| 325 | We must consider the four basic shapes as too small to see, only becoming visible in large numbers [Plato] |
| Full Idea: We must think of the individual units of all four basic shapes as being far too small to be visible, and only becoming visible when massed together in large numbers. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 56c) |
| 327 | There are two types of cause, the necessary and the divine [Plato] |
| Full Idea: We must distinguish two types of cause, the necessary and the divine. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 68e) |
| 314 | Heavenly movements gave us the idea of time, and caused us to inquire about the heavens [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Days, months, years and solstices have caused the invention of number, given us the notion of time, and caused us to inquire into the nature of the universe. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 47a) |
| 312 | Time came into existence with the heavens, so that there will be a time when they can be dissolved [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Time came into being with the heavens, so that they should be dissolved together if ever they are dissolved. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 38c) |
| 309 | Clearly the world is good, so its maker must have been concerned with the eternal, not with change [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If the world is beautiful and its maker good, he had an eye on the eternal; if not, on that which is subject to change; clearly the world is the fairest of things, and he the best of causes, so it is eternal. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 29a) |
| 308 | If the cosmos is an object of perception then it must be continually changing [Plato] |
| Full Idea: The cosmos is visible, tangible and corporeal, and therefore perceptible by the senses; therefore it is an object of opinion and sensation, and therefore change and coming into being. | |
| From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 28d) |