16 ideas
10282 | Logic is the study of sound argument, or of certain artificial languages (or applying the latter to the former) [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: A logic is a collection of closely related artificial languages, and its older meaning is the study of the rules of sound argument. The languages can be used as a framework for studying rules of argument. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [Hodges then says he will stick to the languages] The suspicion is that one might confine the subject to the artificial languages simply because it is easier, and avoids the tricky philosophical questions. That approximates to computer programming. |
10283 | A formula needs an 'interpretation' of its constants, and a 'valuation' of its variables [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: To have a truth-value, a first-order formula needs an 'interpretation' (I) of its constants, and a 'valuation' (ν) of its variables. Something in the world is attached to the constants; objects are attached to variables. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.3) |
10285 | I |= φ means that the formula φ is true in the interpretation I [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: I |= φ means that the formula φ is true in the interpretation I. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.5) | |
A reaction: [There should be no space between the vertical and the two horizontals!] This contrasts with |-, which means 'is proved in'. That is a syntactic or proof-theoretic symbol, whereas |= is a semantic symbol (involving truth). |
10284 | There are three different standard presentations of semantics [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: Semantic rules can be presented in 'Tarski style', where the interpretation-plus-valuation is reduced to the same question for simpler formulas, or the 'Henkin-Hintikka style' in terms of games, or the 'Barwise-Etchemendy style' for computers. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.3) | |
A reaction: I haven't yet got the hang of the latter two, but I note them to map the territory. |
10289 | Up Löwenheim-Skolem: if infinite models, then arbitrarily large models [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: Upward Löwenheim-Skolem: every first-order theory with infinite models has arbitrarily large models. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.10) |
10288 | Down Löwenheim-Skolem: if a countable language has a consistent theory, that has a countable model [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: Downward Löwenheim-Skolem (the weakest form): If L is a first-order language with at most countably many formulas, and T is a consistent theory in L. Then T has a model with at most countably many elements. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.10) |
10287 | If a first-order theory entails a sentence, there is a finite subset of the theory which entails it [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: Compactness Theorem: suppose T is a first-order theory, ψ is a first-order sentence, and T entails ψ. Then there is a finite subset U of T such that U entails ψ. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.10) | |
A reaction: If entailment is possible, it can be done finitely. |
10286 | A 'set' is a mathematically well-behaved class [Hodges,W] |
Full Idea: A 'set' is a mathematically well-behaved class. | |
From: Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.6) |
11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
Full Idea: So-called 'Aristotelian essentialism' is the doctrine of essences not relative to specifications. | |
From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], III) | |
A reaction: In other words, they are so-called 'real essences', understood as de re. Quine says essences are all de dicto, and relative to some specification. I vote for Aristotle. |
11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Just as a sentence is necessary if it holds in all worlds, so it is causally necessary if it holds in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature. | |
From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], V) | |
A reaction: I don't believe in the so-called 'laws of nature', so I'm not buying that. Is there no distinction in Lewis's view between those sentences which must hold, and those which happen to hold universally? |
11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Even if Humphrey is a modal continuant, it doesn't take the whole of him to do such things as winning. | |
From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], Post B) | |
A reaction: This responds to Kripke's famous example, that people only care about what happens to themselves, and not to some 'counterpart' of themselves. |
16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
Full Idea: Probably Humphrey could not care less whether someone else, no matter how much resembling him, would have been victorious in another possible world. Thus Lewis's view seems even more bizarre that the usual transworld identification it replaces. | |
From: comment on David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968]) by Saul A. Kripke - Naming and Necessity notes and addenda note 13 | |
A reaction: I begin to see this as a devastating reply to a theory I previously found quite congenial. |
11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Your counterparts resemble you closely in content and context in important respects. They resemble you more closely than do the other things in their worlds. But they are not really you. | |
From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], I) | |
A reaction: It is a dilemma. If my counterpart were exactly me, I couldn't contemplate possibly losing a leg, or my sanity. But if my counterpart isn't exactly me, then I don't have much interest in its fate. Only essences can save us here. Cf. me tomorrow. |
11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
Full Idea: If whatever thing in world w6 it is that resembles you more closely than anything else in w6 is nevertheless quite unlike you; nothing in w6 resembles you at all closely. If so, you have no counterpart in w6. | |
From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], I) | |
A reaction: This is the nub, because the whole theory rests on deciding whether two things resemble sufficiently 'closely'. But then we need a criterion of closeness, so we must start talking about which properties matter. Essences loom. |
11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
Full Idea: An essential attribute of something is an attribute it shares with all its counterparts. | |
From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], III) | |
A reaction: I don't like this. It ties essence entirely to identity, but I think essence precedes identity. Essence is a nexus of causal and explanatory powers which bestows an identity on each thing. But essence might be unstable, and identity with it. |
3032 | I can form no notion of what the good is [Amphis] |
Full Idea: What the good is I no more can form a notion of, than of the good of Plato. | |
From: Amphis (comedies (frags) [c.350 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 03.1.22 | |
A reaction: It was evidently a running joke in the ancient world that no one could define Plato's Form of the Good. He was said to have written a book on it, now lost. |