9 ideas
14979 | Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Lewis, by Sider] |
Full Idea: The property of 'being alone in the world' is an extrinsic property, even though it has had by an object that is alone in the world. | |
From: report of David Lewis (Extrinsic Properties [1983]) by Theodore Sider - Writing the Book of the World 01.2 | |
A reaction: I always choke on my cornflakes whenever anyone cites a true predicate as if it were a genuine property. This is a counterexample to Idea 14978. Sider offers another more elaborate example from Lewis. |
15454 | Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling' [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Properties may be more or less intrinsic; being a brother has more of an admixture of intrinsic structure than being a sibling does, yet both are extrinsic. | |
From: David Lewis (Extrinsic Properties [1983], I) | |
A reaction: I suppose the point is that a brother is intrinsically male - but then a sibling is intrinsically human. A totally extrinsic relation would be one between entities which shared virtually no categories of existence. |
15455 | Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The way something is is given by the totality of its intrinsic properties. | |
From: David Lewis (Extrinsic Properties [1983], I) | |
A reaction: No. Some properties are intrinsic but trivial. The 'important' ones fix the identity (if the identity is indeed 'fixed'). |
6011 | There is a remote first god (the Good), and a second god who organises the material world [Numenius, by O'Meara] |
Full Idea: Numenius argues that material reality depends on intelligible being, which depends on a first god - the Good - which is difficult to grasp, but which inspires a second god to imitate it, turning to matter and organizing it as the world. | |
From: report of Numenius (fragments/reports [c.160]) by Dominic J. O'Meara - Numenius | |
A reaction: The interaction problem comes either between the two gods, or between the second god and the world. The argument may have failed to catch on for long when people scented an infinite regress lurking in the middle of it. |
21275 | Unlike a stone, the parts of a watch are obviously assembled in order to show the time [Paley] |
Full Idea: When we come to inspect a watch we perceive (what we could not discover in a stone) that its several parts are put together for a purpose, to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day. | |
From: William Paley (Natural Theology [1802], Ch 1) | |
A reaction: Microscopic examination of the stone would have surprised Paley. Should we infer a geometer because the sun is spherical? Crytals look designed, but are explained by deeper chemistry. |
21276 | From the obvious purpose and structure of a watch we must infer that it was designed [Paley] |
Full Idea: The inference is inevitable that the watch had a maker; that there must have existed, at some time, an artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer, who designed its use. | |
From: William Paley (Natural Theology [1802], Ch 1) | |
A reaction: It rather begs the question to refer to an ordered structure as a 'design'. Why do we think it is absurd to think the the 'purpose' of the sun is to benefit mankind? Suppose we found a freakish natural sundial in the woods. |
21277 | Even an imperfect machine can exhibit obvious design [Paley] |
Full Idea: It is not necessary that a machine be perfect, in order to show with what design it was made. | |
From: William Paley (Natural Theology [1802], Ch 1) | |
A reaction: This encounters Hume's point that you will then have to infer that the designer contains similar imperfections. If you look at plagues, famines and mothers dying in childbirth (see Mill), you might wish the designer had never started. |
21278 | All the signs of design found in a watch are also found in nature [Paley] |
Full Idea: Every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature. | |
From: William Paley (Natural Theology [1802], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This is far from obvious. It was crucial to the watch analogy that we immediately see its one self-evident purpose. No one looks at nature and says 'Aha, I know what this is all for'. |
21357 | No organ shows purpose more obviously than the eyelid [Paley] |
Full Idea: The eyelid defends the eye; it wipes it; it closes it in sleep. Are there, in any work of art whatever, purposes more evident than those which this organ fulfils? | |
From: William Paley (Natural Theology [1802], p.24), quoted by Armand Marie LeRoi - The Lagoon: how Aristotle invented science 031 | |
A reaction: Nice to have another example, in addition to the watch. He is not wholly wrong, because it is impossible to give an evolutionary account of the development of the eyelid without referring to some sort of teleological aspect. The eyelid has a function. |