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All the ideas for 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic', 'Plural Quantification' and 'Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind'

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38 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy has its own mode of death, by separating soul from body [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: There is a double death. One, known by all men, consists in the separation of the body with the soul; the other, characteristic of philosophers, results in the separation of the soul from the body.
     From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn9 3)
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: The Geach-Kaplan sentence 'Some critics admire only one another' provably has no singular first-order paraphrase using only its predicates.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 1)
     A reaction: There seems to be a choice of either going second-order (picking out a property), or going plural (collectively quantifying), or maybe both.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: The defining features of a pure logic are its absolute generality (the objects of discourse are irrelevant), and its formality (logical truths depend on form, not matter), and its cognitive primacy (no extra-logical understanding is needed to grasp it).
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 3)
     A reaction: [compressed] This strikes me as very important. The above description seems to contain no ontological commitment at all, either to the existence of something, or to two things, or to numbers, or to a property. Pure logic seems to be 'if-thenism'.
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: Second-order quantification and plural quantification are generally regarded as different forms of quantification.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 2)
Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: The traditional view in analytic philosophy has been that all plural locutions should be paraphrased away by quantifying over sets, though Boolos and other objected that this is unnatural and unnecessary.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 5)
Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: Plural quantification can be used to eliminate the commitment of science and common sense to complex objects. We can use plural quantification over mereological atoms arranged tablewise or chairwise.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 4.5)
     A reaction: [He cites Hossack and van Ingwagen]
Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: Higher-order plural quantification (plural plurals) is often rejected because plural quantification is supposedly ontological innocent, with no plural things to be plural, and because it is not found in ordinary English.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 2.4)
     A reaction: [Summary; he cites Boolos as a notable rejector] Linnebo observes that Icelandic contains a word 'tvennir' which means 'two pairs of'.
Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: Plural quantification seems to offer ontological economy. We can pay the price of a mere first-order theory and then use plural quantification to get for free the corresponding monadic second-order theory, which would be an ontological bargain.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 4.4)
     A reaction: [He mentions Hellman's modal structuralism in mathematics]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: Some philosophers speak about a theory's 'ideological commitments' and not just about its 'ontological commitments'.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 5.4)
     A reaction: This is a third strategy for possibly evading one's ontological duty, along with fiddling with the words 'exist' or 'object'. An ideological commitment to something to which one is not actually ontologically committed conjures up stupidity and dogma.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: Maybe ordinary speakers aren't very concerned about their ontological commitments, and sometimes find it convenient to posit objects.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 2.4)
     A reaction: I think this is the whole truth about the ontological commitment of ordinary language. We bring abstraction under control by pretending it is a world of physical objects. The 'left wing' in politics, 'dark deeds', a 'huge difference'.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
The presence of the incorporeal is only known by certain kinds of disposition [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: Being everywhere and nowhere, the incorporeal, wherever it happens to be, betrays its presence only by a certain kind of disposition.
     From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 4Enn3 21(20))
     A reaction: There is a mystical or dualist view of fundamental powers, as the spiritual engine which drives passive physical nature. It's rubbish of course, but if powers are primitive in a naturalistic theory, it is not a view which can be refuted.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Diversity arises from the power of unity [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: Diversity is born of the development of the power of unity.
     From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 42)
     A reaction: I doubt whether even Porphyry understood this, but we might say that once the principle of unification enters into nature, it will inevitably result in diversity. One all-embracing unity would be indiscernible.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis]
     Full Idea: So-called 'Aristotelian essentialism' is the doctrine of essences not relative to specifications.
     From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], III)
     A reaction: In other words, they are so-called 'real essences', understood as de re. Quine says essences are all de dicto, and relative to some specification. I vote for Aristotle.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Just as a sentence is necessary if it holds in all worlds, so it is causally necessary if it holds in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature.
     From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], V)
     A reaction: I don't believe in the so-called 'laws of nature', so I'm not buying that. Is there no distinction in Lewis's view between those sentences which must hold, and those which happen to hold universally?
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Even if Humphrey is a modal continuant, it doesn't take the whole of him to do such things as winning.
     From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], Post B)
     A reaction: This responds to Kripke's famous example, that people only care about what happens to themselves, and not to some 'counterpart' of themselves.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
     Full Idea: Probably Humphrey could not care less whether someone else, no matter how much resembling him, would have been victorious in another possible world. Thus Lewis's view seems even more bizarre that the usual transworld identification it replaces.
     From: comment on David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968]) by Saul A. Kripke - Naming and Necessity notes and addenda note 13
     A reaction: I begin to see this as a devastating reply to a theory I previously found quite congenial.
Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Your counterparts resemble you closely in content and context in important respects. They resemble you more closely than do the other things in their worlds. But they are not really you.
     From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], I)
     A reaction: It is a dilemma. If my counterpart were exactly me, I couldn't contemplate possibly losing a leg, or my sanity. But if my counterpart isn't exactly me, then I don't have much interest in its fate. Only essences can save us here. Cf. me tomorrow.
If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
     Full Idea: If whatever thing in world w6 it is that resembles you more closely than anything else in w6 is nevertheless quite unlike you; nothing in w6 resembles you at all closely. If so, you have no counterpart in w6.
     From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], I)
     A reaction: This is the nub, because the whole theory rests on deciding whether two things resemble sufficiently 'closely'. But then we need a criterion of closeness, so we must start talking about which properties matter. Essences loom.
Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
     Full Idea: An essential attribute of something is an attribute it shares with all its counterparts.
     From: David Lewis (Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic [1968], III)
     A reaction: I don't like this. It ties essence entirely to identity, but I think essence precedes identity. Essence is a nexus of causal and explanatory powers which bestows an identity on each thing. But essence might be unstable, and identity with it.
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memory is not conserved images, but reproduction of previous thought [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: Memory does not consist in preserving images. It is a faculty of reproducing the conceptions with which our soul has been occupied.
     From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 5Enn6 25(2))
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Intelligence is aware of itself, so the intelligence is both the thinker and the thought [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: Since intelligence is intelligible for intelligence, intelligence is its own object. ...Intelligence, therefore, is simultaneously thinker and thought, all that thinks and all that is thought.
     From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 5Enn3 32(5-7))
     A reaction: This is a bit of a problem for Descartes, if the Cogito is taken as offering evidence (thought) for the existence of a thinker ('I'). Porphyry implies that the separation Descartes requires is impossible.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
The soul is everywhere and nowhere in the body, and must be its cause [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: The soul is neither a body, nor in the body, but is only the cause of the body, because she is simultaneously everywhere and nowhere in the body.
     From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 43)
     A reaction: This is the rather bewildering phenomenology of consciousness which persuaded Descartes of dualism.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Successful introspection reveals the substrate along with the object of thought [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: He who by thought can penetrate within his own substance, and can thus acquire knowledge of it, finds himself in this actualisation of knowledge and consciousness, where the substrate that knows is identical with the object that is known.
     From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 44)
     A reaction: It seems remarkably that this ability is confidently asserted by Porphyry, and flatly denied by Hume. Were they just different people, or were they looking for different things, or was one of them deluded?
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
The soul is bound to matter by the force of its own disposition [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: The individual soul, which declines towards matter, is bound to the matter by the form which her disposition has made her choose.
     From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn4 39)
     A reaction: This sounds like the soul is boss over the matter, and yet the soul is 'made' to choose union with matter. The Universal Soul is seen by Porphyr as the controller of the situation.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: The predicate 'is on the table' is 'distributive', since some things are on the table if each one is, whereas the predicate 'form a circle' is 'non-distributive', since it is not analytic that when some things form a circle, each one forms a circle.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 1.1)
     A reaction: The first predicate can have singular or plural subjects, but the second requires a plural subject? Hm. 'The rope forms a circle'. The second is example is not true, as well as not analytic.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Justice is each person fulfilling his function [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: Justice, as has been rightly said, consists in each one fulfilling his [authentic and proper] function.
     From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 44)
     A reaction: This is presumably a direct reference to the theory in Plato's 'Republic'. It makes the connection between virtue and function which I take to be basic to virtue theory, giving it a naturalistic advantaged over other theories.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
We should avoid the pleasures of love, or at least, should not enact our dreams [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: The pleasures of love will not even involuntarily be tasted, at least, she will not allow herself to be drawn beyond the lights of fancy that occur in dreams.
     From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.4)
     A reaction: Presumably erotic dreams are only tolerated because not much can be done about them. This brings out the puritanism of neo-platonism.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Civil virtues make us behave benevolently, and thereby unite citizens [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: The object of the civil virtues is to make us benevolent in our dealings with our fellow-human beings, and are so-called because they unite citizens.
     From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.1)
     A reaction: Modern commentators underestimate the close link between ancient virtue and citizenship. It is hard for one person to have much of a notion of virtue if they live on a desert island, beyond caring for personal health.
Civil virtues control the passions, and make us conform to our nature [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: The civil virtues moderate the passions; their object is to teach us to live in conformity with the laws of human nature.
     From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.2)
     A reaction: The link with human nature is basic to virtue theory, but this proposal is rather too vague. Are passions not part of the laws of human nature?
Purificatory virtues detach the soul completely from the passions [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: The object of the 'purificatory' virtues is to detach the soul completely from the passions.
     From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.4)
     A reaction: This is an aspect of virtue theory which doesn't appear in Aristotle. He is in favour of rational control of the passions, but not of totally abandoning them. The neo-platonists are much more puritanical. They seem to go against human nature.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
There are practical, purificatory, contemplative, and exemplary virtues [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: The practical virtues make man virtuous; the purificatory virtues make man divine....; the contemplative virtues defiy; while the exemplary virtues make a man the parent of divinities.
     From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn2 I.4)
     A reaction: I like the idea of the 'exemplary' virtues. I think an entire theory of morality could be built on the notion that we are all role-models for one another.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Unified real existence is neither great nor small, though greatness and smallness participate in it [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: By its identity and numerical unity, real existence is neither great nor small, neither very large nor very small, though it causes even greatest and smallest to participate in its nature.
     From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn4 37(5))
     A reaction: Note the platonic word 'participate' [metechein], suggesting that he is talking about the Form of Existence here. Note also that we have 'real' existence here, implying a lesser type of existence that participates in it.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
Time is the circular movement of the soul [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: It is the circular movement of the soul that constitutes time, just as the permanence of intelligence in itself constitutes eternity.
     From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 5Enn3 32(5-7))
     A reaction: Plato loved circles. If you think time is subjective, this is trying to express your intuition. Personally I think it is nonsense
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
Some think time is seen at rest, as well as in movement [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: Some have believed that time manifested in rest as well as in movement.
     From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 5Enn3 32(5-7))
     A reaction: If you like this idea, you should see Shoemaker's lovely three-worlds thought experiment.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God is nowhere, and hence everywhere [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: The divinity is everywhere because it is nowhere.
     From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 43)
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
Everything existing proceeds from divinity, and is within divinity [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: All things that possess or do not possess existence proceed from divinity, and are within divinity.
     From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn5 43)
     A reaction: Nice to see Porphyry endorsing Meinongian objects. I doubt whether he counts as a pantheist, but this is a very pantheistic remark.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
Nature binds or detaches body to soul, but soul itself joins and detaches soul from body [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: Nature binds the body to the soul, but it is the soul herself that has bound herself to the body. It, therefore, belongs to nature to detach the body from the soul, while it is the soul herself that detaches herself from the body.
     From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 1Enn9 2)
     A reaction: Baffling. What happens if there is a conflict? I suppose either party can cancel the bargain, but who wins when they disagree?
Individual souls are all connected, though distinct, and without dividing universal Soul [Porphyry]
     Full Idea: Individual souls are distinct without being separated from each other, and without dividing the universal Soul into a number of parts; they are united to each other without becoming confused.
     From: Porphyry (Launching Points to the Realm of the Mind [c.280], 6Enn4 39)
     A reaction: This sounds like Jung's theory that there is a universal subconscious which links us all together. Taken literally, I assume it is nonsense. As an invitation to acknowledge how much we all have in common, it is a nice corrective to liberal individualism.