Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Against 'Ostrich Nominalism'', 'Abstract Objects:intro to Axiomatic Metaphysics' and 'Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts'

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6 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality

8507	Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs [Armstrong]
	Full Idea: Some philosophers (like Devitt) think of reality as made up of things. Others, like me, think of it as made up of facts or states of affairs.
	From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §3)
	A reaction: Devitt is a follower of Quine on this. Personally I rather like 'processes'. Unanalysed things with predication (Quine) don't look promising. I currently favour things with active powers, which give rise to properties. See Shoemaker and Ellis.

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals

8506	Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong]
	Full Idea: I favour the Realist view that while we can distinguish the particularity of a particular from its properties, but the two 'factors' are too intimately together to speak of a relation between them.
	From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §3)
	A reaction: Is Armstrong being a bit of an ostrich here? We could talk of part-whole relationships, or internal relations, or set membership, or coinciding objects, or bundles. We certainly ought to have a go. Armstrong approaches Quine here!

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism

8505	Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong]
	Full Idea: A philosophical account of a general sort is required of what it is for different tokens to be of the same type. To refuse to give such an account is to be a metaphysical ostrich.
	From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §1)
	A reaction: This defines Ostrich Nominalism (a label Armstrong aims at Quine). I certainly sympathise with Armstrong. If there is no more to a class (a type) than just having members (tokens), nothing is explain. What is natural, essential, intensional etc.?

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta

10414	Abstract objects are constituted by encoded collections of properties [Zalta, by Swoyer]
	Full Idea: In Zalta's view abstract objects are correlated with collections of properties. ..They encode, as well as exemplify, properties; indeed, an abstract object (such as a Euclidean triangle) is constituted by the properties it encodes.
	From: report of Edward N. Zalta (Abstract Objects:intro to Axiomatic Metaphysics [1983]) by Chris Swoyer - Properties 6.3
	A reaction: If we are going to explain abstract objects with properties, then properties had better not be abstract objects. Zalta has a promising idea if we start from a nominalist and naturalistic view of properties (built from physical powers). 'Encode'?

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta

10415	Properties make round squares and round triangles distinct, unlike exemplification [Zalta, by Swoyer]
	Full Idea: On Zalta's view, properties with the same encoding extensions are identical, but may be distinct with the same exemplification extension. So the properties of being a round square and a round triangle are distinct, but with the same exemplification.
	From: report of Edward N. Zalta (Abstract Objects:intro to Axiomatic Metaphysics [1983]) by Chris Swoyer - Properties
	A reaction: (For Zalta's view, see Idea 10414) I'm not sure about 'encoding' (cf. Hodes's use of the word), but the idea that an abstract object is just a bunch of possible properties (assuming properties have prior availability) seems promising.

18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files

16369	There is a single file per object, memorised, reactivated, consolidated and expanded [Papineau, by Recanati]
	Full Idea: For Papineau there is just one file, which is initialised on the first encounter with the object, stored in memory, reactivated on further encounters, and consolidated with familiarity. Accumulation of information shows it is the same file.
	From: report of David Papineau (Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts [2006]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 7.2
	A reaction: Recanati attempts to refute this view, defending a more complex taxonomy of files. I'm sympathetic to Papineau, as distinct shift in file type doesn't sound very plausible. Simplicity suggests Papineau as a better starting-point.